iSTUDlES IN 




STUDIES IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 



By 

GEORGE W. NEET 

Professor of Education 

University of Valparaiso 

Valparaiso, Indiana 



THE M. E. BOGARTE BOOK COMPANY 

Publishers 

1914 



SN 



^^'V 



COPYRIGHTED 1914 
GEORGE W. NEET 



JULr2 «9I4 

©CI.A374640 
^7 



PREFACE 

These studies in psychology are intended primarily 
for use in the author's own classes. As the title implies 
they are in no sense complete. Every teacher of psychology 
has doubtless felt the need of having some of the essential 
truths of psychology presented in a teachable form. It is 
the hope of supplying this need in the writer's own classes 
that prompts to the present little volume. 

A second thought is to give students a general idea 
of the organization of psychology, and a comprehension 
of its organizing principle to the end that an intensive 
study of any particular aspect of the subject may be seen 
in its proper relation to the science as a whole. 

An attempt has been made to analyze knowing into 
its stages of development in order to reveal the function of 
analysis and synthesis in the organization of the various 
truths which make up the subject of psychology. 

G. W. N. 



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in 2011 with funding from 
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CONTENTS 



Chapter Page 

I. Nature, Subject-Matter and Method of Psychology 11 

II. Units of Investigation . ^ 24 

III. The Nervous System 38' 

IV. Activity 50 

V. Mind and Body 59^ 

VI. Mental Attributes and Consciousness 73 

VII. Attention 86^ 

VIII. Apperception, Self-Activity, Iterativeness, 

Rhythm 102 

IX. Mental Activities 112; 

X. The Sensation 127 

XI. The Senses 137 

XII. Sense-Perception 156^ 

XIII. Memory 185 

XIV. Imagination 225 

XV. Conception 250 

XVI. Definition 267 

XVII. Judgment 279^ 

XVIII. Reasoning 292 

XIX. Systematization 303 

XX. Intuition, Instinct, Animal Intelligence 312 

Index 324. 



CHAPTER I. 

Nature, Subject-Matter and Method of 
Psychology. 

The Meaning of Science. — Every one who has lived 
very long among people has some knowledge of plant life, 
of animal life and of the mind. This knowledge he has 
picked up here and there by experience; by his own 
experience and by hearsay from others. An examination 
of this knowledge shows that it exists in bits, scraps and 
fragments; that it consists of truth mixed with error; 
that is, it is not very accurate; and that it is not very 
extensive, and so not complete. Such knowledge, un- 
systematic, mixed with error, and incomplete is called 
common, or ordinary, knowledge. Knowledge which is 
systematic and accurate may be developed from common 
knowledge by experiment, observation and thinking; 
that is, scientific knowledge may be developed from com- 
mon knowledge by experiment, observation and thinking. 
Such knowledge is science, and the following is the 
formal definition of it: 

Science is systematic and accurate knowledge which 
results from common knowledge. It appears that science 
is a product of the mind. It results from the mind's 



12 Studies in Psychology 

activity. It is a mental thing and has no existence out- 
side of the mind. 

It is a mistake to think, for instance, that botany 
as a science has existed as long as plant life has existed. 
Botany has existed only since humanity has learned the 
truths of plant life, has made them into a system, ac- 
curate and more or less complete. Plant life is thus 
many, many years older than botany. 

Science is not only the product of one mind but, as 
we know it, it is the product of many minds, a sort of 
accumulated product of the mind of humanity. 

The Presupposition of Science. — Science is based 
upon the presupposition that the human mind acts uni- 
formly; that is, that under the same conditions, one per- 
son's mind acts in general as other persons' minds act; 
also, that one person's mind acts at one time in general 
as it acts at other times under the same conditions. If 
such were not the case we would seem to live in a world 
of chaos in which no order of any kind could be found. 

Illustration. — ^When ten persons look at snow it ap- 
pears white to each one; also, if one person looks at 
snow ten different times, it looks white to him each time. 
That is to say, the mind acts uniformly to this stimulus, 
and only this enables us to establish the truth that snow 
is white. If to one it appeared white ; to a second, green ; 
to a third one red, and so on, or to one at one time, white ; 
a second time, green, a third time red, and so on, the 
truth that snow is white could never be established. And 
this would be because the mind did not act uniformly. 

Mental Phenomena. — If one will turn his mind in- 



Studies in Psychology 13 

ward and notice what his own mind does, about the first 
thing which he will discover is that his mind changes. 
Now he finds his mind thinking, for instance about gram- 
mar, and at another time he finds his mind thinking 
about history; now, about religion, at another time, 
about politics ; now about music, at another time, about 
poetry. At one time he finds his mind happy ; at another 
time he finds his mind sad. The only way one can 
think of his mind's heing in these different conditions at 
different times is that his mind changes. One knows his 
mind changes, if he can know anything and there is 
nothing which one can know better than that his mind 
changes. Indeed, if one studies carefully enough, he 
will discover that there is nothing else which one can 
know quite so well as that his mind changes. These 
changes of the mind psychologists call mental phenom- 
eria. A change is a phenomenon, and a mental change 
is a mental phenomenon. Other terms frequently used 
interchangeably with phenomenon are activity and ex- 
perience. "We thus reach the following statement: 

A mental phenomenon is a mental change, or activ- 
ity, of any kind. 

The term, phenomenon, has a first and a second 
meaning. The first meaning is the meaning explained 
above. The second meaning is the popular meaning. 
The popular meaning is that a phenomenon is something 
marvelous, startling and unusual. 

Physical Phenomena. — Any physical thing is a 
thing which occupies space, such as wood, a book, a 
horse, or one's body. Or a more fundamental way of 



14 Studies in Psychology 

thinking of it is, a physical thing is anything which 
makes possible sensations of resistance; as, a stone, wa- 
ter, ice, iron, etc. If one observes physical things he 
soon discovers that they change. He can know that 
physical things change as well as he can know anjrthing 
except that his mind changes. That his mind changes he 
knows best of all things. It is the one thing which can 
not be disproved to him. 

That which enables one to know that physical 
things change is that they are known to be in different 
positions and conditions at different times, and the only 
explanation for this is that they change. 

The human body occupies space, so is a physical 
thing. It is observed in different conditions and posi- 
tions at different times, so is known to change. These 
changes of the body are physical changes, or physical 
phenomena. 

A truth of a good deal of importance in psychology 
about mental phenomena is that all mental phenomena 
are accompanied by physical phenomena. Sometimes 
the physical phenomena seem to precede the mental phe- 
nomena, and sometimes the mental seem to precede the 
physical, and sometimes they seem to be simultaneous. 
But, in any case, so far as is known, there is never a 
mental phenomenon but there is in some way connected 
with it a physical phenomenon. They are said to be 
parallel, or they are said to correspond ; that is they are 
corresponding mental and physical phenomena. 

No one whose opinion would carry any influence 
among scientists would claim to know ultimately what 



Studies in Psychology 15 

the mind is, nor can any one study the mind directly. 
But no one knows ultimately what electricity is; no one 
knows what light is ultimately, nor what gravitation is. 
We do know, though, how they act or change; that is, 
we know their phenomena and such knowledge is very 
valuable to us. We need not be discouraged that we 
cannot know or study the mind directly, for we can 
study and know its phenomena and that is as much as 
we can study and know of anything. 

The science which deals with the phenomena of the 
mind and the parallel, or corresponding phenomena of 
some part or parts of the body is psychology. 

Every science deals predominantly with general 
truths or laws; that is, truths which are true of many 
cases. Psychology deals essentially with the laws of 
mental and physical phenomena, truths which are true 
of many minds. This when put in the form of a defini- 
tion is as follows: 

Psychology is the science which treats of the laws 
of mental phenomena together with their corresponding 
physical phenomena. 

Psychology is sometimes defined as the science of the 
mind. While this definition is in a general way true, it 
is not very helpful. It does not show specifically what 
the subject is, and rather implies that the mind may be 
studied directly, which is not the case. The two objec- 
tions to the definition are (1) it is too general, and (2) 
it is misleading. 

The word, psychology, is derived from the two 
Greek words, psyche, meaning mind, or soul, and logos, 



16 Studies in Psychology 

meaning thought or knowledge. Thus literally psychol- 
ogy is knowledge of soul or mind. 

The terms, mind, soul and spirit are used inter- 
changeably by psychologists. Popularly there may be 
some distinctions in the meanings of these terms and 
theologians may sometimes make distinctions in their 
meaning, but such distinctions are not observed in psy- 
chology. 

Subject-Matter of Psychology. — In the mastery of 
any branch of science various points of truth must be 
studied and learned. These truths are usually called 
facts. Also in mastering any science the connections, or 
relations, among the facts in the science must be studied 
and learned. That is to say, in the mastery of any sci- 
ence or branch of science the facts and their relations 
must be learned. These facts and relations constitute 
the subject-matter of any science or subject. And thus 
the following statements of subject-matter are reached: 

A suhject-matter of any subject is the facts and re- 
lations to he learned in that subject. 

A subject-matter is the material of study in any 
subject. 

In the subject-matter of psychology there are in 
general two points to be found, as follows: 

1. Mental phenomena. 

2. Corresponding physical phenomena. 

In physiology, physical phenomena are studied as 
well as in psychology. But physiology is not psychol- 
ogy. Not so many physical phenomena are studied in 
psychology as in physiology. For instance, circulation, 



Studies in Psychology 17 

respiration, and digestion are studied carefully in phys- 
iology, but they are hardly studied at all in psychology. 

And again the physical phenomena are studied in 
psychology in different connections from what they are 
studied in, in physiology. In psychology the physical 
phenomena are studied in connection with mental phe- 
nomena, in so far as they affect and in turn are affected 
by the mental phenomena. In physiology physical phe- 
nomena are studied in relation to organic structure in 
the economy of the life of the individual and species. 

In short in psychology we study physical phenom- 
ena in order to understand psychology; in physiology, 
in order to understand physiology. 

The Methods of Psychology. — The question in this 
connection is. In what manner may the mind study psy- 
chology? That is to say, how may the mind learn, clas- 
sify and explain the facts of psychology? 

There are in general the four following methods of 
studying psychology worthy of consideration: 

1. The Introspective method. 

2. The Experimental method. 

3. The Comparative method. 

4. The Objective method. 

The Introspective Method. — The introspective meth- 
od is the most fundamental method of psychology and 
is the process of studying psychology by means of in- 
trospection. The term, introspection, comes from intro, 
meaning within and spicere, meaning to look. The ion 
in the word signifies the act of. Introspection thus is 
literally the act of looking within. 



18 Studies in Psychology 

We learn the physical phenomena around us in the 
world through our senses ; through sight, hearing, touch, 
taste, etc. We thus learn that objects move, lightning, 
thunder, the fragrance of the rose and the aroma of the 
fruit. But we can not learn the phenomena of the mind 
in this way. These must be learned by having the mind 
to look into itself. We can turn our minds in upon 
themselves and have them learn their own phenomena. 
We can study our wishes, our hopes, our motives, our 
thoughts and our feelings. The process of thus looking 
within with the mind's eye is introspection. And thus 
the following formal statement for it is reached : 

Introspection is the process by which the mind 
directly learns its own phenomena. 

Introspection is also called internal perception. 

Difficulties of Introspection. — There are two difficul- 
ties for the beginner in psychology in studying by the 
introspective method. 

1. It is hard for those who have been used to 
studying objects learned through the senses to turn 
their minds to intangible, spiritual things and study 
them. 

2. If one turns his mind upon a mental phenome- 
non, a thought or a feeling, to study it, it soon disappears 
and he has only the memory of it to study. 

The things in our minds which we know through 
introspection are objects just as truly as the things we 
touch, see, hear, etc. But so accustomed do we become 
to thinking of only the things which we can know 
through our senses as objects that it is difficult at first 



Studies in Psychology 19 

for us to see that mental phenomena are objects, also. 
So since it is difficult to think of mental phenomena at 
all, it is of course much more difficult to observe, learn, 
classify and explain them accurately. 

It is one thing to have the idea of a tree or the feel- 
ing of sorrow, but an entirely different thing to study 
it. Soon after the mind is turned in to study its ideas or 
feelings they disappear and only the memory of them 
remains to be examined. They, therefore, get away al- 
most before one gets a good look at them. 

But though the introspective method does have its 
two difficulties, it is entirely necessary to the study of 
psychology. Without introspection no one could ever 
be made to understand mental phenomena. No one can 
understand anger or pain unless he himself has been 
angry or in pain and he can know his own anger or pain 
only through introspection. 

Psychology therefore must be studied by the intro- 
spective method. 

The Experimental Method. — We can experiment 
with plants directly in the study of botany ; with animals 
directly in the study of zoology; with chemicals in the 
study of chemistry or with matter directly in the study 
of physics, but not with mental phenomena directly in 
the study of psychology. Yet there is such a thing as 
the experimental method of studying psychology. We 
can experiment with the mind indirectly by experiment- 
ing with the body, the connection between them being so 
close, that producing certain bodily conditions induces 
certain mental conditions; also, producing certain men- 



20 Studies in Psychology 

tal conditions induces certain bodily conditions. These 
connections of the mind with the body, that is, the 
mind^s connections with the nervous system, eyes, ears, 
muscles, etc. can be experimented with, and thus mental 
phenomena changed and studied. 

"While experiment is only a means of increasing 
the accuracy of observation and introspection, it has 
through its wide application made possible important 
advances in nearly every field of psychology. To its 
great benefit psychology has become an experimental 
science. ' ' 

The study of the mind in connection with the body 
and the outside world by the experimental method gives 
rise to Physiological Psychology and Psychophysics. 

The study of mental phenomena wholly by the in- 
trospective method gives rise to Introspective Psychol- 
ogy; that is, psychology so far as it can be learned 
through introspection. 

The Comparative Method. — Psychology deals with 
any kind of mental phenomena, but it predominantly 
deals with the normal adult human mind. Help however 
comes to the student of psychology from comparing the 
phenomena of the normal adult human mind with phe- 
nomena of other minds. The phenomena of the normal 
adult mind may be compared with the phenomena of the 
minds of the following: 

1. Lower animals. 

2. Children in various stages of development. 

3. Persons with defective or disordered minds. 
The study of psychology through such comparing is 



Studies in Psychology 21 

by the comparative method, and gives rise to Compara- 
tive Psychology, which is divided into (1) Animal Psy- 
chology; (2) Child Psychology, and (3) Abnormal Psy- 
chology. 

"Those phases of psychology which touch particu- 
larly upon the phenomena of development, whether ra- 
cial or individual, are spoken of as genetic psychology. ' * 

The Objective Method. — The mind by its activities 
produces results in the outside world. These are called 
objective results. The student can study these objective 
results of the mind and learn much about it in a way 
similar to his learning much about electricity by study- 
ing the results it produces. These objective results are 
fixed, certain and definite signs to us of the way the 
mind works. Some of these results are said to be : 

1. Language and science. 

2. Institutions of civilization. 

3. Artistic creations. 

4. Philosophy and religion. 

Studying mental phenomena by means of these ob- 
jective manifestations is by the objective method. 

Necessity of Introspection. — It matters not by what 
method we study mental phenomena we are able to un- 
derstand them only by referring them to our own mental 
experiences and this we can do only by introspection. 
The student of psychology can make no progress what- 
ever in its study without introspection. No one who had 
never experienced a sensation could be made to under- 
stand what a sensation is. The man who had always 



22 Studies in Psychology 

been blind thought scarlet must resemble the sound of a 
trumpet. 

The introspective method of psychology is thus the 
most fundamental method, and introspective psychology 
is the most fundamental kind of psychology. 

The Nature of the Mind. — The persistent question 
always asked the student of psychology either by himself 
or by some one else and never very satisfactorily an- 
swered is What is the mind? It is popular to say that this 
question can not be answered, discuss why it can not be 
answered and let it go at that. However, this question 
is no more unanswerable than the questions. What is 
electricity ? or What is matter ? And there is no help in 
the popular evasion from trying to answer it. 

The writer has studied every reason which he has 
had opportunity to study in support of the contention 
that the mind can not be defined, and not one seems 
good. To the author it seems that a definition for the 
mind may be formed which will not violate any law of 
logical definition ; at any rate, not more than the gener- 
ally accepted definition of a triangle or of a noun vio- 
lates the laws of logical definition. 

Every student who thinks soon learns that the most 
persistent thing in the world in which he lives is force 
or energy; that is, that which will do work. Force does 
all the work done in the world of any kind whatever. 
Force working in various ways which the mind can in 
any way know we call various things. Force manifests 
itself in one way and it is called electricity; in another 
way and it is called heat ; in another way and it is called 



Studies in Psychology 25 

gravitation; in another way and it is called a tree; in 
another way and it is called a mullen stalk ; in another 
way and it is called a horse; in another way and it is 
called a star, and in another way and it is called mind. 
But the form in which the force which we call the mind 
manifests itself is consciousness. Something is known of 
consciousness by every one who studies psychology. This 
knowledge is obtained by comparing consciousness with 
unconsciousness as manifested in self and in others. 

From the above expressed thought the following 
definition of mind is reached : 

The mind is that force which manifests itself in the 
phenomena of consciousness. 

It is not supposed this definition will be fully ap- 
preciated by the student who is a beginner in psychology 
nor by those who are through prejudice antagonistic to 
thinking of mind as force. But it gives some definiteness 
to the idea of what mind is, and it is believed that fur- 
ther study of psychology will contribute to the apprecia- 
tion of the view, and to the realization of the help in the 
definition. 

Read the following: 

1. Angell's Psychology, pp. 1 to 7. 

2. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 1 to 10. 

3. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 6 to 13. 



CHAPTER 11. 
The Units of Investigation. 

Meaning of Unit of Investigation. — The subject of 
psychology is a science, and has resulted from the fact 
that the human mind is dissatisfied with common, or 
ordinary, knowledge and abhors vagueness. In its ef- 
fort to develop science from ordinary knowledge it be- 
gins by stripping away from the subject of study all ir- 
relevant, accidental and occasional facts, seeking the 
elemental, simple and persistent. In this process it 
reaches the most elementary, simplest and persistent 
form of the subject-matter, and this is the unit of inves- 
tigation. The following is the formal statement for it : 

The unit of investigation in any science is the sim- 
plest, most elementary, and most persistent form of its 
subject-matter. That is to say, it is the simplest, most 
elementary, and most persistent whole thing with which 
the science deals. 

Each science has its unit of investigation. The 
chemist knows that his science is primarily concerned 
with the element: namely, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, 
calcium, sodium, chlorine, nitrogen, etc. He studies 
their number, qualities, atomic weights, combinations 
and products. The element thus is the unit of investiga- 
tion in chemistry. 

The botanist has found that his unit of investigation 



Studies in Psychology 25- 

is the organic vegetable cell. He studies its structure,, 
development, combinations and products. 

The zoologist has found that his unit of investigation- 
is the organic animal cell. He studies its structure, de- 
velopment, combinations and products. 

The science of psychology differs somewhat from- 
other sciences with regard to its unit of investigation. 
Other sciences have but one unit, psychology has two. 
This is because of the distinct divisions in the subject- 
matter of psychology: first, the mental phenomena, and 
secondly, the corresponding physical phenomena. 

The unit of investigation in the study of mental 
phenomena is the sensation. The unit of investigation 
in the study of physical phenomena is the nerve cell. 

How the Unit May Be Studied. — The psychologist 
may study his unit of investigation in psychology in 
four ways. 

His first task is to observe it so that he may know 
what it is ; that is, that he may know its nature ; that he 
may identify it so that he may be able to think about it 
in some definite way. 

His second task is to find out how it behaves itself ; 
how it acts; what its processes are when subjected to a 
variety of stimuli under various conditions. 

His third task is to find out what new products or 
combinations are brought into being as a result of the 
activities or processes of the unit of investigation. 

The psychologist 's fourth task is to discover, formu- 
late, state and learn the laws and principles governing 
the activities of both the sensation and nerve cell. 



26 Studies in Psychology 

The Nerve Cell. — The nerve cell is a small body of 
nucleated grayish white matter, nervous matter, includ- 
ing any thread-like extensions reaching from it. Both 
central body and the thread-like extensions are parts of 
the nerve cell ; that is, when there are extensions. Some 
undeveloped cells have no extensions. The extensions 
.are of the same kind of material as the central body and 
are continuous with it. It is sometimes thought that 
just the central body is the nerve cell, and that the ex- 
tensions from it are not parts of the cell. But this is 
wrong. It takes both the central body and the extensions 
to make the nerve cell. Nerve cells consisting thus of 
the central body and the extensions are called neurones 
by students of the nervous system. 

Forms of Neurones. — ^Neurones are of various 
forms. The central body may be spherical, cylindrical, 
pyramidal, or caudate, and all are more or less irregular. 
All neurones of course have the thread-like extensions. 
There are mere germ cells which have no extensions from 
them. They are, so to speak, undeveloped, or baby, 
cells. They are called neuroblasts. 

Material of Nerve Cells. — ^Nerve cells are composed 
of a granular, viscid substance usually called proto- 
plasm. Protoplasm is a living substance. Vitality is 
one of its necessary characteristics. There is no such 
thing as dead protoplasm. Its exact chemical composi- 
tion is unknown, though it is known to be complex to a 
high degree. Its main characteristics are vitality, ab- 
sorption, secretion, and excretion. That is to say, it is 



Studies in Psychology 27 

living, it takes outside substances into itself, it gives out 
useful juices, and throws off waste products. 

Nerve Fibers. — Nerve fibers are parts of nerve cells, 
the extensions, or prolongations, leading off from the 
central bodies. They are too small to be seen with the 
naked eye, but vary much in both diameter and length. 
Some are as large as one twelve hundredth of an inch 
in diameter, and some are no larger than one one hundred 
thousandth of an inch in diameter. They vary in size 
between these two extremes. They have a branching 
structure and vary in length from a part of an inch to 
several feet. 

There are in general two kinds of nerve fibers : those 
which carry impulses toward nerve centers and those 
which carry impulses away from nerve centers. Those 
of the first kind are called afferent nerve fibers and those 
of the second kind efferent nerve fibers. 

The derivation of these words helps in remember- 
ing their meaning. Afferent is from ad meaning tOj and 
ferre, to carry. Afferent nerve fibers are thus carrying 
to nerve fibers. Efferent is from ex meaning from, and 
ferre, to carry. Efferent nerve fibers are thus carrying 
from nerve fibers. 

Sensory and motor are terms which mean nearly 
the same as afferent and efferent when applied 
to nerve fibers, but not quite the same. Sensory 
and motor are not quite as broad terms as afferent and 
efferent. Nerve fibers which carry impulses to nerve 
centers which do not result in consciousness are af- 



28 Studies in Psychology 

ferent nerve fibers, but not sensory. To be sensory the 
fibers must carry impulses which result in consciousness. 

The fibers carrying impulses from the iris of the eye 
to the brain are afferent, but not sensory. 

Nerve fibers carrying impulses from their nerve 
centers which do not result in muscular action are effer- 
ent, but not motor. Such are the fibers carrying im- 
pulses from centers to the liver, resulting in the secre- 
tion of the bile. 

The function of nerve fibers is to carry impulses 
to unify the action of the nervous system. By means of 
the nerve fibers thus the touch corpuscles in the toes are 
in communication with the nerve centers in the highest 
part of the brain. 

Number of Nerve Cells. — The number of nerve cells 
in the human body is so great that one can form no ade- 
quate idea of them. It is estimated that there are as 
many as ten thousand millions in the brain and spinal 
cord. At any rate it is certain that every one has many 
millions which remain unused and so never develop. 

' ' Our picture of the nervous system is of a mass of 
ten thousand millions or so of these minute organisms en- 
closed within a bony case, the skull and spinal column." 

It is well known that cells increase in number by 
cell division. Nerve cells increase in number in this 
way early in the life of the human being, but this in- 
crease ceases before birth. There is no increase in the 
number of nerve cells in the human body after birth. 
Not one of us has a nerve cell more than he had when 



Studies in Psychology 29 

he was born. Some of us may have fewer, but none has 
more. 

Connections among Nerve Cells. — Contrary to pop- 
ular belief, no two nerve cells in the human body have a 
continuous nervous connection. Each nerve cell is a 
distinct and separate thing. There is no extension from 
any nerve cell which is continuous with any extension 
from any other nerve cell. Each neurone is thus ana- 
tomically independent. No connection of continuity 
exists between the neurones. 

How then are nerve cells connected? Very much 
in the same way as the branches of two trees growing 
side by side are connected, or in the same way as the 
roots of an elm tree are connected with the roots of an 
oak growing adjacent. This connection is a connection 
of contact. Neurones thus have connections of contact, 
but not connections of continuity. 

Classes of Neurones. — The classes of neurones are 
(1) sensory; (2) motor, (3) associating. **The sensory 
are receiving neurones; the motor send impressions out 
to the muscles, while the associating neurones serve to 
bring sensory and motor neurones into connection. As 
the sensory neurones always lead toward the center, they 
are sometimes called centripetal or afferent, and for a 
similar reason the motor neurones are the centrifugal or 
efferent elements." The associating neurones are in a 
way located between the sensory and motor neurones 
furnishing pathways for impulses between them. 

Axones and Dendrons. — It has previously been seen 



30 Studies in Psychology 

that developed nerve cells consist partly of extensions, 
or prolongations, from the central body. 

''These are of two kinds, (1) the axone, a fiber hav- 
ing the quality of conductivity and becoming what we 
have called the axis cylinder of a simple nerve, or nerve 
fiber; (2) the dendron, which divides into finer branches 
or rootlets, called dendrites. Their functions are some- 
what uncertain, including possibly that of nutrition in 
the service of the cell body, but probably that of con- 
ductivity also.'' 

^'Axones. — The axones have a branching structure 
and vary greatly in length, from a fraction of an inch 
up to two or three feet, according to location and use. 
They often branch greatly, throwing off side branches 
called laterals, which branch again in turn. They usual- 
ly terminate in little tufts resembling the fingers of a 
hand, or the rootlets of a plant, and known as the arbori- 
zation of the axone. The arborization of one axone may, 
in appearance, clasp or encompass the cell body of an- 
other neurone, or the arborization of one axone may in- 
terlace with the dendrites of another, and thus effect 
communication with it by a process thought to be simi- 
lar to that of electrical induction." 

"The neurone consists of a cell body and two sorts 
of prolongations or processes, the axone or axis cylinder, 
and the dendrites. The axone is a long hairlike exten- 
sion that may reach more than half the length of the 
body. Most nerves in the periphery of the body are 
groups of axones. The axone ordinarily terminates in a 
mass of tree-like branches called the end-brush. The 



Studies in Psychology 31 

dendrites are similar to the end-brush. They are made 
up of a number of branches of the cell protoplasm and 
are usually relatively short. The end-brush of one cell 
is ordinarily in contact with, or very near, the dendrites 
of other cells. The two together are sometimes called the 
arborization of the cells. The points of contact are also 
designated the synapses." 

The Sensation. — -It will be remembered that the sen- 
sation is the unit of investigation in psychology from 
the mental phenomena side of the science. 

When the end organ of any sensory nerve fiber is 
stimulated, it arouses a disturbance there; this disturb- 
ance extends along the nerve fibers until it reaches the 
brain and causes a disturbance there which in some way 
arouses a state of consciousness, if the disturbance is 
great enough. This state of consciousness is what psy- 
chologists call the sensation. The awareness of cold, 
heat, pressure, color, and noise are states of conscious- 
ness which are sensations. 

Steps Leading to. — The steps leading to the sensa- 
tion are partly physical and partly mental, and are as 
follows : 

1. External stimulus. 

2. Excitation of outer nerve ending. 

3. Transmission of the impulse. 

4. Disturbance in the brain. 

5. Corresponding disturbance in the mind. 

6. The resulting state of consciousness, the sensa- 
tion. 

Illustration. — If one should place his hand on a hot 



32 Studies in Psychology 

stove, the motion in the particles of the stove — the stim- 
ulus — would cause a disturbance in the ends of the 
nerves in the hand which would extend along the nerve 
fibers and arouse a disturbance in the brain. Then there 
would be a corresponding disturbance in the mind from 
which would result the pain, the state of consciousness — 
the sensation. 

Or again, if a gun were fired, the motion in the air 
would disturb the ends of the nerve fibers in the ears, 
which disturbance would extend along the nerve fibers 
and disturb the brain. Then there would be the corres- 
ponding disturbance in the mind from which would re- 
sult the sound, the state of consciousness, the sensation. 

External Stimulus. — In the two illustrations given 
above that which disturbs the outer end of the nerve 
fibers is motion. In the first instance it is motion in the 
particles of the stove and in the second instance it is 
motion in the air. A careful analysis of various kinds 
of stimuli will reveal the truth that stimulus is always 
some kind of motion. 

The following from Mr. Dewey helps here: ''But 
numerous as seem the various ways in which external 
bodies may affect us it is found that these various modes 
are reducible to one — motion. Whether a body is far or 
near, the only way in which it affects the organism is 
through motion. The motion may be of the whole mass, 
as when something hits us ; it may be in the inner parti- 
cles of the thing, as when we taste or smell it ; it may be 
a movement originated by the body and propagated to 
us through the vibrations of a medium, as when we see 



Studies in" Psychology 33 

or hear. But some form of motion there must be. An 
absolutely motionless body would not give rise to any 
affection of the body such as ultimately results in sen- 
sation. ' ' 

But there may be much motion in the world about 
us that is not stimulus to us. That motion may be stim- 
ulus it must come in contact with some part of the ner- 
vous system. A statement for stimulus may be as fol- 
lows : 

Stimulus is any motion which comes into contact 
with any part of the nervous system. 

While stimulus is most frequently external to the 
body, it is not necessarily so. But it is always as used 
in this connection external to the mind. 

Excitation of Outer Nerve Ending. — Most of the 
sensory nerves have specialized outer, or peripheral 
nerve endings. The retina of the eye; the touch cor- 
puscles, the taste buds, etc. are the specialized ends of 
nerve fibers. Motion coming in contact with these 
arouses them to a state of motion, disturbance, or vibra- 
tion. It is this disturbance which is known as the excita- 
tion of the peripheral nerve ending. 

This disturbance gives the impulse a strong initia- 
tive and sends it forward with greater force than it 
would otherwise have. 

Transmission of the Impulse. — The disturbance 
in the peripheral nerve ending extends along the nerve 
fiber to the nerve center, the brain, and this is known 
as the transmission of the impulse. 

But what is the thing which is known as an impulse ? 



34 Studies in Psychology 

Mr. Dewey says it is an excess of energy or a surplus of 
force. A surplus of force always produces motion. So 
the impulse always produces motion. The nerve fiber 
may be thought of as made up of very small particles 
in contact with each other. Stimulus disturbs the end 
particles which disturb those in contact with them, those 
disturbing the next and so on. The motion of each par- 
ticle is produced by the excess of energy transferred to 
it by motion. In a similar way a nerve center may 
possess an excess of energy, or force, and motion results. 
All motion in the world is the result of impulse, or of 
an excess of energy, or force. The ultimate source of 
all impulses in so far as our system is concerned is the 
sun. 

As the impulse passes along the nerve fiber a chem- 
ical change occurs in addition to the physical change. 
It seems to be the spreading of the process of oxidation. 
Mr. Pillsbury says : * * Our picture of the propagation of 
an excitation through a neurone is that it corresponds to 
the spread of chemical processes through its substance 
in very much the same way that a spark runs along a 
train of gunpowder." 

Bate of Transmission. — It used to be thought that 
the impulse was an electrical current passing along the 
nerve fiber as if the fiber were a wire. But now since 
the rate of nervous impulse has been measured, it is 
known to be much too slow for an electrical current. The 
nervous impulse travels about 110 ft. per second, while 
an electrical current travels about 186,000 miles per sec- 
ond. The rate of nervous impulse varies, but 110 ft. 



Studies in Psychology 35 

per second is perhaps an approximate average. One hun- 
dred and ten feet per second is seventy-five miles per 
hour. So nervous impulses travel along a nerve fiber as 
fast as a train with a speed of seventy-five miles per 
hour. 

* * A sensory nerve conducts a message at the average 
rate of 111 feet per second. If a man had an arm 111 
feet long, one second would elapse from the time his 
finger was pricked before he felt the pain. ' ' 

''If a man had an arm sufficiently long to plunge 
into the sun's vaporous metal, 140 years would roU by 
before he felt any pain. In other words he would die 
before he knew his hand was burned. A motor nerve 
also transmits a command from the brain to the muscle 
at the rate of 111 feet per second. Suppose an orange 
tree ninety-three millions of miles in height; and the 
hand on an arm of that length already lying on a bough 
one foot from a desired orange. The mind issues a com- 
mand to grasp the fruit. This order would reach the 
hand in 140 years, and not until then would the hand 
grasp the fruit." 

Disturhance in Brain. — The impulse reaches the 
brain and arouses a disturbance there. This disturbance 
may be small or great depending upon the degree of 
nervous tension at the time, and the force of the impulse. 
Sometimes it is almost like dropping a spark into a box 
of tinder or into a quantity of gunpowder. 

Corresponding Mental Disturbance. — Just how the 
disturbance in the brain occasions a mental disturbance 
no one knows. But that a corresponding mental disturb- 



36 Studies in Psychology 

ance occurs is well known. Introspection shows this and 
it is also inferred from the observation of others. One 
knows that a loud noise or a bright light has in close 
connection with it a mental disturbance. And he knows 
this in his own life as well as he can know anything 
whatever. Psychologists say that the exact nature of 
the connection between the brain disturbance a*nd the 
corresponding mental disturbance is unaccountable, un- 
thinkable, and incomprehensible. 

The State of Consciousness y the Sensation. — The 
sensation itself is a purely mental thing, not part mental 
and part physical, and not physical, but always wholly 
mental. It is consciousness resulting from a mental dis- 
turbance corresponding to a disturbance in the brain. 
It is the state of consciousness resulting from a mental 
activity. It is a state, or condition, of consciousness. It 
is fundamental in mental life. A pain from pricking 
one's finger is a sensation. The odor from smelling a 
rose is a sensation. The flavor from fruit, the aroma 
from coffee are sensations. 

** Sensations are in the mind and not in the various 
parts of the body. One says that he has a pain in his 
toe, and so it surely seems to the unsophisticated person ; 
but that is purely a matter of association. The nerve 
ends are in the toe, but the pain is in the mind only. 

We must carefully refrain from speaking of sensa- 
tions as traveling or being 'carried' from the periphery 
to the brain. Sensations can not travel. Nerve currents 
pass from the periphery to the center, but sensations, 
never. We need, therefore, to distinguish between sensa- 



Studies in Psychology 37 

tions, which are psychical, and nerve-impressions, which 
are physical. They may be thought of as having their 
point of contact in the cerebrum.'' 

Definition of Sensation. — The following definition 
of the sensation is a conclusion from the previous study : 

The sensation is a state of consciousness resulting 
from a mental disturbance corresponding to a brain dis- 
turbance caused by some external stimulus. 

Importance of the 8ensatio7i. — The sensation is the 
most elementary and most fundamental conscious mental 
fact. It is the starting point in all mental development. 
Without it the mind could never start in getting knowl- 
edge. Without it there would be no feeling, and the 
will and its development would have no existence. It is 
the first conscious step across from the physical to the 
psychical. 

"Sensation is the meeting-place, the point of coin- 
cidence of self and nature. It is in the sensation that 
nature touches the soul in such a way that it becomes 
itself psychical, and the soul touches nature so as to 
become itself natural. A sensation is, indeed, the transi- 
tion of physical into the psychical." 

Read the following: 

1. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 16 to 30. 

2. Angells' Psychology, pp. 14 to 24. 

3. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 27 to 46. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Nervous System. 

Composition of. — The nervous system is an aggrega- 
tion of neurones, or nerve cells. As previously seen 
these cells are anatomically independent. They are 
connected by contact though that they may work in 
unity. This fact that they work in unity, organize their 
work, is all that enables us correctly to call it the 
nervous system. 

'*We may represent the nervous system most clearly 
as itself a colony of some eleven thousand million amoe- 
ba-like organisms crowded together for the most part 
within the bony wall of the skull and spinal column 
with prolongations extending to all parts of the organ- 
ism. The unit of the nervous system is the neurone. 
Each is connected with numerous other units, and also at 
innumerable points stands in close functional relations 
to the other cells of the body. To understand the action 
of the nervous system we must learn to know (1) the 
character of the single unit and (2) the connections the 
units make with each other and with other parts of 
the body." 

Action of Nervous System. — Since each element of 
the nervous system is connected with many other ele- 
ments by contact, they transmit impulses from one to 
another. The point of contact between any two neurones 



Studies in Psychology 39 

by means of their fibers is called the synapse (plural, 
synapses). The direction the impulse takes is thought to 
depend upon the resistance of the nerve endings at the 
synapses, the impulse following the line of least resist- 
ance. 

** Since there are evidently many possible lines of 
transmission, the question naturally arises, what decides 
which of the many paths shall be followed ? The answer 
is found in a recent theory that the course of the impulse 
is decided at the point of connection between neurone 
and neurone, the synapse. The end-brush of the receiv- 
ing neurone is in contact with the dendrites of several 
motor neurones. Each of these points of contact, or 
synapses, has a different resistance. * * * * The 
lines of discharge depend primarily upon the openness 
of the synapses. In these lowest reflexes the ease of 
transmission depends upon the character of the synapses 
as they are determined in the individual at birth, and 
thus the responses are prepared in advance of any ex- 
perience by the nature of the nervous system. When 
the sensory excitation is weak, only the best developed 
connections are opened. As the impulse becomes strong- 
er, more and more difficult synapses will be crossed, and 
the motor discharge will become more and more diffuse. ' ' 

Centers and Ganglia. — The body of a neurone from 
which the fibers are prolongations is a nerve center. Sev- 
eral of these bodies in contact or apparently so may also 
be called a nerve center. Thus there are many centers 
in the spinal cord and the brain may be regarded as a 
great nerve center. 



40 Studies in Psychology 

Knots or masses of nervous matter are called ner- 
vous ganglia. So again the brain is a great nervous 
ganglion. 

Functions. — The functions of the nervous system 
are in general three, as follows : 

1. To transmit impulses. 

2. To control impulses. 

3. To serve as a storehouse of energy. 
Transmission of Impulses. — The human body is 

called upon in life to unify the action of its various 
parts. In doing this these parts must communicate one 
with another. Also, in thinking, one brain area must 
act in association with other brain areas and so must 
communicate with each other. The transmission of im- 
pulses makes this communication possible. It is thus an 
exceedingly important function of the nervous system 
to transmit impulses. 

Controlling Impulses. — Impulses do all the work of 
the body and mind, too. But of themselves they are 
purely mechanical and uncontrolled. They, unless con- 
trolled, produce motion along the lines of least resistance. 
Now, it is an important function of the nervous system 
to harness the impulses, so to speak and have them to do 
some useful work for the body or the mind; that is, to 
control them. The nervous system does this in all reflex 
and automatic activity. The nervous system helps to 
control the impulses in other kinds of activity, too, in 
any sort of activity of the body or mind whatever. This 
it is seen is of the highest use to both body and mind. 

Store-house of Energy. — It is proper to ask where 



Studies in Psychology 41 

the energy or force is which manifests itself in the phe- 
nomena of consciousness. And the answer is that it is 
stored in that part of the nervous system known as the 
brain. When one thinks that all of the energy for every 
thought, idea, emotion, sensation, desire, hope, aspira- 
tion, determination or perception is stored in the brain 
he begins to see the importance of this function. 

A great amount of energy is stored in the nervous 
system. It is kept mostly in the nerve centers till 
occasion calls for its discharge. The muscles are power- 
less to do work without the discharge of energy to them 
along the nerve fibers. The more energy there is stored 
in the nerve centers the greater the nervous tension is, 
and the more impulses there are. Without the storing 
up of energy in excess in the nervous system there would 
be no such thing as self-activity of mind or body. 

Divisions of the Nervous System. — For the purpose 
of help in study, the nervous system may be thought of 
in two divisions : 

1. The central nervous system. 

2. The peripheral nervous system. 

The Peripheral Nervous System. — The peripheral 
nervous system consists of all nerve cells, nerves, nerve 
fibers and nervous ganglia lying outside and around, to 
some extent, the spinal cord and brain. The nervous 
mechanism of the eye, of the ear, of the nose, of the 
mouth, of the skin, and of the heart, lungs and digestive 
organs constitute in part the peripheral nervous system. 
The term, peripheral, is from two Greek words, meaning 



42 Studies in Psychology 

carried around. Thus the peripheral nervous system is, 
in a sense, carried around the central system. 

The peripheral nervous system is of less interest to 
the student of psychology than the central nervous 
system, because the mind is less closely connected with it. 

The Central Nervous System. — The central nervous 
system consists of the brain and spinal cord. In the 
development of the nervous system there is a time when 
it consists wholly of the spinal cord, and the spinal cord 
is simply a tube. From this tube of nervous material 
all the rest of the nervous system is developed, the peri- 
pheral system and the brain. 

"In the early stages of the embryo the central ner- 
vous system is but a groove in the outer layer of the 
mass. This groove gradually becomes deeper, and the 
tops of the sides approach until they grow together to 
form a tube. The different parts of the entire nervous 
system grow from the different parts of the wall of the 
tube. The original hollow persists to the adult stage 
and is modified by the changes in the shape of the wall. ' * 

The Spinal Cord. — The spinal cord is a column of 
soft nervous matter extending from the brain downward 
in the cavity formed by the bones in the spinal column 
for about 18 inches in man, where it tapers off into a 
filament. The diameter of the spinal cord varies at 
different lengths, but averages on the whole about one- 
half an inch, or more exactly about as large as one^s 
little finger just in front of the middle knuckle. Run- 
ning the length of the spinal cord in front is a deep 
furrow, or cleft, called the anterior fissure, and along 



Studies in Psychology 43 

the back of the cord is another deep cleft called the 
posterior fissure. The anterior fissure is wider than the 
posterior fissure, but not quite so deep. These two 
fissures extend into the cord so far that they almost meet, 
and thus nearly cut the cord into right and left halves. 

Material of the Cord. — If the spinal cord be cut 
across and one look at the exposed cross section, a gray- 
ish appearing substance on the inside will be seen sur- 
rounded by a whitish looking substance. In each half 
the gray matter is somewhat in the form of a crescent 
with rounded horns, the convex side of the crescent be- 
ing towards the center and the horns pointing to the 
front and back. 

The white matter of the cord is made up almost 
wholly of nerve fibers, and appears white from the color 
of sheathes around the nerve fibers proper, which are of 
the same material as that of the cell body. The gray 
matter is made up mainly of the central bodies of 
neurones, but there are some fibers intermingled with 
them. 

The Spinal Nerves. — ^From the spinal cord are giv- 
en off nerves in pairs at intervals along its length. These 
nerves are called the spinal nerves, and there are thirty- 
one pairs of them. The nerves of each pair spring from 
the same level, one from the right half and one from the 
left half of the cord. Each nerve springs from two 
roots, one from the anterior side and one from the pos- 
terior side of its half of the cord. The anterior and 
posterior roots unite to form one nerve, and then pass 
from the spinal cavity through openings between the 



44 Studies in Psychology 

bones of the spinal column. Afferent nerve fibers form 
the posterior roots and efferent fibers form the anterior 
roots, but both are bound up in one nerve. The fibers 
are distributed to the muscles and skin of the trunk. 

Functions of the Spinal Cord. — The spinal cord has 
two general functions, as follows: 

1. The nerve fibers in the cord form the connection 
between the brain and the peripheral nervous system. 
Thus sensory impulses are sent to the brain from the 
sense organs, and motor impulses are sent from the brain 
to the muscles, and this is its first function. 

2. It furnishes a location for nerve centers which 
control impulses without imposing the task on the brain 
and mind, and this is its second function. 

The Brain. — For our purposes here all of that part 
of the central nervous system contained in the cranial 
cavity will be considered the brain. It is the largest 
nerve center in the body. 

Divisions. — In a general way the divisions of the 
brain are three in number: 

1. Medulla Oblongata. 

2. Cerebellum. 

3. Cerebrum. 

In addition to these the Pons Varolii is by some con- 
sidered a fourth division, but from a psychology point 
of view it may be considered a part of the medulla ob- 
longata. 

The Medulla Oblongata. — The medulla oblongata is 
continuous with the spinal cord and projects upward 
into the cranial cavity from it. It is located somewhat 



Studies in Psychology 45 

below and almost in front of the cerebellum and nearly 
centrally below the cerebrum. In structure it is com- 
plex, composed of both white and gray matter arranged 
much as in the spinal cord, but the proportion of gray 
matter in it is greater than in the cord. It has no con- 
volutions on its surface. 

The medulla has at any rate three important func- 
tions, as follows: 

1. It forms a pathway for all impulses to the hem- 
ispheres of the cerebrum from the spinal cord, and from 
the hemispheres of the cerebrum to the spinal cord. 

2. It gives rise to six pairs of the most important 
nerves in the human body. 

3. It contains the nerve centers which control 
respiration, the beating of the heart, the size of small 
arteries, swallowing, the secretion of the saliva and other 
processes. 

The Cerebellum. — The cerebelhnn lies directly be- 
hind the medulla oblongata and slightly above it, and 
directly below the rear portion of the cerebrum. It con- 
sists of two masses, a right and left, much larger than 
the medulla. It has no convolutions on its surface, but 
its surface is closely folded into parallel ridges. It is 
made up of white and gray matter, the gray matter on 
the outside. 

Functions. — The functions of the cerebellum are 
more or less obscure, but so far as known, its main func- 
tion is the control of the muscles in certain kinds of re- 
flex action. When one is learning to walk or skate or 
ride a bicycle, he must direct his actions with his mind. 



46 Studies in Psychology 

But there comes a time if he keeps practicing, when he 
no longer must direct these actions with his mind. The 
actions, some say, have become reflex. But they were 
not at first reflex. Such actions are called, by some, ac- 
quired reflexes. Now, the cerebellum is believed to con- 
tain the nerve centers for the acquired reflexes employed 
in walking, running, skating, etc. ; that is, in locomotion. 

"So little is known about the operations of the 
cortex of the cerebellum, that it will not be profitable to 
discuss it. Suffice it to say that the cerebellum has a 
very rich connection, by means of both sensory and 
motor neurones, with the cerebrum and the lower brain 
centers. ' ' 

The Cerebrum. — The cerebrum occupies the top, 
front, and upper rear part of the cranial cavity. In fact 
it seems to occupy almost the whole of the cranial cavity. 

In size it is from four-fifths to seven-eighths of the 
entire brain. Its weight varies in different persons and 
in the same person at different times in life. Though it 
is difficult to determine an average brain weight, it per- 
haps is not far from 53 ounces in adult life. Daniel 
Webster's brain weighed 53.5 ounces, and Agassiz's, Na- 
poleon's, and Lord Byron's brain about 53 ounces each. 
A man by the name of Rustan, an ignorant and un- 
known workman, had a brain weighing 78.3 ounces. 
Gambetta, a French statesman, "a man of indisputably 
high genius and ability" had a brain weighing 40.9 
ounces. Of the weight of these brains it is to be remem- 
bered that the cerebrum was about seven-eighths. 

In infancy and childhood the weight of the cere- 



Studies in Psychology 47 

brum is not so great, and in old age it is not quite so 
great as in adult life. 

The brains of persons born and reared in cold cli- 
mates are on the average larger than those born and 
reared in the warmer climates. 

Structure of the Cerebrum. — The cerebrum is di- 
vided from back to front by a deep fissure almost into 
two halves, called hemispheres, one being called the 
right hemisphere, the other the left. This fissure is a 
continuation apparently of the fissures of the spinal 
cord, that on the top of the cerebrum being a continua- 
tion of the posterior fissure, and that on the under side 
of the cerebrum being a continuation of the anterior 
fissure of the spinal cord. This fissure, the median fis- 
sure, so nearly cuts the cerebrum in two that only a 
small portion of nervous matter, called the corpus callo- 
sum is left to connect the two hemispheres. The hemis- 
pheres of the cerebrum correspond to each other as the 
halves of an apple cut in two correspond. 

Each hemisphere is divided along its outer side by 
a second large fissure, which is called the fissure of Syl- 
vius. ''This fissure is parallel to a line drawn from the 
end of the nose to the external opening of the ear, and 
about two inches above it, its middle point being over 
the ear." ' 

Another way of locating it is that it lies almost 
directly under a line from the center of the eye socket 
to a point two inches above the external opening of the 
ear, this point being over the middle of the fissure in 
length. 



48 Studies in Psychology 

Each hemisphere is also divided by another great 
fissure, which is called the fissure of Rolando. ' ' It arises 
near the middle and a half inch above the fissure of 
Sylvius, and extends upward and backward about four 
inches to the median line separating the two hemis- 
pheres. ' ' 

Lohes of the Cerebrum. — Each hemisphere of the 
cerebrum is divided on its outer surface into four pretty 
clearly defined lobes : the frontal, parietal, occipital, and 
temporal. 

The frontal lobes lie in front of the fissure of Ro- 
lando and above the fissure of Sylvius in each hemis- 
phere. They occupy the whole front part of the cranial 
cavity. 

The parietal lobes lie above the fissure of Sylvius 
and behind the fissure of Rolando. They occupy the 
whole top portion of the cranial cavity behind the fissure 
of Rolando. 

The occipital lobes lie in the back portion of the 
cranial cavity below the parietal lobes and above the 
back portion of the temporal lobes on the sides. 

The temporal lobes lie below and behind the fissure 
of Sylvius along the sides of the cranial cavity. 

Convolutions. — Each lobe of the cerebrum is divided 
into several convolutions by little winding ditches called 
sulci (singular, sulcus). The areas between the sulci 
are convolutions, and not the ditches as sometimes under- 
stood. 

Matter of Cerehrum. — The cerebrum is composed of 
both white and gray nervous matter. The gray matter 



Studies in Psychology 49 

is on the outside forming a thin covering over the white 
matter and extending down into the sulci and fissures. 
This covering of gray matter is the cotiex. It is of dif- 
ferent thickness in different persons, but is perhaps on 
an average about one-tenth of an inch thick. In some 
brains it is one-eighth of an inch thick and in some not 
more than half so thick. Daniel Webster had a cortex 
one-sixteenth of an inch thick. 

Within, the cerebrum is almost wholly a great mass 
of white matter consisting of nerve fibers. There are 
though to some extent ganglia of gray matter scattered 
among the fibers. The cortex is made up almost wholly 
of the central bodies of nerve cells. 

Functions of Cerebrum. — The functions of the cere- 
brum are no doubt various, but three important ones 
stand out : 

1. It controls all physical and mental action which 
usually is said to be under the control of our minds. 

2. It contains the centers of all action that can 
rightly be called mental. 

3. It is the storehouse for all energy which mani- 
fests itself in conscious phenomena. 

The centers of consciousness, attention, association, 
perception, judgment, reasoning, love, hate, and the will 
are in the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres. 

Read : 

1. Angell's Psychology, pp. 10 to 38. 

2. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 9 to 29. 

3. Pillsbury's Psychology, pp. 16 to 45. 



CHAPTER IV. 
Activity. 

Nature of Activity. — The mind sees objects in one 
position at one time and in another position at another 
time. Thus we see a man in Chicago to-day and some 
time later we see him in New York ; we see a bird on the 
ground now, later we see it in the tree ; we see a horse in 
the field in one place, then in another place. Now we 
see a train beyond the bridge, then this side the bridge. 
We say the objects have moved, changed, or acted. Do 
we see objects move or do we see them merely in different 
positions at different times ? If the object does not seem 
to come to rest at different places, we think we see it 
move, but if we see it one place now, and later see it in 
another place we say we see it has moved. But we are 
just as certain of the motion in one case as in the other. 
The reason it seems to be moving is that the difference in 
positions is so small and the periods of time between the 
different positions so small that the eye and mind can 
not make separate responses to the different positions, 
but makes a continuous response. So strictly speaking 
we do not see motion nor do we see the objects move. 
What we actually see is the object in different positions 
at different times, and we can account for this only by 
believing it moves. 

Again we see an object in one condition at one time 
and in a different condition at another time. Thus we 



Studies in Psychology 51 

find the road muddy to-day, dusty another day ; covered 
with snow a short time ago, bare now. We find our 
friends sorrowful now, happy at another time ; in a good 
humor now, angry at another time. We find the stove 
hot now, cold at another time ; new now, old at another 
time. We find ourselves feeling well now, ill at another 
time; vivacious now, weary at another time. And we 
say for this reason that all these things change, act or 
move. We can account for their being in different con- 
ditions at different times in no other way. 

It can thus be seen that to the mind change, activity, 
or motion is but the presupposition of its thinking ob- 
jects in different positions or conditions at different 
times. 

Inference from the above study gives the following 
definition for activity: 

Activity, to the mind, is the presupposition of its 
thinking objects in different positions or conditions at 
different times. 

Classes of Activity. — In our studies at present we 
are concerned with the activity only of the human mind 
and human body. In considering such activity we do 
not have to observe very long to see that there are activi- 
ties of both the mind and body which go on without our 
intentionally directing them ; also, that there are activi- 
ties of both the mind and the body that we do intention- 
ally direct. These differences among our activities give 
basis for the following classes : 

1. Involuntary activity. 

2. Voluntary activity. 



52 Studies in Psychology 

Involuntary Activity. — Observation shows us that 
some of the activity of the body goes on without our in- 
tentionally directing it; as, coughing, sneezing, heart- 
beating, etc.; also, that mental activity occurs of the 
same kind; as, the wandering of our minds from object 
to object when we sit down to rest, or at other times. 
Mental activity thus, as well as physical, is involuntary. 
From the above study the following definition of invol- 
untary activity is reached: 

Involuntary activity is that hind of activity which 
the mind does not intentionally direct. . 

Voluntary Activity. — Again observation of our ac- 
tivities reveals to us that such activities as writing, 
throwing, picking up objects, playing tennis and sew- 
ing are physical activities which are intentionally direct- 
ed. Also that such activities as solving problems in alge- 
bra, analyzing sentences in grammar, studying an ex- 
periment in science, or interpreting a piece of literature 
are mental activities which are intentionally directed. 
Thus again both physical and mental activities are vol- 
untary. From the above study we have the following 
definition : 

Voluntary activity is that kind of activity which the 
mind intentionally directs. 

Classes of Involuntary Activity. — Study shows that 
there is involuntary activity which is aroused by some 
external stimulus coming in contact with some peripher- 
al nerve ending, such as jumping because of a noise; 
also, that there is involuntary activity that seems to 
originate in some nerve center, such as breathing. These 



Studies in Psychology 53 

differences give basis for the following classes of in- 
voluntary activity: 

1. Reflex activity. 

2. Impulsive activity. 

Reflex Activity. — If the foot of a sleeper is tickled 
he will frequently withdraw his foot without any inten- 
tion of doing so. If a decapitated frog has acid placed 
upon its leg or flank, it will use one or both feet to brush 
it away. * ' If the soles of the feet of a man whose spinal 
cord is injured any where above the sacral region be 
tickled, it often happens that his legs wiU be suddenly 
drawn up, though the man can not feel the tickling and 
can not of his own will draw up his legs. ' ' 

Again a loud noise or sudden motion toward the 
eyes makes one jump unintentionally. 

It should be noticed in all such action first that the 
action is muscular, or it may be glandular, as the secre- 
tion of the tears or the saliva, and, since muscles and 
glands act only in response to nervous action, also ner- 
vous ; that is, neuro-muscular or neuro-glandular action ; 
secondly, that there is always an external stimulus; and 
thirdly, that the action is uncontrolled hy the mind. 

Such action as the action studied above is reflex ac- 
tion, and the following is a formal statement for it : 

Reflex action is neuro-muscular or neuro-glandular 
action caused hy some external stimulus and uncon- 
trolled hy the mind. 

Or a second way of putting it is as follows, since 
it is action not intentionally directed : 



54 Studies in Psychology 

Reflex action is involuntary neuro-muscular or 
neuro-glandular action caused hy some external stimulus. 

The Process of Reflex Action. — The process of re- 
flex action is as follows : a disturbance is caused in some 
nerve center by an external stimulus; without being 
transmitted to the higher nerve centers of intentional 
control, or before the higher nerve centers of intentional 
control have time to act, an impulse is sent out and pro- 
duces activity. The nerve centers turn back, reflex, so to 
speak, the impulse ; hence the name reflex activity. The 
nerve centers which control reflex action are mostly 
found in the spinal cord, but some are in the brain. 

Classes of Reflex Action. — In the case of the man 
who draws his feet up when they are tickled, there is no 
consciousness of the stimulus nor of the action; but in 
the case of the one who jumps because of the loud noise, 
there is consciousness of both the stimulus and the ac- 
tion. These differences give basis for the following 
classes of reflex action: 

1. Unconscious reflex action. 

2. Conscious reflex action. 

Illustration. — When the dim rays of light come into 
the pupil of the eye, they act as a stimulus which causes 
the muscles of the iris to so act as to enlarge the pupil. 
Also, when too bright rays come into the pupil of the 
eye they cause the muscles of the iris to so act that the 
pupil is made smaller. 

The presence of the food in the stomach acts as a 
stimulus which causes the stomach to blush; and the 
food in the intestines acts as a stimulus which causes the 



Studies in Psychology 55 

liver to secrete the bile. All these are cases of un- 
conscious reflex action. 

Illustration. — A little thought shows that in cough- 
ing and sneezing we are frequently conscious of the 
stimulus and the action. So coughing and sneezing are 
frequently good examples of conscious reflex action. We 
are frequently painfully conscious of both the stimulus 
and the action and try in vain to prevent the action, or 
remove the stimulus. Also when we jump because of a 
loud noise w^e are conscious of the stimulus and also of 
the action. Such are good examples of conscious reflex 
action. 

Further Classes of Reflex Action. — By observing re- 
flex action from another point of view we see that such 
instances as coughing, sneezing, and the movements of 
digestion are reflexes with which we are born. But if 
one strikes his foot against something and starts to fall, 
his hands will be thrown out to break the force of the 
fall, and many movements, in walking, skating, riding a 
bicycle, which many authors call reflexes, if reflexes, 
are not those with which we are born. These differences 
in these activities give basis for the following: 

1. Original reflex action. 

2. Acquired reflex action. 

Original Reflex Action. — It is evident that one is 
born with many reflexes. In addition to those mentioned 
above are winking, the secretion of the saliva, the se- 
cretion of tears, and the adjusting of the eyes to see ob- 
jects near and far. 

Acquired Reflex Action. — In cases of walking, skat- 



56 Studies in Psychology 

ing, etc., it is not very clear that they are reflex action. 
They are acquired without any doubt, but they seem to be 
actions that were at one time voluntary, but which have 
become more or less automatic. A definite external 
stimulus seems to be lacking. However, they are con- 
sidered by some authorities as reflex actions, and if there 
be such action, they are examples of it. 

Functions of Beflex Action. — The functions of re- 
flex action are at any rate three, as follows : 

1. To carry on the routine work of the body. 

2. To carry on the functions of the body when 
one is unconscious or when consciousness is otherwise 
engaged. 

3. To protect the body in cases which require 
quicker action than voluntary action. 

Impulsive Action. — It is necessary for us to remem- 
ber that an impulse is an excess of energy, or a surplus 
of force. Children often when they are asleep throw 
their hands, legs, and feet about, also their whole bodies. 
Such actions are caused by the tension in the nerve cen- 
ters due to the excess of energy stored there. This ten- 
sion probably is due to the efl'ect of the blood on the 
nerve centers. At any rate there is no doubt that the 
tension exists and when it becomes too great an impulse 
starts from the nerve center and produces action. Such 
action is impulsive action. Persons who have very much 
impulsive action are called nervous persons. The fol- 
lowing statement for impulsive action is reached from 
the above study : 

Impulsive action is that kind of involuntary action 



Studies in Psychology 57 

caused merely hy an impulse arising from the tension in 
the nerve center. 

Kinds of Impulsive Action. — Some cases of impul- 
sive action are purposeless ; that is, they are not put 
forth to do any useful work. Of such impulsive action, 
the child's throwing itself about in its sleep, and pro- 
truding and chewing its tongue, when learning to write, 
are examples. 

Again in such impulsive action as breathing and 
heartbeating the action is purposive ; that is, is put forth 
to do some useful work. These differences give basis for 
dividing impulsive action into: 

1. Purposeless impulsive action. 

2. Purposive impulsive action, or automatic action. 

Automatic action is impulsive action which serves 
the hody some useful purpose. 

Kinds of Voluntary Action. — Voluntary action is of 
two kinds : 

1. Unreflective. 

2. Reflective, or deliberative. 

First, one frequently acts without reflection. Thus 
some one strikes a person and he strikes back at once. 
The bell rings and one starts to the class. One sees 
somebody fall and stops to help him up. One claps his 
hands when he has listened to a piece of music. Such 
actions are unreflective. 

Secondly, one contemplates taking a journey, or 
buying a farm, or going into some kind of business and 



58 Studies in Psychology 

often thinks a long time on such action. All such actions 
^re reflective or deliberate. 

Read : 

1. Angell's Psychology, pp. 48-49; 283-293. 



CHAPTER V. 
Mind and Body. 

Connection of Mind and Body. — Everyone agrees 
that there is a close connection between the mind and the 
body. But perhaps at present not more of this connec- 
tion is known than the mere beginning, the a, b, c, of 
it, so to speak. All know that prolonged physical work 
will produce mental fatigue, and that prolonged mental 
work will produce physical fatigue. Bodily injuries 
produce pain, but in case of mental excitement frequent- 
ly there is no pain until the excitement is over. Good 
news or bad news may remove hunger, and persons have 
been scared to death, or have been frightened into ill- 
ness. Embarrassment makes the mouth dry and anger 
may make it bitter. 

All these and many other facts indicate a general 
intimate connection between mind and body. 

Effect of Suggestion. — If it is suggested to one that 
a certain bodily condition exists, or will exist, this sug- 
gestion has much influence in producing such physical 
condition. Headaches, toothaches, and other physical 
afflictions have been removed by suggestion. 

"A house surgeon in a French hospital experiment- 
ed with one hundred patients, giving them sugared wa- 
ter. And then, with a great show of fear, he pretended 
that he had made a mistake and had given them an 



60 Studies in Psychology 

emetic instead of the proper medicine. Dr. Tuke says: 
'The result may easily be anticipated by those who can 
estimate the influence of the imagination. No fewer 
than eighty — four-fifths — were unmistakably sick'.'* 

Most remarkable changes of the body, even to the 
blistering of the skin, the change in the blood supply to 
parts of the body, the disturbance of digestion and even 
death may result from suggestion, if various good author- 
ities are to be believed. 

Suggestion here means leading the person to believe 
that the bodily condition either exists or will exist. 

The influence of the mind over the body is known 
to be very powerful. 

Opinion of the Greeks. — Just what part of the body 
the mind is most closely connected with has for more 
than two thousand years been a subject of study. The 
Greeks studied this question and reached various con- 
clusions. Plato believed that the brain is the seat of the 
mind, but Aristotle, the greatest Greek philosopher, re- 
jected this idea. He and other Greeks placed the mind 
in various parts of the body. 

Brain Injury and Consciousness. — The connection 
between consciousness and the brain is closer than be- 
tween consciousness and any other part of the body. A 
blow on the head produces unconsciousness by producing 
concussion of the brain. A blow on almost any other 
part of the body produces only pain. A blow upon the 
heart might produce unconsciousness, but that is because 
it would disturb the blood supply to the brain. Since 



Studies in Psychology 61 

consciousness is a mental thing, a state of mind, this in- 
dicates connection between the brain and the mind. 

Nerves and Consciousness. — It is because of the con- 
nection by nerve fibers between any part of the body 
that may be stimulated and the brain that the mind 
knows of any touch or injury. Let the nerve fibers be 
cut so that they can not transmit impulses to the brain, 
and the mind neither knows of the injury nor feels any 
pain from any wounded part of the body. This is be- 
cause the brain is disconnected from the injured part. 
But knowing and feeling are activities of the mind. So 
brain work is necessary to mental work and this again 
is evidence that the brain is the organ of the mind. 

The Blood, the Brain and the Mind. — Any disturb- 
ance of the blood supply to the brain always produces 
a corresponding disturbance in the mind. There is a 
case on record of a man who had an unusually fine mem- 
ory. He had a spell of sickness which left him with 
enfeebled heart action for more than a year. During 
this time his memory was almost gone. "When he recov- 
ered his normal heart action, his splendid memory re- 
turned. The cause of the poor memory was the poor 
blood supply to the brain. 

Again it is common observation that bad air makes 
attention and learning difficult and many times impossi- 
ble. This is because of the mental condition induced by 
blood improperly aerated acting on the brain. 

Mental action causes an increase in the temperature 
of the brain. Dr. Lombard, a noted investigator says: 
' ' Every cause that attracts the attention — a noise, or the 



62 Studies in Psychology 

sight of some person or other object — produces elevation 
of temperature. An elevation of temperature also occurs 
under the influence of an emotion, or during an inter- 
esting reading aloud." 

"While a woman was being subjected to a test of 
this sort, from no apparent cause her temperature sud- 
denly arose. The explanation was that she had at that 
moment caught sight of a skull in the room." 

"From experiments on animals, we learn that the 
active use of their senses causes a rise in cerebral temper- 
ature. A German investigator found that when 
he presented something not good to eat to the nostrils of 
a dog, the momentary sniff was accompanied by a slight 
rise in temperature. When a package containing a piece 
of meat was offered, the temperature was higher, be- 
cause of more lively emotional interest. ' ' 

An italian investigator by the name of Mosso de- 
vised a table balanced so nicely that a man might lie on 
it without disturbing its equilibrium. By introducing 
some interesting subject that quickened the action of 
the mind, he found that thus the balance was almost 
immediately destroyed. ' ' A sudden noise, an interesting 
thought, anything that increased the activity of con- 
sciousness, would cause the head end of the table to sink 
down as quickly as if a weight had been placed upon 
it." This phenomenon is thought to mean that there is 
either a greater amount of blood in the brain or that 
a greater amount of blood flows through the brain, 'when 
mental activity is increased. 

Localization of Functions. — The brain has its work 



Studies in Psychology 63 

systematized to a greater or less degree. There are 
specific areas for specific functions. Not all parts take 
part in any work the brain has to do. Brain functions 
and brain areas are differentiated, or there is a division 
of labor in the brain. 

The Motor Zone. — This is an area of the brain ly- 
ing on the front side of the fissure of Rolando, accord- 
ing to most recent investigations, in the frontal lobes. 
It is that part of the brain concerned in sending out 
commands to move various parts of the body. 

"So definitely has this area been mapped out, that it 
is possible to find, for the purpose of a surgical opera- 
tion, so small a center as that which moves the vocal 
cords, directs a thumb, or winks an eye." 

Sensory Brain Areas. — These areas are those which 
receive impulses from the sense-organs. The known 
ones are located as follows: 

1. The centers of sight in the occipital lobes of 
the cerebrum. 

2. The centers of hearing in the upper part of the 
temporal lobes of the cerebrum, just below the fissure 
of Sylvius. 

3. The centers of taste and smell on the inner sur- 
face of the temporal lobes at the front just below the 
front portion of the fissure of Sylvius. 

4. The centers of touch in the parietal lobes. 

The Center of Speech, or Broca. — This center is the 
source of much interest. It is situated in the lower part 
of the frontal lobes just in front of the fissure of Ro- 
lando, and just above the front portion of the fissure of 



64 Studies in Psychology 

Sylvius. It is a center not much larger than a pea. 
There is one in each hemisphere, but under ordinary 
conditions only one functions. Recent investigators say 
that if a person be right-handed, the center of Broea is 
invariably found in the left frontal lobe, but if the per- 
son be left-handed the center is invariably found in the 
right frontal lobe ; also, that an attempt to change a left- 
handed child to a right-handed one frequently interferes 
with speech, sometimes producing bad cases of stammer- 
ing. 

This center seems to control the muscles of the vocal 
cords, tongue, etc. used in speaking. The following quo- 
tation sums up pretty well recent thought on this ques- 
tion : 

' ' We know to a certainty that the muscles of the 
right side of the body are controlled by brain elements 
in the left side of the cranium, while the muscles of the 
left side of the body are controlled by brain elements 
in the right side of the cranium. So accurately have 
post mortems and surgical operations following attacks 
of paralysis disclosed the seat of the trouble causing 
the paralysis, that by studying the organs paralyzed we 
can tell with almost absolute certainty just where in 
the brain the blood clot may be found in any given 
case. If a man gets a blow directly on the top of the 
head of sufficient force, his legs will be, for the time 
being at least, paralyzed, so that if a man is stricken 
with paralysis of the legs we know that the blood clot 
will be found in the top region of the brain. By the 
same test we know if an arm is paralj^zed the blood clot 



Studies in Psychology 65 

lies farther down toward the region of the ear. Still 
farther down we find the areas that successively control 
the mouth, the lips, throat and tongue. If the paralysis 
is on the right side of the body we know that the blood 
clot is in the left brain, whatever the region may be. 
Conversely if the paralysis is on the left side of the 
body the blood clot will be found in the right brain. 

From the foregoing facts it seems that the motor 
forces of the body originate in either or both sides of 
the brain. But not so the intellectual faculties. Just 
below the region of the brain that controls the tongue 
we find what is known as Broca's convolution, which is 
not much larger than a pea. It has been demonstrated 
that this little body is the sole center of articulate speech. 
It seems to control directly the muscles of the tongue, 
mouth, throat and lips. Hence an injury to that little 
organ renders speech more or less impossible. Now there 
is a close relation existing between speech and gesture, 
and as that part of the brain which controls the arms 
and hands lies next to that part of the brain that con- 
trols speech, there seems to be good reason for the use of 
gesture as an aid to speech." 

"Now note this fact, that in the right-handed the 
speech center is always in the left brain, and not in 
both, while in the left-handed it is always in the right 
brain. It is true there is a Broca's convolution in both 
the right and left brain, but only one is used. However, 
if the convolution on one side is damaged in youth it is 
possible for the individual slowly to learn to talk. But 
if the damage occurs in middle life, or after that, speech 



^ 



66 Studies in Psychology 

is rarely regained, even though the individual seemingly 
recovers in other respects." 

Association Centers. — The areas in the cerebrum 
which lie between the different sensory centers and be- 
tween the different motor centers and between the sen- 
sory centers and the motor centers are the association 
centers. They are made up of the association neurones. 

Phrenology. — The psychologist is often asked for 
opinions concerning phrenology. So we will let the 
following eminent authors speak on the subject: 

Dr. William T. Harris says: "In later times differ- 
ent phases of the mind came to be assigned to different 
parts of the body. The spleen was supposed to be the 
seat of hilarity and good spirits; wisdom dwelt in the 
heart; anger in the gall; love in the liver; vanity in the 
lungs. " 

"Gall, in 1789, gave the first impulse to the wide- 
spread movement under the name of phrenology. He 
was joined by Spurzheim, in 1804, who carried the 
system to England and the United States, gaining many 
disciples in both countries while Gall made many influ- 
ential converts in Paris. Gall mapped out on the skull the 
locations of mental peculiarities, which he named from 
their excessive manifestations, organs of murder, theft, 
cunning, pride, vanity; on the other hand, Spurzheim 
attempted to systematize the organs into groups, and 
to name them from their normal manifestations." 

"But, aside from this a priori system of psychology 
based on crude introspection, a serious objection to 
phrenology is to be found in the fact that the so-called 



Studies in Psychology 67 

'organs' are protuberances of the skull, and do not cor- 
respond to the natural divisions of the brain. The 'or- 
gans' of perception, twelve in all, crowded together be- 
hind the eyes are formed by the protrusion of the outer 
wall of the skull, while the inner table, keeping close to 
the brain, leaves a 'sinus,' or chasm, between it and the 
outer. Moreover, the convolutions, which are distinctly 
marked by well established fissures or furrows (sulci), 
in no case agree with the 'organs' as mapped out. Some 
organs are located over fissures; some unite portions of 
different convolutions. The organ of amativeness be- 
longs to the cerebellum, while that of alimentiveness (an- 
other 'propensity') belongs to the cerebrum. Bony pro- 
cesses on the skull for the insertion of muscles are (as 
in the case of ' combativeness ' ) mistaken for brain pro- 
tuberances. No account is made of the convolutions in 
the 'island of Reil', or of those which are found in the 
median longitudinal fissure which separates the two 
hemispheres of the brain." 

Dr. Joseph Simms says: "Phrenologists assert that 
each organ of a mental faculty occupies a certain posi- 
tion perciptible on the outside of the brain, with a 
definite area which they have mapped out. They also 
hold that each of these organs extends to the center of 
the base of the brain, tapering to it somewhat like a 
cone, having its base turned toward the outer world. 
They make no account of the fissures, the intervening 
sulci and anf ractuosities that cut many of these supposed 
cones, some at right and some at oblique angles. Then 
the large, long cavities or ventricles intercept and would 



68 Studies in Psychology 

hinder many of them from reaching the central, basilar 
part of the brain. The anatomical structure of the 
brain thus appears fatal to this theory of the organs. ' ' 

"The late Dr. 0. W. Holmes, a learned man and 
experienced physician and professor of anatomy in 
Harvard University for thirty-five years, says: 'The 
walls of the head are double, with a great chamber of 
air between them, over the smallest and most crowded 
organs. Can you tell me how much money there is in 
a safe, which also has thick walls, by kneading the 
knobs with your fingers ? So, when a man fumbles about 
my forehead, and talks about the organs of individuality, 
size, etc., I trust him as much as I should if he felt over 
the outside of my strong box, and told me that there 
was a five-dollar or a ten-dollar bill under this or that 
rivet. Perhaps there is, only he doesn^t know anything 
about it. We will add that, even if he knows the inward 
dimensions of the strong box, he could not thence de- 
termine the amount of cash deposited in it\'' 

These quotations sum up pretty well what scientists 
think of phrenology. No one who has studied science 
long enough to make his opinion worth anything be- 
lieves what it teaches. 

Effect of Brain Injury on Mind. — This is shown to 
some extent in the case of a man named Gage who was 
tamping a charge of blasting powder in a rock with a 
pointed iron bar three feet and seven inches long and 
one and one-quarter inches in diameter, and weighing 
thirteen and one-half pounds, when the charge suddenly 
exploded. ' * The iron bar, propelled with its pointed end 



Studies in Psychology 69 

first, entered at the left angle of the patient's jaw, and 
passed clear through the top of his head, near the sagi- 
tal suture in the frontal region, and was picked up at 
some distance covered with blood and brains. The pa- 
tient was for a moment stunned, but within an hour 
after the accident he was able to walk up a long flight 
of stairs and give the surgeon an intelligible account of 
the injury he had sustained. His life naturally was for 
a long time despaired of; but he ultimately recovered 
and lived twelve and a half years afterward. ' ' 

"His contractors, who regarded him as the most 
efficient and capable foreman in their employ before 
his injury, considered the change in his mind so marked 
that they could not give him his place again. The equi- 
librium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual 
and animal propensities seems to have been destroyed. 
He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the gross- 
est profanity, which was not previously his custom, man- 
ifesting but little deference to his fellows, impatient of 
restraint or advice when it conflicted with his desires, 
at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and 
vacillating, devising many plans of future operation, 
which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned 
in turn for others more feasible. A child in his intel- 
lectual capacity and manifestations, he has the animal 
passions of a strong man. Previously to his injury, 
though untrained in schools, he possessed a well balanced 
mind, and was looked upon by the people who knew 
him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic 
and persistent in executing all his plans of operation. 



70 Studies in Psychology 

In this regard, his mind was radically changed, so de- 
cidedly that his friends and acquaintances said he was 
no longer Gage." 

Aphasia. — Aphasia is the loss of the power of 
speech, the vocal organs remaining uninjured and the 
intelligence unimpared. It results from injury to the 
brain. If the nerve cells in the center of Broca in the 
frontal lobes of the cerebrum are diseased or injured so 
they can not function aphasia results from the lack of 
ability to control the organs of speech. 

Or again if the nerve cells in certain places in the 
temporal lobes are injured or diseased aphasia results 
from the loss of memory of spoken words. One could 
not speak his own name or that of any friend or object 
whatever, nor could he understand what is spoken to him 
by anyone whatever. 

Brain Size and Intelligence. — Contrary to popular 
opinion there is no direct proportion between the size of 
the brain and the intelligence of the person. Brains 
ranging anywhere from forty to seventy ounces may be- 
long to persons of remarkable intellectual power and dis- 
tinguished ability or to idiots and imbeciles. 

Dr. Joseph Simms, an eminent scientist and scholar, 
studied this subject for more than thirty years in North 
America, continental Europe, Great Britain, Asia, Afri- 
ca, and Australia, and is thus capable of speaking with 
authority concerning it. He says: ''Esquirol's asser- 
tion that no size or form of head or brain is incident to 
idiocy or superior talent is borne out by my observa- 
tion." 



Studies in Psychology 71 

"Taking, now, the sixty heaviest brains of persons 
not noted for intellectual greatness, we find the average 
to be 63.2 ounces. Comparing this with the average of 
sixty famous men, 51.3 ounces, we find a difference in 
favor of imbeciles, idiots, criminals and men of ordinarv 
mind of 11.9 ounces." 

These and many other studies show that one could 
never classify men into classes of different degrees of 
intelligence upon the basis of brain size. 

Convolutions and Intellectual Capacity. — ''Large 
and complicated convolutions of the brain with deep 
sulci have been regarded by some persons as inseparable 
from superior powers of mind. The supposition is er- 
roneous and groundless. * * * * Squirrels manifest 
foresight and economy in storing nuts for the winter's 
use; yet they have no brain convolutions. The cetacea, 
especially whales, have much larger brains than men, 
with more numerous and more complex convolutions and 
deeper sulci; yet their intelligence bears no comparison 
with that of the human race." 

''Idiots often possess as large brains as men dis- 
tinguished for their intellectual power, and their brains 
have as deep sulci, and convolutions as fine, as large and 
as complex. Our table of the common and weak-minded 
contains a mention of an idiot whose brain weighed fifty- 
three ounces, or exactly as much as Napoleons, and had 
fine convolutions and a large frontal lobe, but who could 
never learn to speak." 

"The elephant carries a far larger brain than man, 
finely formed, broad and high in front, with much more 



72 Studies in Psychology 

numerous and complex convolutions and deeper anfrac- 
tuosities, and yet no intelligent person would for a 
moment claim that its mind excels or even equals that 
of man." 

Growth and Development of Brain. — Growth of the 
brain means increase in weight or in bulk. At birth 
the brain of the average baby is near three-fourths of a 
pound in weight or about one-eighth the weight of its 
body. Its brain grows very rapidly during the first four 
years and then slowly increases until about fifteen or 
sixteen when it reaches its full weight. A brain whose 
maximum is 1,440 grams would weigh at seven years of 
age 1,350 grams and at four years of age 1,325 grams 
approximately. After the age of fifteen or sixteen the 
weight of the brain remains nearly the same till about 
fifty, from which time on till death it loses in weight, as 
estimated by some authorities, at the rate of one ounce 
in ten years. 

Brain development means a perfection in the struc- 
ture of the brain. This consists in the change in the 
shape and size and prolongations of the cells in the 
brain. While brain growth goes forward so rapidly 
brain development goes on very slowly. And when brain 
development begins and continues rapidly brain growth 
becomes slower and slower and after a time ceases en- 
tirely. 

Read : 

1. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 36-42. 

2. Angell's Psychology, pp. 27-38. 

3. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 16-29. 



CHAPTER VI. 
]\Iental Attributes and Consciousness. 

Meaning of Attribute. — An attempt to study any- 
thing for the purpose of understanding it always con- 
sists in seeking out the attributes of that thing, and an 
object is known just to the degree that its attributes are 
discovered and learned. All knowledge thus in a general 
way grows out of the process of discovering and learning 
the attributes of objects. If one knows all the attributes 
of an object, he knows all there is to be known about 
that object. And if he knows all the attributes of 
any object, he knows a great deal about every object, 
since any object has connections with all other objects. 
Thus to know all the attributes there are to know would 
mean infinite knowledge, the knowledge of everything. 

The terms, characteristic, and mark, are terms used 
interchangeably with the term, attribute. 

Strictly speaking an attribute is indefinable, but the 
following statement characterizes it : 

An attribute is any characteristic of an object which 
helps the mind in knowing the object. 

Illustration. — A certain house is large, red, new, 
rectangular, has four verandas, two chimneys, sur- 
rounded by a big lawn, has two bay windows, and is 
situated on a slope. Each of the italicized words ex- 
presses an attribute of the house; that is, it expresses 



74 Studies in Psychology 

some mark of the house which helps the mind in know- 
ing it. 

Classes of Attributes. — If we observe the attributes 
of objects very long we soon see that each object pos- 
sesses some attributes that enable the mind to know it 
from every thing else. Thus in the sentence, This knife 
in my hand is a present from mother, the italicized words 
express attributes which enable the mind to know the 
knife from all other things. Again the tower on the east 
division of the old college building has some attributes 
which enable the mind to know it from all other things 
on earth. The same is true of every other object. 

And again we can observe that every object in a 
class has some attributes that belong to every other 
object in the class. Thus one triangle has just three 
angles, and so has every other one just three angles. 
One man has a vertebral column and so has every other 
man. One dog is a quadruped and so is every other dog. 
One winter is colder than summer in the temperate zones 
and so is every other one. 

Thus from this viewpoint there are two classes of 
attributes : 

1. Particular. 

2. Common. 

And the following are definitions for them: 
A particular attribute is an attribute which helps 
the mind to know its object from everything else. In the 
sentence, Niagara Falls is a grand spectacle, ''Niagara'' 
expresses attributes which help the mind in knowing the 
falls from all other things. Thus "Niagara" expresses 



Studies in Psychology 75 

a particular attribute. When we talk about a particular 
object, the term, particular^ means just those attributes 
which enable the mind to know the object from all 
other things. Individual is a word which means the 
same as particular. Thus an individual object and a 
particular object mean the same. Each object is a par- 
ticular object, since each object has some attributes 
which enable the mind to know it from everything else. 

A common attribute is an attribute ivhich belongs 
alike to each object of a class of objects. Thus sweetness 
is a common attribute of sugar ; sourness, of acid ; grow- 
ing feathers, of birds; and having four feet, of horses. 

Classes of Common Att^^ibutes. — Again we observe 
that some common attributes belong to every object of 
the class but do not extend beyond that class; that is, 
do not belong to any other object besides those of the 
class. Thus groiving feathers is an attribute that belongs 
to every bird of the class birds, but does not belong to 
any other object except birds; that is, does not extend 
beyond the class. 

There are also some common attributes that belong 
to every object of a class but also belong to other objects ; 
that is, extend beyond the class. Thus having two feet 
is a common attribute of birds, but it is an attribute 
also of man and monkeys. 

These differences among common attributes give 
basis for two classes : 

1. Class common attrihutes. 

2. Universal common attributes. 

The following; are definitions for them: 



76 Studies in Psychology 

A class common attribute is a common attribute 
which does not extend beyond the objects of a class, 
Three-angledness is a class common attribute of tri- 
angles ; growing flowei^, a class common attribute of one 
kind of plants. 

A universal common attribute is a common attribute 
tvhich extends beyond the objects of a single class. Hav- 
ing wings is a universal common attribute of birds. It 
belongs to all birds, but also belongs to other things 
besides birds, to butterflies, for instance. 

It is quite common for students to make the error of 
thinking that a universal attribute is one that belongs to 
everything in the universe. But this is just what it does 
not mean. There is good reason for thinking that no 
such attribute exists. The universal attribute is an 
attribute that connects a class out with other things in 
the universe. Thus having wings connects the class, 
birds, with butterflies, bees, bugs, and other things. 

An Attribute of Mind. — A man can do various 
kinds of work. He can run, skate, cut wood, build 
houses, etc., but in order to do these various things he 
must possess various attributes. He must have weight, 
strength, etc. Thus weight and strength are attributes 
of one's body. Without these one could not run, jump, 
skate, and so on. In an analogous way the mind has 
attributes. Without these it could not do its work. The 
following is the formal statement for an attribute of 
mind : 

An attribute of mind is a fundamental character- 
istic of mind without which mind could not do its worli. 



Studies in Psychology 77 

Universal Common Attributes of Mind. — The fol- 
lowing is a list of the attributes of mind most valuable 
to study: 

1. Consciousness. 

2. Attention. 

3. Apperception. 

4. Self-activity. 

5. Iterativeness. 

6. Rhythm. 

These attributes are as fundamental and necessary 
to the mind as weight or strength is to the body. They 
belong to all human minds but they also belong to some 
of the lower animals. A horse is conscious, can give 
attention, and is self-active. Thus these six attributes 
are universal common attributes of the human mind. 

Consciousness. — This is the most fundamental 
attribute of mind. Without consciousness the mind as 
we think of it could not be studied or known. 

One can at the start get a general idea of conscious- 
ness by comparing his condition of mind when he is 
very sound asleep with his condition of mind when he is 
awake. "When he is awake consciousness is showing its 
influence upon the mind, but when he is sound asleep 
consciousness is not influencing the mind at all; con- 
sciousness is in abeyance. 

If one knows, he knows that he knows or knows that 
he thinks he knows that he knows ; that is, he knows his 
own mental condition. Again if one is asked a question, 
and he says he does not know the answer to it, it is 
because he knows the condition of his own mind. If 



78 Studies in Psychology 

one is insulted, he feels hurt or angry and he knows that 
he feels hurt or angry ; that is, he knows his own mental 
condition. If one is thinking about Niagara Falls, he 
knows that his mind is active ; that is, he knows his own 
mental activities. If one is solving a problem in 
arithmetic, he knows that his mind is active on arith- 
metic; that is, he knows his own mental activity. The 
mind thus knows itself. 

What enables the mind thus to know itself ; that is, 
its own conditions and activities? Consciousness. The 
mind is able to do this because of the attribute of con- 
sciousness. Thus we reach the following statement for 
consciousness : 

Consciousness is that attribute of mind hy virtue of 
which the mind knows itself; its own conditions and 
activities. 

Thus by virtue of consciousness the mind is differ- 
ent from anything else known to us. Mind is the only 
thing that can know itself. Through consciousness the 
mind knows its own sorrows, pleasures, pains, hopes, 
aspirations, successes, disappointments, loves, hates, 
ideals and motives, and it knows it knows these, and 
knows itself as the knower. 

Classes of Consciousness. — If one observes his own 
consciousness by means of introspection he will see that 
at some times he seems to be conscious of w^hat is in his 
own mind. Thus we ask one what he is thinking about 
and he says he is thinking of his own thinking; that is, 
of what is, so to speak, passing through his mind. Thus 



Studies in Psychology 79 

one thinks of his own motives or intentions. Or he 
thinks of his own sorrow or depression. 

At another time one seems to be conscious of some- 
thing not in his mind. Thus one seems to be conscious 
of a friend, a house, a tree, a flower, a dewdrop or an 
ocean. These differences in consciousness give basis 
for two classes of consciousness. First, that kind by 
which we seem to be conscious of some object outside 
the mind. Secondly, that kind of consciousness by 
which we seem to be conscious of something in the mind. 

1. Objective consciousness. 

2. Subjective consciousness. 

The following are the formal statements for them: 

Objective consciousness is that kind of conscious- 
ness by which the mind seems to be aware of something 
outside the mind. 

Siibjective consciousness is that hind of conscious- 
ness by which the mind seems to be aware of something 
within the mind. 

Objects of Consciousness. — Observation shows us 
that we may be conscious of, in general, two kinds of 
things : first, physical things ; secondly, mental things. 

Nature of an Object. — The true idea of an object 
is frequently not to be found in the minds of those who 
should have it. In fact many persons have but a re- 
stricted idea of an object. It is quite common to find 
persons who think only those things which occupy space 
and have weight are objects. To such persons such 
things as trees, rocks, houses, horses, etc. seem to 
be objects, but such things as character, honor, beauty, 



80 Studies in Psychology 

virtue, wisdom, etc. do not seem to be objects. The view 
that only those things which possess weight and occupy 
space are objects is narrow and erroneous. 

The derivation of the word, object, furnishes a key 
to the right idea of what an object is. The word is from 
oh, against, and ject, thrown. Thus an object is any- 
thing which is thrown against the mind as a challenge 
to its activities. That is to say, anything the mind thinks 
about is an object. The following is the formal defini- 
tion for an object: 

An ohject is anything about which the mind can 
think. 

Classes of Objects. — Observation shows us that the 
mind sometimes thinks of such objects as flowers, trees, 
men, horses, books, and mountains; that is, about ob- 
jects which occupy space. 

And again the mind thinks about such objects as 
honor, virtue, character, purity, whiteness, sweetness, 
love, hate, sorrow, misfortune and happiness; that is, 
about objects which do not occupy space. This differ- 
ence in objects about which the mind thinks furnishes 
basis for two classes of objects: 1. Material. 2. Im- 
material. 

The following are the formal definitions for them: 
A material object is an object which occupies space. 
An immaterial object is an object which does not oc- 
cupy space. 

The things which the mind is conscious of are thus 
both physical and mental. That is to say, the mind is 



Studies in Psychology 81 

conscious at some times of material objects and at other 
times of immaterial objects. 

Fields of Consciousness. — If one examines his mind 
carefully by introspection he will find that at almost 
any time when he is awake there are many things more 
or less in one's mind. For instance, one sits in the 
library reading a book. The content of what he is read- 
ing is in his mind, so are various sounds, other persons 
in the library, the trees which appear through the 
window, book cases, the touch of his clothing, and so on, 
perhaps. It is true that most of these are only dimly in 
the mind, but in the mind all the same. Thus what one 
has in mind at any one time constitutes a kind of con- 
scious field. 

Again we observe that most of what we have had in 
our minds in the past and what we say we know we do 
not have in mind at any one time. Indeed we have very 
little of what we know in our consciousness at one time. 
So there is a great field of what we have known which 
constitutes a sort of subconscious field. These differ- 
ences in our minds give grounds for the two classes of 
conscious fields. 

1. The conscious field. 

2. The subconscious field. 

The Conscious Field. — The conscious field consists 
of all that one has in consciousness at any one time, 
either dimly or clearly. One's conscious life is a suc- 
cession of these fields. They always have various things 
in them ; that is, they are complex. * ' They contain sen- 
sations of our bodies and of the objects around us, 



82 Studies in Psychology 

memories of past experiences and thoughts of distant 
things, feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, 
desires and aversions, and other emotional conditions, 
together with determinations of the will, in every variety 
of permutation and combination." 

The conscious field always has something in it which 
is clearly in consciousness. This is called the center, or 
focus of the conscious field. All of those things in the 
conscious field which are but dimly in consciousness 
constitute what is called the margin of the conscious 
field. 

The Subconscious Field. — The subconscious field 
is made up of all that the mind has ever had in con- 
sciousness but which it does not have in consciousness at 
any time. "At any one moment we are not conscious 
of a thousandth part of what we know. It is well that 
such is the case, for when we are studying an object 
under a microscope, trying to memorize poetry, demon- 
strating a geometrical proposition, or learning a Latin 
verb, we should not want all we knew of history and 
physics, or images of the persons, trees, dogs, birds, or 
horses, that we remembered, to rush into our minds at 
the same time. If they did so, our mental confusion 
would be indescribable." 

Differences in States of Consciousness. — By obser- 
vation through introspection it may be seen that our 
conscious states differ in the following respects: 

1. They differ in intensity. At one time, one is 
slightly in pain; at another, in excrutiating pain. At 
one time, one is a little sad; at another crushed with 



Studies in Psychology 83 

sorrow. At one time, one is studying slightly; at an- 
other, very hard. 

2. They differ in quality. At one time, our con- 
sciousness is painful; at another time, pleasurable. At 
one time, our consciousness is one of surprise ; at another 
time, one of being bored. These differ in quality. 

3. They differ in the extent of the conscious field. 
Sometimes there are but few things in the conscious field 
compared with what there are in it at other times. If 
one were intently studying the petals of a primrose in 
his hand his conscious field would be narrow as compared 
Avith his conscious field when he is looking at a landscape 
in the distance. 

4. They differ in the speed with which objects cross 
the conscious field. At one time, ideas succeed each 
other very slowly in consciousness ; at another time, they 
jostle each other in a mad rush, and go across the con- 
scious field at a galloping pace. 

Functions of Consciousness. — Consciousness has 
several functions, the chief ones of which are as follows : 

1. It enables the mind to know one mental exper- 
ience from another. This function is of the highest 
importance to the mind. If the mind could not tell one 
mental experience from another it could not know a 
pebble from a pumpkin; a dewdrop from an ocean; a 
man from a mushroom; a mouse from a muUen stalk; a 
hat from a hammer, nor a cabbage from a carrot. In 
short, one could never get started in getting knowledge. 

2. It enables the mind to know the value of its 
experiences to itself. Without this function of con- 



84 Studies in Psychology 

sciousness the mind would never know what of its exper- 
iences to avoid and what to repeat. It could not tell 
which are good for it and which are bad for it. It could 
not tell whether good intentions or bad intentions are to 
be cultivated. 

3. It enables the mind to direct its activities so as 
to do mental work. Without consciousness the mind's 
activities would scatter over all creation as they do in 
dreams. No one thing could be held in mind long 
enough to be thought out. Mental activity would waste 
itself in aimless wandering, if consciousness did not 
cling to some purpose. 

4. It enables one properly to estimate himself. 
Since consciousness enables one to know the condition of 
his own mind, it enables him to estimate himself. It 
enables one to know how much he knows, how much his 
knowledge is limited, the purity of his motives, the 
quality of his intentions and the strength of his will 
power; in short, to know himself. 

Education of Consciousness. — One's consciousness 
is educated when it reveals accurately to him his mental 
conditions. The difference between the man whose con- 
sciousness is educated and the one whose consciousness 
is not educated lies in the fact that one whose conscious- 
ness is educated knows pretty accurately his own worth, 
while the one whose consciousness is not educated 
usually either overestimates or underestimates himself. 
Consciousness becomes educated by study and research, 
just as one grows in any kind of education. 



Studies in Psychology 85 

Read : 

1. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 44-52. 

2. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 46-59. 

3. Angels 's Psychology, pp. 47-63. 



CHAPTER VII. 

Attention. 

Nature of Attention. — The most persistent thing of 
which the human soul is conscious is change. Changes 
in the mind's environment and changes in the mind 
itself are the things studied in every study of the mind. 
Anyone of these changes definite enough to be separated 
from other changes is an experience. Thus an exper- 
ience is a change of some sort, and a mental experience 
is a mental change of some sort. Mental life is a suc- 
cession of these changes or experiences, and so is physical 
life. 

Most of our mental experiences go forward without 
the mind's being clearly conscious of them. The mind 
though has the power of bringing any experience clearly 
into consciousness and of focusing its energy upon it 
after it is in consciousness. This the mind is able to do 
because of the attribute of attention. 

Thus the mind is able to do the two following things 
because of attention: 

1. The bringing of some experience clearly into 
consciousness. 

2. The focusing of its energy upon it. 

A little introspective study shows that at most 
times there are many things in one's mind. As one sits 
in his study he sees books, furniture, pens, pencils,. 



Studies in Psychology 87 

papers, the scenery outside his window, and many other 
things ; he, perhaps, hears children shouting at play, the 
singing of birds, the cackling of chickens, the rushing of 
the train, the clatter of wagons on the road, the ticking 
of the clock, and so on. In short, a large number of 
things are more or less in his consciousness. Most of 
these things, or better the experiences aroused by these 
things, are only dimly in consciousness. But because of 
the attribute of attention the mind is able to exalt 
any one of these dimly conscious experiences into clear 
consciousness. And this is the first thing the mind is 
able to do because of attention. It is a differentiating 
function of the mind. It is the process of separating 
one experience from a more or less integrated mass form- 
ing a substratum in consciousness. 

The second thing which the mind can do because of 
attention is that of narrowing down the field of con- 
sciousness. It is what is usually called concentration. 
It is somewhat analogous to focusing the rays of the sun 
by means of a lens, which consists in narrowing down 
the focal field by converging the rays toward a point. 

From the above study the following definition of 
attention is reached: 

Attention is that attribute of the mind hy virtue of 
which the mind brings some experience clearly into con- 
sciousness and focuses its energy upon it. 

Illustration. — One is sitting in his room engaged in 
reading the morning paper. The clock is sitting upon 
the mantel shelf ticking away as loudly as usual, but he 
does not hear it clearly, though there is a sort of dim 



88 Studies in Psychology 

consciousness of its ticking. Suppose some one says 
"Hows clearly the clock ticks!" Immediately he hears 
it clearly. That is to say, the mind brings clearly into 
consciousness the experience aroused by the ticking of 
the clock and focuses its energy upon it. 

Condition of Attention. — There are certain condi- 
tions which must exist in order to have attention of any 
kind, good, bad or indifferent. These may be grouped as 
follows : 

1. The condition of the self stimulated. 

2. The nature of the stimulus stimulating. 

In order to give good attention one must have a 
normal healthy nervous system and a normal mind in a 
healthy natural condition. No one suffering from 
disease, fatigue, worry, inferior or unhealthy nervous 
organization can rightly be expected to give vigorous 
and prolonged attention. It is a physical and mental 
impossibility. This may be summed up in the state- 
ment that one condition necessary to vigorous, prolonged 
attention is a healthy vigorous tone of the self, both 
mental and physical. 

From the student ^s point of view there are at any 
rate four things fatal to habits of vigorous, concentrated 
prolonged attention. They are as follows: 

1. Food insufficient in quality or quantity. 

2. Insufficient physical exercise. 

3. Insufficient pure, fresh air. 

4. Insufficient quantity of sleep. 

Food insufficient in quantity and quality affects the 
vigor and tone of the whole being physically. And the 



Studies in Psychology 89* 

relation between physical and mental is so close that the 
power of attention suffers in a corresponding degree. 

It is a law of life that a healthy state of any organ 
or system of organs is maintained only by a healthful 
amount of exercise. Lack of exercise brings on languor^ 
ennui and blase' . These conditions, due to the depen- 
dence of one's mental life upon the physical, make 
strongly against attention. 

Bad air is the bane not only of health in the school- 
room, but of comfort, vivacity and all that goes to make 
school life a pleasure and a success. Every adult 
should have 3,000 cubic feet of fresh air per hour, or 
fifty cubic feet per minute as the minimum for the best 
attention. Of course, people can live on a smaller 
quantity of fresh air. It is not the intention to say they 
can not. But it is the intention to say that vigorous, 
prolonged, concentrated attention can not be maintained 
to its maximum under any other conditions. 

Lack of sleep is a common and prolific source of 
poor attention in school work. No one who is sleepy can 
give very good attention to anything. It does not, how- 
ever, seem generally to be understood that every one 
should have as the minimum seven hours of sleep in 
every twenty-four preferably in a majority of cases 
from 11 :00 p. m. to 6 :00 a. m. It is worthy of emphasis 
that this is the minimum. It is also true that in the 
cases of most persons more than seven hours in twenty- 
four are demanded. Again it is not the inten- 
tion to say that one can not live on fewer than seven 
hours of sleep in every twenty-four, but it is the inten- 



90 Studies in Psychology 

tion to say that he can not feel vigorous, happy, sweet- 
tempered ; in short, be his best self, continuously on less 
than seven hours of sleep in every twenty-four. It is 
certainly a well established truth that good attention 
demands seven or more hours of sleep in every twenty- 
four. 

The kind of stimulus has much to do with the 
attention. The reason why some things in themselves 
seem to attract and hold the attention is due to the 
stimulus they furnish. A blinding flash of lightning or 
a terrific crash of thunder will attract one's attention 
under almost any set of circumstances. A runaway 
horse dashing down the street will do the same thing. 

A story is told of a clergyman who, talking in loud, 
monotous tones, was astonished to see many of his con- 
gregation sleeping. He spoke a sentence or two in a 
hollow whisper and several of them awoke with a start. 
Thus change in the stimulus attracts attention. It is 
the quality of the stimulus which the teacher manipu- 
lates in holding the attention of his students. 

Classes of Attention on Basis of Direction. — At 
times one seems to be attending to things outside of his 
mind, and at other times he finds himself attending to 
things in his mind. Said in another way, sometimes 
one's attention is directed inward and sometimes out- 
ward. Thus on this basis there are two classes of atten- 
tion, and they are called: 

1. External. 

2. Internal. 



Studies in Psychology 91 

External attention is that hind of attention the 
stimulus of which is outside the mind. 

Internal attention is that kind of attention the 
stimulus of which is in the mind. 

Illustration. — If one is sitting at his window and 
watching intently the frolics of the jaybirds among the 
trees upon his lawn, his attention is external. But if he 
is thinking of his own motives, hopes, aspirations, likes, 
dislikes, and so on, his attention is the internal kind. 

Classes of Attention on Basis of Effort. — By intro- 
spective study of our own attention we discover that at 
some times we give attention without any seeming effort, 
while at other times conscious effort is required to give 
attention. In the first case the attractiveness of the 
stimulus is so great that the mind is held to it without 
any apparent effort, while in the second case the stim- 
ulus fails to hold the mind. In either kind of attention 
there is involved some effort, but in the one kind the 
effort is not a conscious one, while in the other there is 
peculiarly a conscious effort. This difference in atten- 
tion gives basis for dividing attention into two classes : 

1. Non-voluntary. 

2. Voluntary. 

The following are formal definitions for them: 

Non-voluntary attention is that kind of attention in 
which no conscious effort is involved. 

Volimtary attention is that kind of attention in 
which a conscious effort is involved. 

It is popularly thought that voluntary attention is 
a much higher kind than the non-voluntary and that it 



92 Studies in Psychology 

is the kind possessed by men and women of great ability, 
by geniuses. In fact one frequently hears it said that 
the only difference between the genius and the ordinary 
man is in the power of voluntary attention. A little 
introspective thought, though, shows that voluntary 
attention is not of long continuous duration with any 
one. AVhen the mind strays away from the object of 
attention, by an effort it is hauled back and forced upon 
it. But if the mind stays there very long, it will be 
found that what was voluntary attention has changed 
into the non-voluntary kind and the mind is held by the 
attractiveness of the stimulus. Unless there is such 
attractiveness about the object of attention, the mind can 
not stay there and no attention of any kind will exist for 
it. The effort of attention will prove to be spasmodic 
attempts at short intervals to hold the mind upon some 
object of consideration. Thus voluntary attention is a 
momentary aft'air and is itself very quickly exhausted 
in the effort. 

The attention of the genius is almost wholly of the 
non-voluntary kind. He attends with concentration to 
any object under consideration for a long time because 
it awakens so many new and interesting connections and 
suggests all sorts of pleasant associations, thus opening 
up various and multiform avenues of" thought. 

To the ordinary man not so richly endowed the con- 
nections are fewer, and since there is nothing to hold the 
mind, it soon wanders, and it is said to lack concentra- 
tion. Thus the ordinary mind has much more opportu- 
nity to exercise voluntary attention than the mind of the 



Studies in Psychology 93 

genius. It is mucli more of a necessity for the ordinary 
mind to exercise voluntary attention than it is for the 
mind of the genius. 

Basis of Attention. — The basis of attention is 
interest. And by this is meant the mind gives attention 
to that in which it is interested and does not give atten- 
tion to that in which it has no interest. This is true, but 
what is interest? 

To the mind dissatisfied with vagueness, it is hardly 
sufficient merely to say or think that interest is the basis 
of attention. The meaning of interest must be made 
more definite. 

An examination of various cases of interest shows 
that when one is interested in a thing he has a feeling 
for that thing. Thus one's interest in a thrilling story 
is his feeling for that story; and a child's interest in 
sweetmeats is his feeling for sweetmeats. Thus interest 
is a feeling. But in interest there is always the addi- 
tional thought that the object or action in which the 
mind is interested is the cause of the feeling, and the 
mind so regards it. Thus the following definition of 
interest is reached : 

Interest is any feeling for an object or action which 
the mind regards the cause of the feeling. 

One's interest in art is his feeling for art, the mind 
regarding the art as the cause of the feeling. And a 
man's interest in his family is his feeling for his family 
accompanied by the idea that the family is the cause of 
the feeling. 

Classes of Interest. — An examination of one's inter- 



94 Studies in Psychology 

ests shows that he is interested in some things because of 
themselves and in some other things not because of them- 
selves, but because they are a means to some other thing. 
Thus much of the routine of daily labor is done because 
not of interest in it as an end, but because of interest in 
it as a means to something beyond, the money received 
for it or some other kind of remuneration. One's inter- 
est in an absorbing piece of music or a thrilling narra- 
tion points to nothing beyond itself. It is exhausted in 
the act. This difference in our interests is basis for 
classifying them into : 

1. Direct. 

2. Indirect. 

The following are definitions for these two classes 
of interest: 

Direct interest is that hind of interest ivhich the 
mind has for something as an end. 

Indirect interest is that kind of interest which the 
mind has in something as a mere means to an end be- 
yond. 

Direct interest is the interest with which one works 
when he loves his work. It is the interest which fur- 
nishes the basis for most of life's happiness. It is the 
only kind of interest which is an effective guarantee of 
good work. Work in which there is a direct interest is 
invariably better done, and there is much pleasure in 
doing it. Work done with only an indirect interest is 
drudgery and the tendency always is to slight it. 

The art of correct living is largely included in learn- 
ing to do one's work with a direct interest in the neces- 



Studies in Psychology 95 

sities and vicissitudes of daily life. All work however 
humble or hard may thus have pleasure in it. 

From the teacher's point of view the aim should 
always be to secure direct interest from the children in 
their work. And the teacher who is able to do this 
largely finds his opportunities for helping his children 
broad, and his satisfaction in his own endeavor deep. 

No teacher, though, can secure direct interest from 
all his pupils at all times. The varying conditions of 
life, the influences of heredity, the previous environment 
and disposition of children with their limitations of 
knowledge make it many times an impossibility. From 
which it turns out that some aspects of school work will 
always be drudgery to some children, much the same as 
some aspects of life's work will always be drudgery to 
many people. In such cases the work must be done with 
an indirect interest. 

People are often unaware that they are criticising 
themselves when they say that they can not get inter- 
ested in this or that. The natural healthy attitude of 
the mind is interest in all things. And to be unable to 
get interested in a thing is a sure indication of an un- 
healthy attitude of mind or of a mind with such a small 
store of knowledge that the new thing has few or no con- 
nections, or associations, or it may be an indication of 
both, as it frequently is. One who says he can not get 
interested in a thing is thus saying that he is so ignorant, 
that he does not know enough about it to be interested 
or that he is not healthy in mind. Thus one who is not 
able to get interested in a subject should look within for 



96 Studies in Psychology 

the difficulty and not outward. He will also do well to 
keep still about it, unless it is the desire to show an ab- 
normal, unhealthy condition of his soul or an undevel- 
oped ignorant state of the self. 

From the above it is seen that people's interests are 
quite usually too shallow and too narrow. That is to 
say, most persons are not deeply enough interested in 
enough things. Most persons have a sort of fleeting shal- 
low interest in many things, but an intensive interest 
in a very few things. Thus their lives are touched very 
lightly by most things, and they live only a very small 
part of life's possibilities. Their lives can not be full 
and rich and strong. Only deep life interests in many 
things can make the current surge full and strong. 

The Law of Interest. — The question, Why is one 
interested in a thing at all? suggests itself. If one 
studies his own interests for a short time, he will find 
that he has interest in that which gives or promises 
pleasure or pain. If one is interested in studying or 
reading Tennyson 's Bugle Song, it is likely to be be- 
cause it gives him pleasure. The pleasure one has in a 
thing may be sensuous or intellectual, real or imagined. 
The child is interested in an apple or a stick of candy 
because of the sensuous pleasure it furnishes him. The 
advanced student is interested in his algebra problem 
because of the intellectual pleasure it furnishes him. 

The boy is not interested in a strapping he is exper- 
iencing because of the pleasure it furnishes, but because 
of pain. The traveler lost in the forest is not interested 
in the howling wolves because of the pleasure the howl- 



Studies in Psychology 97 

ing of the wolves furnishes, but because of the pain, but 
he is just as truly interested. 

Thus not only agreeable things but disagreeable 
things as well awaken interest. There is more than one 
way for a thing to be made interesting. 

From the above study the following law of interest 
may be stated : 

The mind is interested in tvhatever gives or promises 
pleasure or pain. 

Laws of Attention. — -The following are statements 
for some of the most important laws of attention : 

1. The mind can not attend to uninteresting 
things. 

2. Attention to an unvarying stimulus can not long 
remain vigorous. 

3. Attention centered on an unvarying stimulus 
tends to produce a hypnotic or comatose condition. 

4. When the mind's power of attention is fatigued 
it may be rested by directing it into new channels or by 
giving one's self up to non- voluntary attention. 

Things entirely without interest never so much as 
find their way into consciousness and the mind can get 
no hold at all upon them to give them the attention. But 
many things which awaken a sort of fleeting interest 
never call forth a real effort of attention because of the 
shallow interest. The only way to secure effective atten- 
tion is to work for deep interest. We find time always 
in life's frantic struggle to attend to those things for 
which our interests are so strong that they have become 
passions. 



98 Studies in Psychology 

It is a common observation as well as a common 
experience that monotony kills attention. That is to say 
lack of variety, sameness in stimulus or sensation always 
has a deadening influence on attention. A public speak- 
er who uses a monotonous tone fails to hold attention. 
A story repeated in an unvarying way ceases to hold 
attention. 

The mental capacity for action in any unvarying 
direction is small, and soon becomes exhausted. As soon 
as it is exhausted the attention in that direction must of 
course cease. 

Many experiments have been conducted to show 
that attention to an unchanging stimulus will stupefy 
one and throw him into a sort of unnatural sleep or into 
a sort of comatose state, a semi-conscious condition. 

It gives some rest when the mind becomes tired of 
attending to one line of work, say history, to direct it 
into new channels, such as arithmetic, or just to let the 
mind follow its own associations in a state of relaxa- 
tion. Such rest, though, is only a matter of redistribut- 
ing the mental energy and nervous energy. Real rest 
with an increase of nervous and mental power comes 
only from cessation of attention in sleep. Sleep is the 
great restorative for all sorts of mental and physical 
fatigue. 

Importance of Attention. — "There is a constant 
struggle on the part of sensations to survive in con- 
sciousness. That sensation which we allow to take the 
most forcible hold on the attention usually wins the day. 
If we sit by an open window in the country on a sum- 



Studies in Psychology 99 

mer day, we may have many stimuli knocking at the 
gates of attention. ' ' Unless we select out some one thing 
and center the attention upon it, nothing but mental 
chaos results. If we give ourselves up to every passing 
stimulus we belong more to our environment than we do 
to ourselves. 

For the sake of the mental habit, one can not afford 
to do less than pay such attention to any public speaker, 
teacher, or preacher as that which would enable him to 
give the chief points in synopsis of the address, if called 
upon to do so. Practice in doing this very thing, giv- 
ing a synopsis of the address, is a most stimulating and 
helpful exercise in acquiring good habits of attention. 

Concentration. — Concentration, the power to focus 
the mind 's energy upon a small field of consciousness for 
periods of considerable duration, is frequently thought 
to be an absolutely necessary characteristic of marked 
ability. It is even thought that, if one does not possess 
this presumably happy power to a considerable degree, 
he can not amount to much as a thinker. A degree of 
power of concentration is a very desirable characteristic 
to possess, but there is a possibility of its being carried 
too far. Extreme concentration is absent-mindedness. 
It is the condition in which one forgets ever3i;hing except 
the subject of immediate thought : forgets to eat ; forgets 
to answer his letters ; forgets to keep his appointments ; 
forgets to speak to his friends; forgets what he goes to 
market for ; in short, forgets a thousand things which the 
highest success in life demands he should remember. 



100 Studies in Psychology 

Then too much concentration, as well as too little, is at 
times both mentally and physically inconvenient. 

And it is not necessarily true that one must possess 
the power of concentration to a high degree in order to 
be a success in the world. Professor William James puts 
this truth well in the following : ' ' This concentrated type 
of attention is an elementary faculty; it is one of the 
things that might be ascertained and measured by exer- 
cises in the laboratory. But, having ascertained it in a 
number of persons, we could never rank them in a scale 
of actual and practical mental efficiency based on its 
degrees. The total mental efficiency of a man is the 
resultant of the working together of all his faculties. 
He is too complex a being for any one of them to have 
the casting vote. If any one of them do have the casting 
vote, it is more likely to be the strength of his desire and 
passion, the strength of the interest he takes in what is 
proposed. Concentration, memory, reasoning power, 
inventiveness, excellence of the senses — all are sudsid- 
iary to this. No matter how scatter-brained the type of a 
man's successive fields of consciousness may be, if he 
really care for his subject, he will return to it incessantly 
from his incessant wanderings, and first and last do 
more with it, and get more results from it, than another 
person whose attention may be more continuous during 
a given interval, but whose passion for the subject is of a 
more languid and less permanent sort. Some of the most 
efficient workers I know are of the ultra-scatter-brained 
type. *****! seriously think that no one of 
us need be too much distressed at his own short comings 



Studies in Psychology 101 

in this regard. Our mind may enjoy but little comfort, 
may be restless and feel confused; but it may be ex- 
tremely efficient all the same.'' 
Read: 

1. Angell's Psychology, pp. 64-90. 

2. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 104- 
129. 

3. James' Talks to Teachers on Psychology, pp. 
91-115. 

4. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 132-148. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Apperception^ Self- Activity, Iterativeness, 
Rhythm. 

Nature of Apperception. — This is another attribute 
of the mind without which knowing would be an impos- 
sibility and without which feeling and willing would 
remain undeveloped. 

All learning is the mind's process of getting mean- 
ing. But to say this does not help much without one's 
having a perfectly definite idea of what meaning is. At 
first thought it seems that objects around one in the 
world have meaning, but a closer study shows that this 
is not the case. The mind in studying a thing appears 
to get meaning from it, it is true, but when it can not 
in any way connect a thing with its past experiences it 
gets no meaning from it. If the thing has small con- 
nection with the mind's experiences, the mind gets smaU 
meaning from it. If the thing has many connections 
with the mind's experiences, the mind gets much mean- 
ing. Thus in learning a thing the mind gets meaning 
from it just to the extent it has past experiences and can 
connect these with the present experiences. Now if the 
mind has had ever so many experiences but not like the 
ones the thing it is trying to learn arouses, it will get no 
meaning. Thus the mind connects the past and present 
experiences by seeing the likeness between them; but to 



Studies in Psychology 103 

see likeness, there have at the least to be two things, and 
to be two things there must be differences. So the mind 
connects its experiences by seeing the likenesses and 
differences between them. 

And from the above truths the inference is that 
meaning is the likeness and difference between our ex- 
periences and is in the mind. 

But what makes one thing put us in mind of 
another? What enables the mind to connect its exper- 
iences, the present with the past? Apperception. 
Apperception is the attribute of mind which enables the 
mind to do this, that is, connect the present with the 
past experiences. 

But this is not all that apperception enables the 
mind to do. Apperception enables the mind to change 
itself permanently with each experience. Every exper- 
ience the mind has leaves the mind a little different from 
what it was before it had the experience. The mind may 
forget the most it has learned, but it never entirely loses 
the effect of the activity it put forth in learning it. The 
mind never is again after an experience just what it was 
before the experience. The effect of the experience 
becomes organized into the self. 

What Apperception Enables the Mind to Do. — 
From the above study it appears that the mind is able 
to do two things because of apperception. They are as 
follows : 

1. It enables the mind to bring past experiences to 
bear upon the present experience in getting its mea/ning. 



104 Studies in Psychology 

2. It enables the mind to organize the effect of the 
present experience into itself. 

The mind learns only by bringing the past exper- 
ience to bear upon the present. It is to be noticed that 
it does this consciously some times but most usually un- 
consciously. Thus when one sees a flower and says that 
it is a beautiful rose, he is not usually conscious that he 
is bringing his past experience to bear upon the present, 
but he is so doing nevertheless. In some cases one is 
perfectly conscious he is bringing the past experience to 
bear upon the present one, but usually he is not. 

The organizing the effect of the experience into the 
self may appropriately be called ntental assinailation. 
The effect of the experience becomes a part of the tissue 
of the mind, so to speak, as the food becomes a part of 
the tissue of the body through physical assimilation. 

Definition of Apperceptio7i. — The following is the 
formal definition of apperception, obtained from the 
previous study: 

Apperception is that attribute of mind by virtue of 
which the mind brings its past experiences to bear upon 
the present experience in getting its meanijig, and by 
virtue of which the effect of the present experience is 
organized into the mind. 

Illustrations. — If one who knows nothing of geology 
were walking down a valley and should find a rock 
almost round, but having a plane surface as if it were 
worn off by holding it on a grindstone, he would prob- 
ably get much the same meaning as he would by looking 
at any other rock. But if a geologist should find it, he 



Studies in Psychology 105 

would connect his past experience with that aroused by 
the rock and say it called to his mind an ice age, when 
tremendous ice fields covered all the northern part of 
Indiana. To one man it means much; to the other one, 
very little. Each brought his past experiences to bear 
upon the present, but one had little similar experience 
while the other had much. 

A child called a jardiniere of ferns "a pot of green 
feathers. ' ' The child had had experience with pots, with 
green things, and with feathers which it brought to bear 
upon the experience aroused by the jardiniere of ferns 
with which it had not had experience. 

A small boy called a locomotive "a big bow-wow."" 
He had had experiences with ' ' bow-wows, ' ' dogs, which 
he brought to bear upon the experience aroused by the 
locomotive with which he had not had experience. 

The south sea islanders called Captain Cook's goats 
''horned hogs." They had had experiences with hogs 
and horns, which they brought to bear upon the exper- 
iences aroused by the goats with vv^hich they had not had 
experience. 

In each of the above cases the present experience 
was connected with the past in trying to get meaning. 
This the mind could do because of apperception. 

The Laws of Apperception.— There are two im- 
portant laws of apperception as follows: 

1. When the mind sees that elements in an experi- 
ence are similar to those of a previous experience, it gives 
the new experience the same meaning as the old. 



106 Studies in Psychology 

2. The mind in learning naturally goes to the un- 
known from the nearest related known. 

Illustrations. — The first law is illustrated by the fol- 
lowing : A little girl just learning to talk learned what 
a pumpkin was from playing with a large round one just 
inside the garden gate. Then she called the moon, a 
marble, the sun, a ball and everything spherical in 
shape a pumpkin for a long time. 

The second law is illustrated by the following: A 
little boy called the chicken's wings its arms. Wings y the 
unknown, was gone to from arms, the nearest related 
known. 

Mastery of a Subject. — From the study of apper-* 
ception, it is easily seen that the mastery of any subject 
consists of three things, as follows : 

1. The understanding of the subject. 

2. Fixing it in mind. 

3. Stating it in good language. 

The mind is able to understand any subject on ac- 
count of the first thing the mind does because of apper- 
ception. It is able to fix in itself anything because of 
the second thing the mind does on account of apper- 
ception. Stating a thing in good language helps, also, 
to fix anything in mind. 

8 elf -activity. — In a sense probably everything in 
the universe possesses self-activity. Physicists tell us 
that the little particles of the stone, wood, soil and every- 
thing else are in a constant state of motion, or activity. 
This, however is not just the sense in which the term is 



Studies in Psychology 107 

used in psychology. In the study here the term will 
be used in its psychological sense entirely. 

Nature of Self-activity. — Some idea of self-activity 
may be had by comparing objects which possess it with 
those which do not. A sewing machine acts in sewing, 
but always from a power without itself. A threshing 
machine acts, but the cause of its activity is not within 
itself. All machines act in a manner similar to the 
threshing machine and sewing machine ; that is, from a 
cause not within themselves. A plant acts in growing by 
taking food from the soil and air and making it over 
into plant tissue ; that is, by making it a part of itself. 
A horse acts from a cause within himself in taking food 
and changing it into horse flesh; and, also, by moving 
from place to place, he acts. The horse moves from place 
to place, takes his environment, breaks down its individ- 
uality and makes it a part of himself. The human body 
acts in moving from place to place, changing itself to fit 
its environment to suit its needs. 

The action of the plant, the horse, the human body, 
and also the mind are caused from within while the 
action of the machine is caused from without. The 
plant, the horse, the human body, and the human mind 
possess self-activity^ but the machine does not. The 
mind is thus self-active, since it possesses the attribute 
by which it causes itself to act. 

Definition of 8 elf -activity. — From the above study 
the following definition of self-activity is reached: 

Self -activity of the mind is that attribute by virtue 
of which the mind causes itself to act. 



108 Studies in Psychology 

Law of Self-activity. — Without self-activity things 
never truly grow. Self-activity is at the basis of all 
growth. Everything which grows grows by means of 
self-activity. The mind grows by self-activity. The 
mind grows most when it is most self-active providing 
the activity is not carried to the extremity of exhaustion. 
Any activity may be carried so far that it ceases to be 
healthy and may result in breakdown or paralysis. Thus 
the law of self -activity may be stated as follows : 

The mind grows hy its own self-activity and grows 
most when exercised to the maximum healthful activity. 

Nature of Iterativeness. — This is another attribute 
of the mind as fundamental as consciousness or atten- 
tion. In brief iterativeriess means the tendency of the 
mind to repeat its phenomena. 

When the muscles of the arms and fingers perform 
the movements in making any character in writing for 
the first time or in playing the piano, the activity is done 
with difficulty and very unskillfuUy. Repeated attempts 
give more skill and success. Each act makes the per- 
formance a little easier to accomplish. Each act affected 
the muscles and the mind, and this effect remained with 
them in the form of a tendency. That is to say when an 
attempt was repeated the mind and muscles tended to act 
so as to make the action a little easier rather than to act 
in some other way. Thus each act of mind or muscle 
leaves a tendency. 

But what is a tendency ? We say the growing point 
of the stem of a plant has a tendency to grow upward, 
and the growing point of the root has a tendency to 



Studies in Psychology 109 

grow downward. We fold a paper, and then say it has 
duck has a tendency to play in the water. What alJ 
a tendency to fold in the same place again. We say a 
these things are in the last analysis which we are ac- 
customed to call tendencies is a mystery. We can not 
define a tendency, but we can characterize it as follows : 

A tendency is a disposition to perform some activity. 

Definition of Iterativeness. — The mind possesses the 
characteristic by which it has a tendency to repeat its 
activities. The following is the formal definition of 
iterativeness : 

Iterativeness of the mind is that attribute hy virtue 
of which the mind tends to act again as it has acted. 

Function of Iterativeness. — It is difficult to estimate 
the value of iterativeness in one's mental life. Its value 
is so great that it can not be overestimated perhaps. 
The following are some of its functions : 

1. It enables the mind and body to form habits. 

2. It enables one to attain skill in activity. 

3. It enables one to acquire arts, as walking, run- 
ning, skating, talking, writing, and so on. 

4. It enables one to remember. Without iterative- 
ness there could be no memory. 

The Nature of Rhythm. — When the word, rhythm, 
is mentioned, most persons probably think of poetry and 
music. Poetry and music possess rhythm, it is true, but 
rhythm is not restricted to them. It belongs to almost 
everything in the world. Everything from a dewdrop to 
an ocean, from a snowflake to a glacier, from a pebble to 



110 Studies IN Psychology 

a continent, possesses rhythm. Every leaf, every flower, 
and every blade of grass possesses rhythm. 

An examination of things possessiong rhythm al- 
ways shows that there is some characteristic, a departure 
from it and a return to it, and that things not possessing 
rhji^hm fail in this characteristic. Thus in a broad sense 
rhythm is as follows: Rhythm is the thing itself, the 
departure from that thing and the return to it. It does 
not matter what the thi^ig is, just so there is the de- 
parture from it and the return to it. The following is 
rhythmical : 

"The day is cold and dark and dreary; 
It rains and the wind is never weary." 

In this there is the sound symbolized by eary in the 
word, "dreary." This is the thing, and "It rains, and 

the wind is never w " is the departure from it. The 

return is the sound of eary in the word "weary." 

In the maple leaf rhythm is manifested by a portion 
on the right half always having a corresponding like 
portion on the left half, the parts between the like parts 
being different. One of the like parts is the thing, that 
between them is the departure from it, and the other like 
part is the return to it. The human mind possesses this 
tendency to act, to depart from the action, and to return 
to it. This is the mind's attribute of rhythm. 

Since the mind is rhythmical it likes rhythm in any- 
thing and dislikes that which is not rhythmical. The 
world is full of rhythm and the human mind longs for it. 

DefiniUon of BJiythm. — From the above study the 



Studies in Psychology 111 

following formal definition of rhythm as an attribute of 
mind is reached : 

Rhythm of the mind is that attribute hy virtue of 
which the mind has an activity, departs from it and 
tends to return to it at regularly recurring periods. 

Function of Rhythm. — ^Without rhythm the activ- 
ities of the mind as well as all other of life's activities 
would lack order, system, regularity and harmony. 
Thus the following is the function of rhythm: 

1. By rhythm the mind introduces order, regular- 
ity, system, and harmony into lifers manifold and com- 
plex activities. 



CHAPTER IX. 
Mental Activities. 

Nature of Mental Activity. — By observation of 
one 's own mind he can see that at one time he is thinking 
of probably arithmetic, and at another time of gram- 
mar ; at one time he is sad, and at another time happy ; 
at one time angry, and at another time in good humor; 
at one time striving to direct his activities, at another 
time resting. That is to say, one sees his mind different 
at different times. And for this reason he knows that 
his mind changes, that he sees it in different conditions 
at different times. 

Now mental activity is the presupposition of the 
mind's being in different conditions at different times. 

Classes of Mental Activities. — By looking into our 
minds to study their activities we are able to see that at 
some times our minds are almost wholly occupied in 
thinking ; again they are depressed with sorrow or elated 
with joy ; and at other times the mind seems to be doing 
nothing much but striving to direct its activities and the 
activities of the body. These distinctions among the 
mind's activities give basis for dividing them into three 
groups : 

1. Knowing. 

2. Feeling. 

3. Willing. 



Studies in Psychology 113 

Order of These Activities. — The order of these 
activities may be seen from almost any common illustra- 
tion. For instance we read of the storm which devas- 
tated Galveston a few years ago, and understood that 
the people were left in desolation — knowing; we sympa- 
thized with them and were sorry for them — feeling; we 
directed our activities to send them money, food, and 
clothing — willing. Thus in any complete act of the 
mind the order of development is knowingy feeling, and 
willing. 

Nature of Knowing. — In general all knowing is the 
mind^s process of getting meaning. But that this state- 
ment may not be misleading the term, meaning, must be 
thoroughly understood. Most persons, at first thought, 
would probably say that meaning is something which 
objects in the external world have. That is to say, 
meaning seems to be in the books, in trees, in rivers, in 
flowers, and so on. But strictly speaking this is an 
error. Careful thinking shows that things very unlike 
what the mind has ever experienced seem to have very 
little meaning for it. And this truth carried on out 
shows that, if it were possible to find anything entirely 
different from anything the mind has ever experienced, 
the mind would get absolutely no meaning from it. 
Again, two persons look at the word, ohliviscor, and 
while one gets no meaning from it, to the other, it means, 
I forget. So no two persons get precisely the same 
meaning from an object or event which they see. An 
object or event stimulates to an activity of the mind, 
and, if the mind has had past mental activities of a sim- 



114 Studies in Psychology 

ilar character to connect the present activity with, it is 
said the mind gets meaning. Thus meaning is a thing 
which is in the mind. That is to say, meaning is rela- 
tion; and further, it is the relation between present men- 
tal experiences and past mental experiences. But to 
trace this thought out further is to study experience and 
relation. 

Experience will be found by accurate thought to 
mean any change, or activity, and any mental experience 
is any mental change, or activity. 

Relation is the connection between the mind's 
experiences. It is the likeness and difference between 
the mind's experiences. 

Definition of Knowing. — From the above study the 
following definitions of knowing are got: 

Knowing is the mind's process of getting meaning. 
Meaning is the relation between the mind's experiences. 
Experiences are changes, or activities. Relation is the 
likeness and difference between the mind's experiences. 

Knowing is the mind's process of grasping the rela- 
tion between its present and past experiences. 

Discriminating and Unifying. — Discriminating is 
seeing differences and unifying is seeing likenesses. The 
mind in knowing sees differences and likenesses between 
its experiences and thus discriminates and unifies. Thus 
knowing is both discriminating and miifying. The 
mind always discriminates first in knowing and unifies 
secondly. One thing necessary in knowing a maple tree 
is to see the difference between the mental activity it 
arouses and the mental activity aroused by the oak tree ; 



Studies in Psychology 115 

and a second thing necessary is to see the likeness 
between the activity aroused by the maple tree and the 
activity aroused by maple trees in the past. 

The mind is not always reflectively conscious that it 
is seeing the likeness and difference between its exper- 
iences, but it sees them just the same. 

Thus we arrive at a third definition of knowing: 
Knowing is the mind's process of, first, seeing the differ- 
ences, and, secondly, the likenesses between its exper- 
iences. 

All Knowing Indirect. — There is no way for the 
mind to get meaning directly from an object. The past 
experience must always come in as a means in knowing. 
This truth leads to the statement that all knowing is 
indirect. That is to say, in knowing, the experience 
aroused by any object is always referred to the past 
experience, and this act of reference to the past exper- 
ience makes the knowing indirect. 

Function of Knowing. — The question here is. Why 
does the mind want to know? What good is there in 
knowing? Careful reflection on this point leads us to 
believe that the mind needs to know that it may direct 
itself and the body to act as they should. There would 
be no need for knowing if there was no acting to be done. 
If one always knew the best thing to do next he would 
have no further need for knowledge. He would be as 
wise as he needs be. Thus knowledge ultimately has its 
end in activity. 

Wisdom and Virtue. — ^Wisdom thus consists in 
knowing what is best to do next. If one possesses knowl- 



116 Studies in Psychology 

edge which never in any way guides in knowing what is 
best to do next, it is not a part of one's wisdom. It 
violates the origin and function of knowledge. It is 
useless. Thus the difference between wisdom and 
knowledge appear. One is wise only to the extent to 
which he knows what is best to do next. 

Thus wisdom consists in knowing what is best to do 
next under any set of circumstances, and virtue consists 
in doing it. 

Nature of Feeling. — In general feeling is the agree- 
able or disagreeable aspect of our experiences. Every 
experience the mind has changes it both temporarily 
and permanently. The mind never is after an exper- 
ience quite what it was before the experience. Some of 
these experiences change the mind for the better and 
some change it for the worse, but all change it perma- 
nently in some way. This change of the self by an ex- 
perience is called the value of an experience. The value 
of an experience may be stated as follows : 

The value of an experience is the effect of the exper- 
ience on the self. 

Experiences have two values to the self: 

1. Positive. 

2. Negative. 

If the experience is in harmany with the growth 
toward well-being, the experience has a positive value; 
that is, if it furthers development toward well-being, it 
has a positive value to the self. If the experience is not 
in harmony with growth toward well-being, it has a 7ieg- 
ative value. That is to say, if the experience hinders the 



Studies in Psychology 117 

development toward well-being it has a negative value 
to the self. 

Now the mind has the ability of becoming aware, to 
a greater or less extent, of the value of experiences to 
itself. That is to say, the mind is aware or thinks it is 
aware, at least, when it has an experience, whether the 
experience furthers or hinders its growth in well-being. 
It is no doubt true that experiences are unfavorable to 
the growth in well-being, even when the mind regards 
them as favorable. And it holds equally true that an 
experience may be favorable to growth in well-being, yet 
the mind regard it as unfavorable. 

When the self has an experience, and becomes 
aware, or supposes it is aware, of the value of this 
experience to the self, the condition, or state, of mind 
which results is feeling. 

Genesis of Feeling. — By genesis of feeling is meant 
the series of mental changes which result in feeling in 
specific instances. Thus one is not in sorrow, but later 
finds himself sad. Now, the question is. What series of 
changes of the self led to the feeling of sadness? This 
series is the genesis of feeling. 

A careful study of the genesis of feeling reveals the 
following steps in it : 

1. An experience. 

2. Value of experience. 

3. Awareness of value of experience. 

4. Resultant state of mind — feeling. 
Illustratio7i. — A fire is pleasant on a cold day. The 

pleasure is a feeling. The fire stimulates one to an 



118 Studies in Psychology 

experience. This experience furthers one's well-being — 
the value of the experience. The mind either consciously 
or unconsciously recognizes this value — the awareness 
of the value of the experience. The resultant pleasure — 
the state of mind, the feeling. 

Definition of Feeling. — The following definition for 
feeling grows out of the genesis of feeling: 

Feeling is the state of mind which results from the 
mind's becoming aware of the value of an experience 
to the self. 

An analysis of this definition reveals the following 
points in it : 

1. A state of mind. 

2. An experience. 

3. The value of an experience. 

4. Becoming aware. 

5. The self. 

By state of mind is meant the disturbed or agitated 
condition of consciousness. It is a deeper thing than 
what is usually called a mental activity. In the activity 
of a muscle, the whole muscle acts together, but the 
individual molecules in the muscle act, too. The ac- 
tivities of the mind are comparable to the activities of 
the muscle as a whole, while the state of mind is compar- 
able to the molecular action. It is an activity, but an 
unobtrusive, subtle activity of the self. 

Feeling is always a state, or condition, of the mind, 
and is always an accompaniment of activity or exper- 
ience. 

An experience, as before seen, is any change, or 



Studies in Psychology 119 

activity, whatever. It is what the feeling accompanies^ 
and what feeling indirectly results from. 

The value of an experience is tJie effect of the exper- 
ience on the life of the person. This effect is in part 
temporary and in part permanent. One thing about it 
is certain, one's experiences organize his life, build his 
character, for a higher or lower destiny. 

Becoming aware is the recognition by the mind 
either consciously or unconsciously of the value of an 
experience to the self. The thing become aware of is 
thus the value of the experience. It is not meant that 
the mind always reflectively and consciously thinks out 
the value of the experience to the self, but that it uncon- 
sciously, or implicitly, responds so as to indicate that 
this is what it has done. 

The self in the widest sense is both the body and the 
mind. Thus there is a physical self and a mental self. 
The physical self is the self-active, self-adjusting organ- 
ism called the body. The mental self is the original 
power of the mind to know, feel, and will plus the effect 
of its experiences on it. 

Forms of Feeling. — All feeling is divided into the 
following large forms, not classes : 

1. Love, or like. 

2. Hate, or dislike. 

3. Indifference. 

Love, or Like. — When the mind has an experience 
which it regards as having a positive value to the self 
the feeling which arises is love, or like. The formal defi- 
nition is as follows : Love is the feeling which arises 



120 Studies in Psychology 

when the mind has an expet^ience ivhich it regards as 
having a positive value to the self. 

It has sometimes been taught that we can love only 
persons, and that we liJte all other things. Such teach- 
ing is purely arbitrary and unwarranted. It is entirely 
correct to say we love flowers, poetry, paintings, music, 
truth, beauty, and goodness. One finds the term, love, 
so used in good English. 

"Any object whatever may become an object of love 
or hatred, though it is usual to restrict these terms to 
higher objects." — Dewey. 

Hate, or Dislike. — If the mind has an experience 
which it regards as having a negative value to the self, 
the feeling which arises is hate, or dislike. The formal 
definition is as follows : Hate is the feeling which arises 
when the mind has an experience which it regards as 
having a negative value to the self. 

Indifference. — There is perhaps no such thing as 
entire indifference with respect to anything, but there 
are various degrees of it. The term, indifference, names 
a mental state and it should be studied and described 
in psychology. 

If the mind regards the experience as having little 
or no value to the self, the state of mind which arises is 
indifference. The following is the formal definition: 
Indifference is that state of mind which arises when the 
mind has an experience which it regards as having 
little or no value to the self. 

The Function of Feeling. — It is difficult to appre- 
ciate the value of feeling in the life of the individual. 



Studies in Psychology 121 

Its functions can not well be overestimated. The three 
following points indicate these to some extent: 

1. It makes life w^orth living. 

2. It is a guide in human action. 

3. It is the mainspring to all human activity. 
Without feeling life would not be worth living. It 

is impossible to conceive what one would want to live 
for, if all feeling were taken out of life. No joy, no 
hope, no love, no happiness, nor pleasure would bless 
one's life, if there were no feeling. Feeling is thus the 
wine of life. 

Feeling is a sort of safeguard which nature has. 
thrown around us. Feeling ahvays accompanies activ- 
ity. If the activity furthers the gro\vi:h toward well- 
being, a pleasant feeling accompanies it to urge, us to 
repeat the activity for the development it furnishes. If 
the activity hinders gro\^i:h toward well-being, a dis- 
agreeable feeling accompanies it to urge us to avoid the 
activity because of the hindrance to development. Thus 
feeling is a guide in action. However it may seem one 
is always ultimately guided by his feeling. 

Feeling urges to activity; that is, it is a spring to 
action. Everything which one intentionally does, he 
does because of feeling; because he loves somebody or 
something. Thus love of truth has produced science 
and philosophy ; love of beauty, architecture, sculpture, 
painting, music and poetry; also, many other beautiful 
things ; love of society, the family, the church, the school 
and the state; love of goodness, ethics. 

Nature of Willing. — A short accurate statement for 



122 Studies in Psychology 

willing is willing is the mind^s process of controlling its 
impulses. 

Willing is a complex process involving both know- 
ing and feeling, being characterized by sttnving to act 
in some way. The process of willing always begins with 
jun impulse. Impulse is an excess of energy, or a sur- 
plus of force. Impulse produces some sort of activity. 

The impulses which urge the little child to throw 
his arms and legs about in any direction before he is 
old enough to control himself are good examples of im- 
pulses. 

By a rather complex process in willing impulse is 
changed into desire. Desire is a feeling directed toward 
something which it is thought will satisfy that feeling. 

Desire in the process of willing is changed into 
choice. Then lastly the mind directs the activities of the 
self toward the realization of the choice; that is, toward 
carrying out the choice. 

Definition of Willing. — The following are both ac- 
curate definitions of willing: 

1. Willing is the mind's process of controlling its 
impulses. 

2. Willing is the process in which the mind 
changes impulses into desire, desire into choice, and in 
which the mind tries to realize the choice. 

An analysis of this definition shows the following 
points in it: , 

1. Impulse. 

2. Desire. 

3. Choice. 



Studies in Psychology 123 

4. The process by which impulse becomes desire. 

5. The process by which desire becomes choice. 

6. The process by which the mind seeks to realize 
the choice. 

Impulse as seen before is a surplus of force. It 
furnishes the power to make the whole process of willing 
go. 

Desire is a feeling for anything which the mind 
thinks will satisfy the feeling. Thus one's desire for a 
drink is his feeling for the drink with the additional 
point that the mind thinks the drink will satisfy the 
feeling. And so it is with every desire. 

A careful analysis of the process by which impulse 
becomes desire shows the following points involved in it : 

1. The mind is conscious of its real condition. 

2. The mind sees an ideal condition of itself. 

3. The mind compares these two. 

4. The mind decides which is better. 

5. A feeling of dissatisfaction arises. 

6. A desire arises. 

Illustration. — A student knows of a lecture, which 
arouses an impulse in him. He is at home — his real con- 
dition; he thinks of his being at the lecture — the ideal 
condition; he compares these two; he decides that to be 
at the lecture is better than to be at home ; he is dissatis- 
fied to be at home, and so desires to have himself at the 
lecture. 

In the process of changing the desire into choice 
there may be involved a conflict of desires; that is, the 
mind may desire two things or more, the possession of 



124 Studies in Psychology 

one of which precludes the possession of the other or 
others. In the illustration given the student probably- 
desired to stay at home and study his lesson, but he also 
desired to be at the lecture. Since he could not both go 
to the lecture and stay at home, there was a conflict of 
the two desires. 

^ The selecting the desire to go to the lecture and 
dropping the other out of mind was the choice. Thus 
choice is selecting a desire and dropping out of mind any 
other desire in conflict with it. The thing chosen is thus 
a desire. 

An analysis reveals the following in the process by 
which desire becomes choice: 

1. Two or more desires before the mind. 

2. The mind compares these. 

3. The mind decides which is better. 

4. The selecting of the better one — the choice. 

The process in which the mind tries to realize the 
choice, consists in the mind's directing the mental and 
physical activities to perform the deed. The directing 
is purely mental, but the activities directed may be 
either mental or physical. In the above illustration, the 
mind's directing the physical activities of going to the 
lecture was the process in which the mind was trying 
to realize the choice. 

The process of realizing the choice may be short 
or may continue through years. . It may be extremely 
difficult and complex, and never is entirely simple. 

The Functions of Willing. — Repeated acts of the 



Studies in Psychology 125 

will give self-control and character. Thus the functions 
of the will are in general two : 

1. Self-control. 

2. Character. 

Self-control is of three kinds: physical, prudential, 
and moral. Character is of two kinds: good and bad. 

Intellect, Feelmg, and Will. — We must distinguish 
between a power of mind and the resulting activity. 
Thus one may have the power to run and not be running 
at all. Thus there is a distinction betAveen the power 
to run and the activity of running. 

Intellect is a power of mind, the power to know. 
Knowing is an activity and the intellect is the power 
which is back of the activity of knowing. The following 
is a formal definition for intellect : 

Intellect is the power by which the mind grasps the 
relation between its present and past experiences. 

In a similar way feeling and will may be defined as 
powers, as follows: 

Feeling is the power of having agreeable and dis- 
agreeable aspects to our experiences. 

The will is the mind's power of controlling its 
impulses. 

Opposition between Knowing, Feeling and Willing. 
— Knowing, feeling and willing oppose each other to 
some extent. Thus one can not know and feel and will 
to the maximum at the same time. If most of the men- 
tal energy is employed in knowing, feeling and willing 
are weakened. Or if one is feeling to the maximum, it 
opposes knowing and willing. The expression, one is 



126 Studies in Psychology 

so angry he has no sense, means feeling opposes the best 
work of the intellect. 

All in All. — In every complete mental activity 
knowing, feeling and willing are all involved. There is 
no complete activity of the mind which is just knowing 
or just feeling or just willing. All are involved in every 
complete activity. Thus all is in all in psychology. 

If the predominating element in an activity is know- 
ing, the act is called one of knowing ; if it is feeling, the 
act is called one of feeling; if it is willing, the act is 
caUed one of willing. Thus mental activities are named 
on the basis of their predominating element. 



CHAPTER X. 
The Sensation. 

Nature of the Sensation. — The sensation is the first, 
most primitive, and least developed conscious mental 
activity which the mind ever has. It is the first con- 
scious step in the mental changes succeeding the physical 
changes in one 's life. It is the first conscious step across 
from the purely physical to the mental. It is the first 
consciousness resulting from external stimulus. 

If one places his hand on a chestnut burr, it acts as 
a stimulus, which excites the peripheral nerve ending. 
This disturbance of the peripheral nerve ending extends 
along the nerve fiber to the brain and there arouses a 
disturbance. This disturbance of the brain is followed 
by a disturbance in the mind from which there results a 
state of consciousness. It is this resultant state of con- 
sciousness which is the sensation. 

Thus the succession of steps leading up to and in- 
cluding the sensation are: 

1. Stimulus. 

2. Excitation of peripheral nerve ending. 

3. Transmission of impulse. 

4. Disturbance in the brain. 

5. Corresponding mental disturbance. 

6. The resultant state of consciousness, that is, the 
sensation itself. 



128 Studies in Psychology 

Stimulus, as before seen, is always some kind of 
motion which comes in contact with some part of the 
nervous system. Thus the stimulus of hearing is motion 
in the air ; the stimulus of sight is motion of the ether ; 
the stimulus of touch is motion in the molecules of 
matter; the stimulus of the muscular sense is motion in 
the muscles. 

Impulse is an excess of energy, or a surplus of 
force. Thus in the transmission of the impulse one 
particle of nervous matter has an excess of energy and 
strikes against another particle and transfers some of 
its energy to it; and it in turn strikes the next, trans- 
ferring some of its energy to it, and so on till the impulse 
reaches the brain. Then the disturbance spreads and 
produces a small or large disturbance in the brain, 
depending upon the force of the stimulus and the ten- 
sion in the brain. 

Just how a disturbance of the mind results from the 
disturbance in the brain is not known. If this were 
known the exact connection between the mind and the 
body could probably be worked out. In our present 
state of knowledge this connection is a mystery. But we 
know positively that there does result a mental disturb- 
ance. 

It is this mental disturbance which arouses con- 
sciousness; that is, arouses the sensation. And since 
one can no more be conscious without being conscious of 
something than he can eat without eating something, the 
sensation is the consciousness of the mental disturbance. 

Definition of Sensation. — The sensation may be de- 



Studies in Psychology 129 

fined as follows: The sensation is the first state of con- 
sciousness resulting from external stimulus. 

The popular notion of sensation is usually vague. 
It is not uncommon to hear the term, sensation, used for 
stimulus and impulse. Sensation is often thought of as 
a physical thing, and is spoken of as being transmitted. 
No sensation is a physical thing and no sensation is ever 
transmitted. Four steps leading to the sensation are 
physical, but the sensation itself is a state of conscious- 
ness, and consciousness is purely a mental thing. 

Classes of Sensations, — There are two classes of 
sensations : 

1. General, or organic. 

2. Special. 

General, or organic, sensations are those which give 
us a knowledge of the ill-being or well-being of our bod- 
ies, and have no special sense organs. Any organ of the 
body which has nerves is an organ of general sensation. 
Pai7i, fatigue, hunger, and thirst are general sensations. 

Special sensations are those which give us a knowl- 
edge mainly of objects around us, and have special 
sense organs. Light, soimd, odor, and flavor are special 
sensations. 

Characteristics of Sensations. — Sensations have 
three characteristics. They are as follows: 

1. Quality. 

2. Intensity. 

3. Duration. 

Quality. — The quality of sensations is the main dif- 
ference between sensations. It is it more than anything 



130 Studies in Psychology 

else which enables the mind to tell the differences 
among material objects. No two objects stimulate the 
mind to quite the same sensations in quality. The mind 
knows hot from cold, rough from smooth, sweet from 
sour, white from black, one man from another, and so 
on because of a difference in the quality of the sensa- 
tions. 

Causes of Difference in Quality. — There are several 
causes of the difference in the quality of sensations, 
some of which are the following: 

1. Difference in the quality of the stimulus. This 
is the main cause of the difference in the quality of 
sensations. The song of the robin gives different sen- 
sations from the song of a hen, the lowing of cows, dif- 
ferent from neighing of horses. The rose gives different 
sight sensations from those given by the lily. A feather 
gives different touch sensations from those given by a 
stone. A carnation gives different sensations of smell 
from those given by the hyacinth. An apple gives dif- 
ferent taste sensations from those given by a strawberry. 
These differences in the quality of sensations are all due 
to differences in the quality of the stimuli. 

2. Difference in the sense organ stimulated. If 
the same stimulus, as an electrical current, be applied 
to the eye and the ear, sensations different in quality 
result. 

3. The time for which the stimulus acts may 
change the quality of the sensation. After one looks 
at red for a long time it may appear green. 

4. The intensity of sensation changes its quality. 



Studies in Psychology 131 

A moderate degree of warmth is pleasant. But by in- 
creasing the stimulus the sensation becomes painful. A 
light gives a pleasant sensation. But increase its intens- 
ity and a place is reached where it becomes painful. 

Intensity. — The intensity of the sensation means 
the force with which a sensation affects one. It is very 
well illustrated by the difference in the sensations 
aroused by a light of ten candle power and one of sev- 
enty-five candle power, or by the difference in the sen- 
sation aroused by a kerosene lamp and by that of an 
electric light. 

Causes of Difference of Intensity. — The following 
are causes of the difference in the intensity of the sen- 
sation : 

1. The intensity of the stimulus. The cause of 
the difference in the intensity of the sensation aroused 
by a candle and by the sun is that the stimulus from 
the sun is more intense than the stimulus from the can- 
dle. Also, the cause of the difference in the intensity 
of the sensation from the report of a rifle and from a 
peal of thunder is in the intensity of the stimulus. 

2. The attention the mind gives it. If the atten- 
tion is centered on the pain from a slight wound, it 
becomes more intense. If no attention is given to 
wounds they often are not at all painful. 

3. The conditon of mind and body. A noise that 
gives but a slight sensation when one is feeling well 
gives a much more intense sensation when one is not 
feeling well. "If we have a headache, a noise that we 
should not ordinarily notice may seem unbearable." 



132 Studies in Psychology 

4. Contrast in stimulus. ' ' Let A be a bowl of cold 
water; B, a bowl of hot water; C, a bowl of lukewarm 
water. Plunge the right hand into A, the left into B; 
then withdraw both and plunge them into C. The luke- 
warm water will seem warm to the right hand, cold to 
the left." Thus contrast affects the intensity of the 
sensation. 

Limits of Sensation. — Our sensations do not ac- 
quaint us with all the phenomena of the world in which 
we live. In fact they acquaint us with only a small 
part of it. Thus the ear can not acquaint most persons 
with vibrations in the air below thirty per second and 
above 36,000 per second. There are vibrations in the 
air below thirty and above 36,000 per second, but we 
have no sensations to give us a knowledge of them. 

We have no sense which gives us sensations of the 
vibrations of ether before they reach 18,000,000 per 
second, when we get sensations of heat. Then there is 
a jump to the sensation of light at about 462,000,000,- 
000,000 per second, which gives red. They increase as 
we pass from one color to another until about 733,000,- 
000,000,000 per second is reached, which gives violet. 
Beyond this the eye does not give us sensations, so all is 
darkness. 

Thus our sensations are limited to a very small 
amount of the phenomena in the world about us. There 
is no knowing how the world would appear if we had a 
dozen more senses. 

The Threshold of Sensation. — *' There is always in- 
ertia to be overcome in rousing nervous matter. A cer- 



Studies in Psychology 133 

tain amount of stimulus is expended in this. If no more 
is added, there is no sensation. When the inertia is 
once overcome, the sensation will perist for a time after 
the cessation of the stimulus. Atmospheric vibrations 
at the rate of ten per second do not sufficiently stimulate 
the brain to render us conscious of sound. When they 
reach a minimum of from sixteen to thirty, they enter 
the threshold of human consciousness; and at a maxi- 
mum of 36,000, they pass out by the upper threshold. 
The cat can hear sounds inaudible to man, and hence has 
a lower aural threshold." Thus sensations have two 
thresholds: 

1. Upper. 

2. Lower. 

Intensity of Sensation not Proportional to Intensity 
of Stimulus. — The increase in the intensity of the sensa- 
tion is not proportional to the increase in the intensity 
of the stimulus. 

'* Within certain limits, any sensory stimulus may 
be augmented without increasing the sensation. We 
should not perceive increased intensity in a sound when 
augmented one-fourth. An ounce might be added to 
two pounds without detection by the pressure sense. 
The additional stimulus necessary to increase the inten- 
sity of a sensation varies for different senses. Sound 
must be increased one-third; light, only one one-hun- 
dredth." 

Thus doubling the stimulus in intensity does not 
double the sensation in intensity. 

Duration. — The duration of the sensation has refer- 



134 Studies in Psychology 

ence to the time which it lasts. Thus the difference be- 
tween a whole note and a half note of the same pitch, 
intensity, and quality, is in their duration. Again, some 
tastes endure for a long time while others disappear 
quickly ; that is, the duration of some is greater than of 
others. 

The Local Sign of Tactile Sensations. — There is 
something about touch, or tactile, sensations which en- 
ables the mind to know the point of application of the 
stimulus. Thus when the foot is touched the mind does 
not make the mistake of thinking it is the face which is 
touched. This characteristic of the sensation is the 
local sign. The formal statement for it is as follows: 
The local sign of tactile sensations is that characteristic 
of them which enables the mind to tell the point of appli- 
cation of the stimulus. 

Aspects of the Sensation. — If one should put his 
hand upon a hot stove, the sensation got would (1) 
enable him to know something; (2) give pain; and (3) 
stimulate him to act. Thus there are three aspects to the 
sensation as follows: 

1. Intellectual. 

2. Emotional. 

3. Volitional. 

The intellectual aspect of the sensation is that one 
which enables the mind to get knowledge from the sensa- 
tion. It furnishes the basis for the development of 
knowing. 

The emotional aspect of the sensation is that aspect 



Studies in Psychology 135 

which is pleasurable or painful. It furnishes the basis 
for the development of feeling. 

The volitional aspect of the sensation is that aspect 
which urges to action. It furnishes the basis for the 
development of willing. 

Comparison of General and Special Sensations. — 
The following points in the comparison of general and 
special sensations are worthy of study: 

1. General sensations enable the mind to know 
the ill-being or well-being of the body; the special, 
mainly the outside world. 

2. General sensations have no special sense organs ; 
the special have. 

3. The knowledge got through general sensations 
is vague, while that obtained through special sensations 
is much more definite. 

4. The emotional aspect predominates in the gen- 
eral sensations; the intellectual, in the special. 

5. General sensations have no special brain areas; 
special have. 

Pain, hunger, fatigue and thirst as examples of 
general sensations give one only a knowledge of the ill- 
being or well-being of the body. This is the function of 
the general sensations. Color, odor, sound, flavor and 
so on, special sensations, give one a knowledge mainly 
of objects in the outside world, though not wholly. The 
mind can also get a knowledge of the body through 
special sensations. 

Any part of the body containing nerves is an organ 
of general sensation; not so, in regard to the special 



136 Studies in Psychology 

sensations. Their organs are the eyes, the ears, the 
nose, and so on — special organs. 

Pain, fatigue, and so on, general sensations, do not 
give definite knowledge. The knowldege got through 
them is general and vague. Sound, flavor, odor, and 
color, special sensations, give definite knowledge. 

General sensations are mainly painful or pleasur- 
able. This is the most important thing about them. But 
the most important thing about the special sensations is 
their value to the intellect. They enable the mind to 
get knowledge. 

General sensations are not aroused by impulses 
being carried to special brain areas. Any part of the 
cortex of the brain seems to be connected with general 
sensations. Sight sensations, auditory sensations and so 
on have special brain areas. 

Read: 

1. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 60-103. 

2. Angell's Psychology, pp. 91-121. 

3. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 27-44. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The Senses. 

The Nature of a Sense. — A sense is wholly a mental 
thing. It is not made up of nerve endings, tissues, blood 
vessels nor cells. It is not a physical thing at all. It is 
entirely mental. It is a sense which enables the mind 
to get sensations. The following is the formal statement 
for it: A sense is the mind's power to get sensations. 
Thus the sense of sight is the mind's power to get sensa- 
tions of color; the sense of hearing is the mind's power 
to get sensations of sound; smell, the mind's power to 
get sensations of odor. 

**A sense is not an organ or group of nerve-ends, 
but a power of the mind. A sense is the mind's power 
to receive impressions of the outer world by means of 
a particular set of nerves, or part of the nervous system. 
For example, the sense of smell is the mind 's power to be 
impressed through the agency of the olfactory nerves 
and their special connection in the brain." 

Classes of Senses. — There are in general two classes 
of senses: 

1. General, or organic. 

2. Special. 

Pain, hunger, thirst and fatigue are sensations got 
through the general sense. It will be seen that their 
function is chiefly to inform one of the ill-being or well- 



138 Studies in Psychology 

being of the body ; also, that they have no special organs. 
Any part of the body having nerves is an organ of the 
general sense. Thus the hands, the eye, the stomach, the 
heart and the liver are organs of the general sense. The 
definition of the general sense is as follows: 

The general sense is that sense which gives one a 
knowledge of the ill-being or well-heing of the hody and 
has no special organs. 

Color, sound, odor, and flavor are sensations got 
through the special senses. Their functions, it is seen, 
are mainly to give us knowledge of objects in the outside 
world. They have special organs. Thus the eye is the 
organ of color sensation ; the ear, of sound sensation ; the 
nose, of odor sensations ; and the mouth, of flavor sensa- 
tions. The definition of a special sense is as follows ; 

A special se7ise is that hind of sense which gives us 
mainly a knoivledge of objects around us, and which has 
special organs. 

The Special Senses. — The special senses are seven 
in number, though not long ago it was thought that there 
were only five. If they be named accordingly as they 
give most knowledge during one's whole life under 
normal conditions, they are as f oUow^s : 



1. 


Sight. 


2. 


Hearing. 


3. 


Touch. 


4. 


Smell. 


5. 


Taste. 


6. 


Muscular. 


7. 


Temperature. 



Studies in Psychology 139 

The Temperature Sense. — ''Next to the organic 
sense in its generality, is the Thermal, or Temperature 
Sense, yielding the sensations of heat and cold. This 
sense was formerly not distinguished from that of touch, 
for the reason that its nerve ends are distributed 
through the skin. But experimentation finally estab- 
lished the fact that these sensations arise from the ex- 
citation of separate nerve ends devoted to this purpose. 
Some of these are susceptible only to contacts of rela- 
tively high temperature, and are known as heat spots; 
others only to contacts of low temperature, and are 
known as cold spots. These are closely interspersed 
throughout the skin, but may be located by the use of a 
metal pencil or needle. If this when heated be touched 
to a 'cold spot,' only the sensation of contact will be 
felt ; the same will be true if a cold point touches a ' heat 
spot.' It should be remembered that 'heat and cold are 
only skin deep. ' The temperature of the blood, and con- 
sequently of the flesh, does not vary greatly with the 
changes of atmospheric temperature. The temperature 
of the blood is confined within the range from 95" t 106 ** 
Fahrenheit, the normal temperature being from 97° to 
98.5°. Sidney Smith, on a hot day, wished to 'take off 
his flesh and sit in his bones. ' It would have answered 
as well to take oft' his skin only." 

There are the two following reasons why the 
temperature sense is to be considered a separate sense 
from the touch : 

1. They have separate nerve fibers and nerve end- 
ings. 



140 Studies in Psychology 

2. Their delicacy does not vary in the same way 
over different parts of the body. The tip of the tongue, 
the ends of the fingers and the lips are most sensitive to 
touch, while the cheek, not very sensitive to touch, is the 
most sensitive to temperature. 

The Muscular Sense. — The muscular sense and 
touch are so closely connected that formerly they were 
not discriminated. And there are some psychologists 
now who do not regard it as a separate sense. But it is 
better regarded a separate sense. 

There are afferent nerve fibers which have their 
peripheral ending in the muscles. When the muscles 
act or are at rest these fibers carry impulses into the 
brain and there result muscular sensations. The mental 
power to get sensations of motion and resistance from 
sensory nerve fibers having their peripheral ends in the 
muscles is the muscular sense. 

The chief sensations got through this sense are the 
sensations of movement and resistance. Both measure 
muscular energy which is being put forth. Without the 
aid of other senses the mind learns muscular movement, 
its distance and direction; also, the amount of energy 
put forth in Overcoming resistance in any form what- 
ever, weight, hardness, or rigidity. 

Ideas Got from Muscular Sense. — Through the var- 
ious muscular sensations the mind gets ideas of motion, 
extension, distance, direction, weight, hardness, softness, 
rigidity and pliahility. 

The muscular sense is thus seen to be a very import- 
ant sense. It gives us the original ideas which furnish 



Studies in Psychology 141 

the basis for geometry and physics. Without the mus- 
cular sense our progress in getting acquainted with the 
external world would be very slow if not impossible. 

The Sense of Taste. — Taste is that special sense 
whose end organs are the taste huds in the tongue. This 
is a statement for taste in a strict sense. What is usual- 
ly called taste is really a combination of three senses: 
taste proper, smell, and touch. It is a common observa- 
tion that when anything affects the sense of smell, a 
bad cold, for instance, our food tastes different. And 
much of the pleasure which comes from eating jellies, 
ices, etc., is derived from touch and the temperature 
sense. 

There are on the tongue papillae which give the 
roughness to the tongue, and in these papillae are taste 
buds. Soluble substances reduced to liquid form soak 
into these taste buds and stimulate them. From these 
stimuli there result the sensations of taste. 

The distinct tastes are four in number : sweet, sour, 
salt, and hitter. There are many combinations of these 
four. Such so-called tastes as puckery, pungent, and 
hot are not regarded by psychologists as tastes, properly 
speaking. They are called mechanical effects. "All 
these 'mechanical effects' belong really to the class of 
organic sensations. ' ' 

Functions of Taste. — The functions of taste are in 
general three: 

1. It has been called the ' ' sentinel of the stomach. ' ' 



142 Studies in Psychology 

2. It gives points of knowledge about substances in 
the external world. 

3. It gives us a great deal of pleasure. 

The Sense of Smell. — The sense of smell is that 
special sense whose organ is the nose. Hidden away in 
the upper cavities of the nose are two small patches of 
mucous membrane. In these are distributed the olfactory 
nerves, the nerves of smell. They are affected by gas- 
eous particles of matter coming in contact with them, 
and there result the odor sensations. 

''These nerve ends are extremely sensitive and may 
be stimulated by inconceivably small portions of matter. 
It has been calculated that three one hundred millionths 
of a grain of musk can be distinctly smelled ; and a sub- 
stance called mercaptan can be smelled in still more 
minute quantities.'' 

Odors are many in number but they do not have 
definite names. They are usually grouped as: 

1. Agreeable. 

2. Disagreeable. 

These terms are not definite in meaning, but very 
vague. 

The effects of ammonia, horse-radish, pepper, snuff, 
and dust are not considered as sensations of smell, 
properly speaking. They more properly belong to the 
organic sense. 

Functions of Smell. — The functions of smell are 
similar to those of taste. They are three in number. 

1. Smell is a sentinel to the stomach and the respi- 
ratory organs. 



Studies in Psychology 143 

2. Smell gives us ideas of many substances in the 
external world. 

3. Smell gives us a great deal of pleasure. 
''Confusion of Taste and Smell. — The confusion of 

taste and smell is a very common experience. Many sub- 
stances, as fruits and cakes or confectionery containing 
certain 'flavoring extracts/ as vanilla, peppermint, etc., 
when taken into the mouth and subjected to its heat and 
moisture and the process of chewing, give off vapors 
which rise from the pharynx into the upper cavities of 
the nose and produce sensations of smell. These, occur- 
ring in such close connection with real sensations of 
taste, are not discriminated from them, and all go in as 
Haste.' The so-called cooking extracts have no true 
tastes, but only their respective odors and certain 
mechanical effects due to the alcohol which they con- 
tain. The taste of onions is sweetish, where any exists; 
their chief characteristic, even in the mouth, being their 
odor and the 'strong' mechanical effect. If the nasal 
passages be properly obstructed, one can not distinguish 
by taste alone peppermint or wintergreen lozenges from 
each other or from those without any 'flavoring' ele- 
ment. ' ' 

The Sense of Touch. — Touch is that one of the 
special senses which gives sensations of contact and pres- 
sure. The sense organs of touch are distributed through 
the layers of the skin. There are several forms of these. 
These are special endings of afferent nerve fibers, and 
some of them are quite complex. There are the follow- 
ing of these organs: 



144 Studies in Psychology 

1. Touch cells. 

2. Pacinian corpuscles. 

3. Tactile corpuscles. 

4. End bulbs. 

The organs of touch are more numerous or more 
sensitive in some parts of the skin than in other parts. 
The tip of the tongue, the lips, and the finger tips are 
most sensitive, while the thigh or mid dorsol region is 
least sensitive. The finger tips of the blind become most 
wonderfully sensitive, since they have to depend upon 
them largely for their knowledge of the external world. 

Strictly speaking the sensations of touch are only 
those of contact and pressure. Pressure by some author- 
ities is considered intensity of contact. 

Functions of Touch. — The functions of touch are in 
general of two classes : 

1. Pleasure- giving. 

2. Knowledge-giving. 

The sensations of smoothness and softness are pleas- 
urable. They are especially so when combined as in 
velvet, or the human skin. Dust and sand give pleasant 
sensations to the feet and hands of children. Rough- 
ness and hardness when combined into harshness are on 
the other hand, disagreeable. 

The knowledge-giving function of touch is by far 
its most important function. Along with the muscular 
sense it gives us our most fundamental ideas of the 
material world. 

' ' Thus we derive from contact, first, the idea of 
extension, and thus also of superficial form. This comes 



Studies in Psychology 145 

from what is known as 'plurality of points/ that is 
through the number of points of stimulation, or of nerve 
ends excited. The idea of motion may also be derived 
from the succession of stimulated points, as when we 
draw a pencil point across the skin, or in the progress of 
a fly or other creeping thing across the cuticle. From 
plurality of points, we also derive ideas of surface^ as 
roughness, smoothness, the rough surface being that in 
which the projecting points are relatively few and far 
apart, as in a rough-plastered wall contrasted with . a 
polished surface. Some idea of weight may also be 
derived, as when a weight is placed on the back of a 
hand supported by a table." 

The Local Sign of Tactile Sensations. — It will be 
remembered that local sign of touch sensations is thai 
characteristic of them ivhich enables the mind to know 
the point of application of the stimulus. Thus the mind 
knows pretty well just where the stimulus is applied on 
the skin or at how many points on the skin. This en- 
ables the mind to tell the form and size of objects. 

"The accuracy of this localizing power varies 
greatly with different areas of the skin. This may be 
tested by touching the skin at two points simultaneously, 
as with the points of a pair of compasses or scissors, and 
noting the distance between them necessary to produce 
a consciousness of two contacts. This distance is least 
on the tip of the tongue, where it is only four-hun- 
dredths of an inch, whereas, on the middle of the back 
the points must be over two inches apart in order to be 
distinguished as two." 



146 Studies in Psychology 

Thus touch gives the following ideas: extension, 
roughness, smoothness, weight, form, distance, motion 
and size. 

''The value and importance of active touch is em- 
phasized by the fact that it is so often employed as a 
court of appeal from the other senses. 'There are 
ghosts to all senses but one ; ' but whatever seems real to 
the touch has met the supreme test of reality. 'Let me 
take hold of it,' is our demand when we distrust our 
other senses." 

The Sense of Hearing. — The sense of hearing is 
that special sense which gives sensations of sound. The 
sense organ of hearing is the ear. The ear is a very 
complicated organ consisting mainly of cavities, canals, 
fluids and membranes. In these are distributed the ends 
of the fibers of the auditory nerves. 

The stimuli of hearing under ordinary conditions 
are waves, or vibrations, of the air. These vibrations are 
produced by some vibrating body. 

These waves of the air disturb the ends of the 
auditory nerves and set up impulses which result in 
sensations of sound. 

Classes of Sound. — Sounds are of two classes : 

1. Noises. 

2. Tones. 

Tones are sounds produced by regularity of vibra- 
tion of the air. Noises are sounds produced by irregu- 
larity of vibration in the air. 

Characteristics of Tones. — The characteristics of 
tones are three : 



Studies in Psychology 147 

1. Pitch. 

2. Intensity. 

3. Timbre, or quality. 

Pitch, which is ordinarily called highness or low- 
ness, of sound is due to the rapidity of vibration. A 
sound of the human voice produced by the vibration of 
the vocal cords at the rate of 100 per second is very low ; 
one produced by the vocal cords vibrating at the rate of 
700 times per second is very high. 

The range of the human voice is from eighty-seven 
to 768 vibrations per second ordinarily, though a famous 
singer's voice is said to have reached a height of 1,365 
per second. 

The ears of most persons are capable of responding 
to vibrations so as to hear only between thirty and 36,000 
vibrations per second. But in rare instances sounds are 
heard produced by from sixteen to 40,000 vibrations per 
second. 

The middle C of the musical scale is produced by a 
rate of 256 vibrations per second. 

Intensity of sound is usually called loudness or 
softness of sound. It results from the amplitude of the 
vibrations in the air. The amplitude of vibration has 
reference to the distance through which the vibrating 
medium swings. Thus if one vibrating string swings 
through a space of six inches and another swings 
through a space of twelve inches, the amplitude of the 
vibrations of the air produced by the second is greater 
than those produced by the first. Thus the amplitude, 



148 Studies in Psychology 

or breadth, of the sound waves determines the intensity 
of the sound. 

Timbre, or quality, of tone is that characteristic 
which enables the mind to tell tones of the same pitch 
and intensity one from another, as the tone of one 
friend's voice from another, the song of the robin from 
the song of the thrush, the song of the oriole from the 
song of the cat bird, the music of the fiddle from the 
music of the mandolin, or of the flute from the bagpipe. 
It is said that the difference in quality is due to differ- 
ence in overtones. 

Functions of Hearing. — The functions of hearing 
are in general of two kinds : 

1. Pleasure-giving. 

2. Knowledge-giving. 

The chief pleasure-giving value is to be found in 
music. Music charms, soothes, and delights the mind 
of everyone from the infant to the most aged. 

In addition to pitch, intensity ^ and quality of sound 
the mind gets harmony, distance, and direction through 
hearing. These when associated with objects give the 
mind a great deal of knowledge concerning objects in the 
external world. 

The Sense of Sight. — Sight has been called the king 
of the senses. Its wonderful range and its constant use 
during all of one's waking hours properly give it this 
high position. 

Sight is that one of the special senses which gives, 
sensations of light and shade. 

Organ of Sight. — The eye is the organ of sight. 



Studies in Psychology 149 

*'The organ of sight is a seemingly more simple but no 
less wonderful instrument than the organ of hearing. 
The enclosing envelope, or eyeball, consists of three coats 
or layers. The outer, called the Sclerotic coat, is a tough 
white membrane, which encloses the eye except in front, 
where the transparent cornea takes its place, like the 
crystal of a watch set in its case. Next within is the 
Choriod coat, a thin, black coat of great delicacy. In 
front, it is modified into the curtain called the Iris, the 
circular opening in which is called the Pupil. The iris 
contains certain muscles by the contraction of which 
the pupil may be dilated or contracted. The third or 
inner coat, called the Retina, covers only the back por- 
tion of the eyeball, having the form of a cup or bowl. ' ' 

The space inside these coats is filled up with humors 
and lenses. 1. Just back of the cornea is a watery fluid 
called the Aqueous Humoi\ 2. Just behind this humor 
is the Crystalline Lens, ' ' a double convex lens of a jelly- 
like substance having considerable elasticity and en- 
closed in a capsule attached to the Suspensory Liga- 
ment." 3. Between the crystalline lens and the retina 
is the Vitreous Humor, a semifluid substance. 

Stimulus of Sight. — The stimulus of sight is vibra- 
tions of ether. Ether is a medium which pervades all 
space. The vibrations of ether enter the eye in rays, 
or lines, of light. The waves of these rays are many in 
number per second ranging from 462 trillions to 733 
tnllions. 

These rays of light pass into the eye and stimulate 



150 Studies in Psychology 

the retina from which result the sensations of light and 
shade. 

Accommodation. — In order that rays of light may 
be focused upon the surface of the retina so as to form a 
correct image, means of adjusting the crystalline lens 
are provided. If the object to be seen is close to the 
eye the lens must be more convex than if it is at a 
distance. This adjustment of the lens to suit the eye to 
the distance of the object is called Accommodation. 

In order that the student may understand accommo- 
dation, it is absolutely necessary that he have well in 
mind the position of the parts of the eye. Having these 
in mind he can understand the following explanations: 
*'In a state of rest the front of the lens is kept some- 
what flattened by the suspensory ligament, which is at- 
tached to the crystalline lens and to the ciliary process- 
es. The ciliary processes are attached to the ciliary 
muscle, which is itself firmly attached to the point of 
junction of the cornea and sclerotic. When the ciliary 
muscles contract the ciliary processes are pulled for- 
ward. This loosens the suspensory ligament, and the 
crystalline lens by its own elasticity becomes more con- 
vex. The strain felt in looking at an object very near to 
the eye is the muscular feeling due to the contraction 
of the ciliary muscle. ' ' — Dexter and Garlick. 

"How does the lens change its curvature? The 
crystalline lens is elastic, that is, if its surface be made 
flatter by pressure, it recovers its original curvature and 
shape when the pressure is removed. We have seen that 
the lens is kept in its place by the suspensory ligament 



Studies in Psychology 151 

passing off from its edge to the ciliary processes all 
around it. The lens itself is enclosed by a transparent 
membrane, thicker in front than behind, called the cap- 
sule of the lens. It is to this capsule that the suspensory 
ligament is attached, but the suspensory ligament not 
only joins the capsule at the edge of the lens, but be- 
comes directly continuous with the part of the capsule 
covering the front of the lens. This ligament is natur- 
ally tight, so that it is always more or less compressing 
the front of the lens, making this surface less convex 
than it would otherwise be. When we are looking at dis- 
tant objects the pressure of the suspensory ligament is 
reducing the curvature of the front surface of the lens 
as much as possible, so as to make the lens weak. In 
this condition also is the lens when the eye is at rest, as 
during sleep. From the junction of the cornea and 
sclerotic there are fine unstriated muscle fibers passing 
downward into the ciliary processes. These form a con- 
tinuous ring of delicate muscle, called the ciliary muscle. 
When this muscle contracts, the ciliary processes with 
the loosely-attached choroid are drawn upwards towards 
the origin of the muscle from the junction of the firm 
and immovable sclerotic and cornea. As the ciliary pro- 
cesses are moved they carry with them the attachment of 
the suspensory ligament up nearer to the lens ; thus the 
whole suspensory ligament is slackened. When we look 
at a near object this muscle contracts, and so slackens 
the suspensory ligament, and the lens, the pressure on 
its anterior surface being lessened, becomes by its own 
elasticity more convex." — Foster and Shore. 



152 Studies in Psychology 

External Muscles of the Eye. — The eyeball must be 
turned in various positions in seeing. There are six 
muscles attached to the eyeball on the outside: four 
straight muscles, called Recti, and two oblique muscles, 
called Obliqui. The recti move the eyeball up and down 
and to the right and left. The obliqui run through 
loops which act as pulleys and move the eyes in direc- 
tions between those produced by the recti. 

These muscles are important psychologically in 
that sensations from them help sight in furnishing ma- 
terial for various kinds of ideas. 

The Unaided Office of the Eye. — In adult life we 
get so much of our knowledge through the sense of sight, 
that we are likely at first thought to overestimate its 
original power. Though in adult life we get ideas of 
distance, direction, size, form, roughness, smoothness, 
hardness, softness, heat and cold, not one of these 
ideas came to the mind originally through sight. Orig- 
inally sight gives but three things : 

1. Colors. 

2. Combination of colors. 

3. Intensity of light. 

Mr. Dewey calls these three things (1) hue, (2) 
tint, and (3) intensity. 

'*A man who had never seen until lie was thirty 
years old has sent to The Problem, a magazine for the 
blind, a remarkable account of his experience when the 
bandage was drawn from his eyes in the hospital, and 
he was, as it were, born again into the world. 

What I saw frightened me, it was so big and 



Studies in Psychology 15^ 

made such strange emotions I called out in terror and 
put out my hand. My fingers touched my nurse's face. 
I knew she was there, for she had just taken the bandages 
from my eyes, and I knew what I was touching, but I 
did not know what it was I saw. 

*For mercy sake, what is it?' I asked. The nurse 
answered me soothingly, taking my fingers in her hand 
and moving them from her mouth to her eyes, to her 
nose, chin and forehead. 

' It is my face that you see. Look ! You know this 
is my mouth — my chin — and these are my eyes. ' 

Soon I knew that I was seeing what was familiar to 
the touch of my fingers — a human face. But the sensa- 
tion was still one of terror. I seemed so small beside that 
expanse of human features which was so familiar to my 
fingers, so unnatural to my new sense. 

When the nurse moved away from my cot, I felt a 
new sensation, which was so agreeable that I laughed 
aloud. The nurse came back, but not so close as before. 

'What is that?' I asked. 

'You are looking at the blanket which lies across 
your feet,' she said. 

'Blankets must be very beautiful things,' I said. 

'It is a red blanket,' she explained. 

Then I thought I knew why people spoke of the 
beauty of the red rose. This was my first knowledge of 
colors. 

I saw and yet I did not know that I saw. How 
could I know at first that those new and wonderful sen- 
sations meant the birth of a sense of which I knew noth- 



154 Studies in Psychology 

ing except in theory? Of course I was expecting to see, 
but was this sight — this jumble of extraordinary sensa- 
tions? 

The dazzling light first convinced me, for I had 
always been able to distinguish between night and day. 
But I could not recognize objects with my new-found 
sense until I had translated into its speech the language 
of the other senses. 

The one lesson of the blanket was sufficient to teach 
me the color, red. Yellow was a different matter. The 
nurse brought me a cool drink. I could recognize her by 
sight now. The thing I saw in her hand I knew to be a 
tray after I had felt it. Suddenly I felt a thrill of 
disgust. 

'What is that thing on the tray?' I asked. 'It 
makes me sick.' 

'It is a lemon. You said you liked lemonade.' 

'Then it is yellow. It is the color that nauseates 
me. ' 

Any object close to me looked tremendously large. 
I had often romped with children, yet when I first set 
eyes on a baby it looked gigantic. 

The first day I sat by the window I put my hand out 
to feel the pavement. 

' That must be the pavement, ' I said. ' I 'm going to 
feel of it to make sure. ' 

' My goodness ! ' laughed the nurse. ' The pavement 
is two stories below. ' 

The first meal I ate was an odd experience. When 



Studies in Psychology 155 

I saw the great hand with a huge fork approaching my 
mouth, the inclination to dodge was ahnost irresistible.'* 
Read : 

1. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 50-75. 

2. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 29-40. 



CHAPTER XII. 

Sense-perception. 

The Development of Knowing. — The most helpful 
way to study knowing is to study its development be? 
cause in this way the mind sees how the different ele- 
ments to be studied in knowing have come into existence, 
how they change and are succeeded by new products. 

But at once we are confronted with the question, 
What does the development of knowing consist of ? And 
to answer this question, it is necessary to rethink what 
knowing is. This was defined in a previous study as 
follows : 

Knowing is the mind^s process of grasping the re- 
lation between its experiences. So, in brief, all knowing 
is a process of grasping relations. This is true whether 
it be the simplest kind of knowing of the little child or 
whether it be the highest kind of knowing of the most 
profound thinker. 

Illustration. — One finds a peculiar looking plant 
growing in a pasture. He knows it is a plant because the 
experiences which it arouses in his mind are related 
to the experiences which plants have aroused in his mind 
before, but beyond knowing it is a plant, he is not 
aware of having any knowledge concerning it. What 
kind of roots, what kind of blossoms, what kind of 
fruit it produces, he does not know. Whether it is benef- 



Studies in Psychology 157 

icent in its connection with man or whether it is in- 
jurious he does not know. If we should ask him why 
he does not know these things, he will say something 
Avhich in substance will mean he lacks experience with 
the plant. But one may learn to know all these things 
and the learning will be seeing the plant in its relations. 
So it looks as if knowing is seeing the relations between 
outside objects in this case. But scientifically speaking 
the mind can not do such a thing. The mind is mental 
and can deal with only mental things; that is, with 
mental experiences. Knowing the plant is then grasp- 
ing the relations between the experiences the mind is 
stimulated to, by these various things in connection with 
the plant. 

Knowing is then getting relations between our ex- 
periences and relations are in the mind only. They are 
the connections between our mental experiences. 

If few relations are grasped the knowing is little 
developed, but if many relations are grasped the know- 
ing is much developed, and so gaining in ability to get 
relation is one thing the development of knowing con- 
sists of. 

Not all the knowledge one has of anything is of 
equal importance, and so not all relations grasped are 
of equal importance. Some are of little importance and 
some are of much importance. 

To know that the toad is a homely creature is not as 
important as to know that he is one of man's best 
animal friends. To know that the three-leaved ivy vines 
is not as important as to know that it is a most dangerous 



158 Studies in Psychology 

poisonous plant. To know that malaria causes chills 
is not as important as to know that it is caused by a lit- 
tle animal living in the red blood corpuscles. 

An important thing in knowing then, is to dis- 
tinguish between important and unimportant relations 
and that knowing which does so is more developed than 
that which does not. Also, that knowing which dis- 
tinguishes to a large degree between the important re- 
lations and the unimportant ones is more developed than 
that knowing which distinguishes between the important 
and unimportant relations to a small degree. 

A second thing thus that the development of know- 
ing consists of is gaining in ability to distinguish be- 
tween important and unimportant relations. 

Though one could both get more and more rela- 
tions and distinguish between the important and unim- 
portant ones and yet was very slow in doing these 
things something would be lacking. And one who can 
do these two things readily is evidently a more devel- 
oped knower, other things equal, than one who cannot. 

From this study it appears that the development of 
knowing consists of the following three things: 

1. Increasing ability to grasp more and more re- 
lations. 

2. Increasing ability to distinguish between the im- 
portant and unimportant relations. 

3. Increasing ability to do "1" and '*2" easily 
and readily. 

So to show that one kind of knowing is more de- 
veloped than another, one must show that the mind in it 



Studies in Psychology 159 

does one or more of these three things to a greater de- 
gree than in the other. 

Stages in the Developme7it of Knowing. — In its 
growth from the lowest to the highest kind of knowing 
the mind manifests its activities in fairly well marked 
stages. These stages are named from the predominant 
element in the activity and are as follows: 

1. Sense-perception. 

2. Memory. 

3. Imagination. 

4. Conception. 

5. Definition. 

6. Judgment. 

7. Reasoning. 

8. Systematization. 

9. Intuition. 

Sense-perception is the least developed kind of 
knowing and intuition is the most highly developed kind. 

Sense-perception. — This as the term indicates is per- 
ception of objects through the senses. The term sense- 
perception is frequently used by authors to mean the 
same as the term perception. This should not be done, 
as the term perception is a term of broader application 
than the term sense-perception. Perception may be the 
perception of what is going on in one's own mind; that 
is, inner perception, or it may be the perception of ma- 
terial objects; that is, outer perception. Inner percep- 
tion is simply iiitrospection, previously studied. Outer 
perception is sense-perception, the subject of study in 
this chapter. Perception includes both introspection and 



160 Studies in Psychology 

sense-perception. To use the terms interchangeably is 
not scientifically accurate. 

The term perception is also used in a kind of popu- 
lar sense to mean almost any kind of knowing. One 
says he perceives the force of an argument, when he 
means he comprehends it. Or he says he perceives the 
gravity of a situation, when he means he understands 
it. Or, again, he perceives the humor of a joke. This 
general vague use of the term is its popular use and not 
the sense in which it is used in psychology. 

In these studies the term is used to mean the pro- 
cess of getting a knowledge of material objects through 
the senses — its scientific use. 

Really the only way to understand sense-perception 
perfectly well is to trace through the process, step by 
step, of the mind in the act of sense-perception. 

We look at a flower and know it is a carnation. The 
act is one of sense-perception. We of course do not get 
the material carnation in mind. That is a psychological 
and physical impossibility. We say we get the idea of 
the carnation in mind, and in general this is right. But 
there is no such thing as an idea getting out of the 
carnation and in some mysterious way getting over into 
our minds. The mind of course is mental and deals 
only with mental things. 

The only thing which one actually receives from the 
carnation is some rays of light reflected by it. These 
strike the retina of the eye and disturb it, this dis- 
turbance spreads, reaches the brain, disturbs it and re- 
sults in a group of sensations. A complex object always 



Studies in Psychology 161 

is the stimulus for a group of sensations, not a single 
sensation. This group of sensations is like a group of 
sensations which the mind has had in the past when it 
was informed it was experiencing a carnation, may be 
many times in the past when it understood it was ex- 
periencing carnations. The mind sees, either conscious- 
ly or unconsciously, the likeness between the present 
group of sensations and the past group of sensations 
and infers the object is a carnation. This is the process 
of the mind in sense-perception. 

Again we listen to a bird's song and know the bird 
is an oriole. The act is one of sense-perception. 

All that comes to one in this case is some motion 
in the air produced by the activity of the bird in sing- 
ing. The motion comes into the ear and affects the ends 
of the auditory nerve; this disturbance spreads to the 
brain, and produces a disturbance there and results in 
a group of sensations. This group of sensations is like 
a group of sensations the mind has experienced in the 
past, probably many times, when it understood it was 
experiencing the activity corresponding to the oriole. 
The mind grasps, consciously or unconsciously, the like- 
ness between the present group of sensations and the 
past group and infers that the bird is an oriole. This 
again is the process of the mind in sense-perception. 

If one both sees and hears some object, as a bird, 
there goes on sense-perception through two senses, sight 
and hearing. 

The process in sense-perceiving some objects 



162 Studies in Psychology 

through smell, taste and touch is similar to that in the 
case of sight or hearing. 

The process of seeing the likeness and difference 
between a present group of sensations and a past group 
of sensations and referring them to some object is called 
interpreting the sensations, and this, interpreting the 
sensations is the sine qua non of sense perception. There 
is no sense-perception without it. 

Induction from the above cases of sense-perception 
gives the following definitions of sense-perception: 

Sense-perception is the mental process of interpret- 
ing the sensations corresponding to some external object. 

Sense-perception is that stage in the development 
of knowing in which the mind interprets the sensations 
corresponding to some external object. 

The Object of Sense Perception. — In the discussion 
above the carnation and the oriole were the objects 
sense-perceived. These objects were particular objects; 
they were material objects, they were external to the 
mind, they were present in time and space and the pre- 
sumption was they were not known to have been known 
before. 

Suppose one should have a rose placed under his 
nose, he being blindfolded, and from the odor the mind 
would know that the object is a rose. The mental ac- 
tivity would be a case of sense-perception. The object 
again is particular, material, external, present in time 
and space and not known to have been known before. 

From these several examples the conclusion is that 



Studies in Psychology 163 

the object with which sense-perception deals has the 
following characteristics : 

1. Particular. 

2. Material. 

3. External. 

4. Present in time and space. 

5. Not known to have been known before. 
Particular. — That which makes an object particular 

is that which enables the mind to know it from all other 
things. It is differences which enables the mind to do 
this. A particular object is thus an object known from 
all other things. 

Material. — To the mind that is material which 
makes possible sensations of resistance, or occupies 
space. But the mind can know that the object occupies 
space only because it stimulates to sensations of resist- 
ance. The material object thus is one that stimulates to 
sensations of resistance. 

External. — The external object is an object outside 
the mind, not necessarily external to the body. One may 
perceive parts of his own body. 

Present in Time and Space. — The quantity of time 
actually present is unconceivably small, so the term pres- 
ent time as usually used has reference to a present 
period of time. In this sense to-day is present ; this min- 
ute is present; this hour is present. This century is 
called the present century. But the present period is 
always found to be measured by some event, as the year 
by the time it takes the earth to swing around the sun. 
So when it is said the object is present in time the mean- 



164 Studies in Psychology 

ing is that the object and the act of sense-perceiving co- 
exist, exist at the same time. 

The quantity of space one can actually call present 
is also very relative. It may be very small or it may be 
very large. An object may be present to one sense and 
not present to another. One may hear a friend speaking 
in the next room, but not be able to see the friend. The 
friend is present to hearing but not present to sight. 
One may see the sun, some 92,000,000 miles away, but 
he can not hear, touch, taste, or smell it. It is present 
to sight, but not present to any of the other senses. One 
may see a star so far away that it takes the light 2500 
years to come from it to the eye, traveling at the rate 
of 186,000 miles per second. The star is present to sight 
but not to the other senses. An object then is present in 
space when in such a positiion as to be a stimulus to any 
of the senses. 

Not Known to Have Been Known Before. — If the 
object is known to have been known before either pop- 
ularly or scientifically one would say he remembers it. 
So known to have been known before is an element of 
memory but not an element of sense-perception. If one 
knows he has known the object before, it seems right to 
say it may be a case of sense-perception to the place 
where this element comes in, but at that place it shades 
into memory. 

Relation of Sensation to Object. — In sense-percep- 
tion the sensation always is referred to the object as an 
attribute of the object, and the object is made up of the 
total of its attributes. The odor of clover, the flavor of 



Studies in Psychology 165 

the orange, the scarlet of the poppy are all sensations — 
mental things — though the mind in sense-perception re- 
gards them as real attributes of the objects. This is only 
another aspect of the truth so often seen that the mind 
is mental and can deal only with mental things. 

Classes of Sense-perception on Basis of Sense In- 
volved. — One sees a flower and knows it is a rose, a case 
of visual sense-perception ; he hears a bird and knows it 
is a lark, a case of auditory sense-perception; he touches 
an animal and knows it is his dog, a case of tactual sense- 
perception; he smells a flower and knows it is a pansy, 
an instance of olfactory sense-perception; he tastes a 
fruit and knows it is a strawberry, an instance of gus- 
tatory sense-perception ; he comes in contact wdth an ob- 
ject and knows it is cold, an instance of temperature 
sense-perception ; he lifts an object and knows it is 
heavy, an instance of muscular sense-perception. 

So on the basis of the sense involved, there are the 
following classes of sense-perception: 1. Visual. 2. 
Auditory. 3. Tactual. 4. Olfactory. 5. Gustatory. 6. 
Temperature. 7. Muscular. 

Visual Sense-perception. — Visual sense-perception 
is so important in adult life that one is likely to over- 
estimate its original importance. We in adult life know 
size, distance, direction, form, temperature, roughness, 
smoothness, hardness, softness, odor, flavor, weight, etc. 
of objects, as well as what they are, through sight, but 
scarcely think that all these things have been transferred 
to visual sense-perception from some other kind of sense- 
perception. But such is the case. At first visual sense- 



166 Studies in Psychology 

perception gives us only (1) color, (2) combinations of 
color, and (3) intensities of light of objects. As said 
before some authors call these : 1. Hue. 2. Tint. 3. In- 
tensity. 

By combining and associating these three things 
sight learns to construct its field of vision. 

The Field of Vision. — **When a surgical operation 
has enabled the blind to see, they have invariably at 
first declared that objects either touched their eyes or 
were at no definite distance from them. A landscape 
with a hill and a forest in the background, a pasture 
with cattle and sheep, a brook with a growth of willows 
and a white farmhouse in the foreground, were first seen 
only as blotches of color touching the eye." 

Visual sense-perception learns from several things 
how to construct a field of vision, that is, how to sense- 
perceive objects. 

1. By the size of the retinal image, since it varies 
with the distance of the object. If men at work in a 
field look to be only about two feet high, the mind, since 
it knows the size of an average man, thinks they must be 
a considerable distance away. 

"The fishermen, that walk upon the beach 
Appear like mice." 

2. The mind estimates distance by the intensity 
of light. More light comes to the eye when the object 
is close and less when the object is far away, other things 
equal. So a lighter shade is a sign of a closer object 
and a darker one a sign of a more distant object. Also 



Studies in Psychology 167 

the outline of the distant object is dim and of a near 
one sharp. 

The painter by manipulating shades and outlines 
gives the idea of perspective on canvas. 

3. The mind estimates distance and size by the in- 
tervening objects. One used to estimating distance on 
land is almost certain to underestimate distance on water 
or a plain when there are no intervening objects. A 
common instance of this is the way most people misjudge 
the width of a river. 

4. The motion of objects across the field of vision 
helps visual sense-perception. In case of turning the 
eyes to right or left, up or down, objects far apart afar 
off require less motion of the eyes than objects far apart 
nearer. 

Also in riding past objects, those near at hand pass 
from sight quickly and those far off much more slowly. 

5. The muscles of the eye furnish data, too, which 
helps visual sense-perception. The eye must be focused 
differently in looking at objects near and far and the 
muscular activity helps the mind in estimating distance 
and size. 

Auditory Sense-perception. — Auditory sense-per- 
ception is the process of interpreting sensations of sound. 
One hears sounds caused by a violin, a piano, a bell, a 
dog, a cow, a grasshopper, a cricket or robin, interprets 
them and knows the object which produces the stimulus. 
All such are instances of auditory sense-perception. 

By auditory sense-perception we do the following: 



168 Studies in Psychology 

1. Locate, to some extent, the object producing the 
stimulus. 

2. Refer the sound to the characteristic object pro- 
ducing the stimulus. 

The mind tells the distance and direction of the 
stimulus producing object by (1) intensity of the 
sound, (2) the quality of the sound and (3) by the 
direction of the approaching sound wave. 

The intensity of the sound varies with distance the 
sound waves travel. A report of a cannon is not so in- 
tense when five miles away as when one mile away. 

The quality of the sound is changed, too, by the 
distance the sound waves travel. A flute produces a 
sound different in quality when near at hand and when 
one-half mile away. 

If the line of the approaching sound wave be from 
the front, from the right, left or back, it will in each 
case result in sounds that differ a little in quality. This 
furnishes the mind signs which enables it to know some- 
thing of direction. 

Accuracy of Auditory Sense-perception. — Auditory 
sense-perception is not as accurate as popularly thought. 
Many mistakes both as to distance and direction are 
made. Some experiments seem to show that as many as 
forty cases in a hundred were in error as to direction, 
and almost all cases more or less in error as to distance. 

The ventriloquist deceives in every way, (1) as to 
the character of the object producing the stimulus, (2) 
as to distance, and (3) as to direction. He produces the 
sound the object would naturally occasion if it were 



Studies in Psychology 169 

what it seems to be and were where it seems to be. His 
art consists in doing this. 

The mind knows the character of the object oc- 
casioning the sound by the quality of the sound. The 
mind thus knows a friend by his voice, the thrush by 
his song, the horse by his neigh, the cow by her low, the 
storm by its roar, etc. It makes mistakes though here, 
too, quite often. 

Tactile Sense-perception. — Tactile sense-perception 
is the process of interpreting sensations of touch. In 
the dark we put our hands on a chair, the table, a book, 
the stove, a hat, or the door, and the mind knows the 
object in each case, and each case is an instance of tactile 
sense-perception. 

Tactile sense-perception is the most fundamental 
kind of sense-perception and the hardest kind to deceive. 
We may think we see and hear something, but when we 
put out our hands and touch nothing, we decide sight 
and hearing were in error, and that touch is right. 

From the sensations of contact and pressure, the 
purely tactile sensations, the mind learns the extensions, 
roughness, smoothness, weight, form, distance, motion 
and size of objects. And from these signs it readily knows 
what the objects possessing these characteristics are. 

Touch sense-perception is capable of improvement 
by cultivation. This is readily seen in the case of the 
blind who learn to read by touch, to do fancy work 
and even to understand one who is speaking to them, 
when both deaf and blind, by placing their fingers on 
one's vocal organs. 



170 Studies in Psychology 

Olfactory Sense-perception. — Olfactory sense-per- 
ception is the process of interpreting the sensation of 
smell. The odor of the rose, of the violet, of the clover 
or linden, of coffee, of the codfish, of the cocoa, or the 
strawberries enables the mind to know these objects by 
these sensations alone. Each case of such knowing is 
an instance of olfactory sense-perception. 

Olfactory sense-perception is better developed in 
many of the lower animals than in man. The dog will 
track, by olfactory sense-perception, his Inaster along 
the crowded streets of a city hours after the master has 
passed that way. 

Olfactory sense-perception is capable of cultivation 
to a rather high degree. The following quotation will 
show something of this: 

' ' Dr. Howe, in the Forty-third Report of the Massa- 
chusetts Asylum for the Blind, is authority for the 
statement that Julia Brace, a deaf and blind mute, 
could instantly recognize a person she had met before 
as soon as she caught the odor from his glove or hand. 
This sightless girl was actually employed to sort all 
the clothing of pupils after it came from the wash. Her 
power of smell, in definiteness and vividness must have 
surpassed the sense of sight in most persons.^' 

Gustatory Sense-perception. — Gustatory sense-per- 
ception is the process of interpreting the sensations of 
taste. Knowing chicken, beef, mutton, an apple, a peach, 
a cherry, or an onion by taste is in each instance gusta- 
tory sense-perception. 

The extent to which gustatory sense-perception is 



Studies in Psychology 171 

capable of cultivation may be known from the skill of 
wine tasters and tea tasters. Mr. Taylor in his genetic 
psychology says that tea tasters become so skillful that 
one may mix fifty kinds of tea together, steep some of 
the mixture and the tea taster by tasting will correctly 
tell the different teas mixed. Wine tasters become equal- 
ly skillful and some have been known "who could tell 
under what latitude a wine was produced as accurately 
as an astronomer can predict an eclipse." 

Temperature Sense-perception. — This is the process 
of interpreting sensations of heat and cold. This kind 
of sense-perception is usually combined with tactile 
sense-perception and seldom, if ever enables one to 
know an object merely by itself. It enables the mind to 
know objects as hot or cold. 

Muscular Sense-perception. — Muscular sense-per- 
ception is the process of interpreting muscular sensa- 
tions. Muscular sense-perception is usually combined 
with tactual sense-perception, but probably not to as 
large a degree as temperature sense-perception. The 
chief muscular sensations are those of movement and re- 
sistance. By a combination of these the mind learns the 
motion, extension, distance, direction, weight, hardness, 
softness, rigidity and pliability of objects. 

Classes of Sense-perception on Basis of Develop- 
ment. — We look at a table and say it is rough or smooth. 
The knowledge that the table is rough or smooth is 
gained by the way it looks ; that is, through visual sense- 
perception. But this knowledge could not have been 
gained at one time through visual sense-perception. It 



172 Studies in Psychology 

could have been obtained through only tactile sense-per- 
ception. There thus appear two kinds of sense-percep- 
tion which may be used in knowing the table is rough or 
smooth. 

Again, if one learns that a piece of red-hot iron is 
hot by placing his hand upon it, he gets his knowledge 
through the temperature sense, the only w^ay there is of 
directly getting such knowledge. At first, sight could 
not give such knowledge, but later the mind would know 
that the iron is hot through sight. Here again two kinds 
of sense-perception may be used in knowing the iron is 
hot. 

In the first case the sense-perception was transferred 
from tactile sense-perception to visual sense-perception, 
and in the second case, from temperature sense-percep- 
tion to visual sense-perception. The first kind of sense- 
perception is original sense-perception and the second 
kind is transferred sense-perception. 

Thus on the basis of development there are two 
classes of sense-perception: 

1. Original. 

2. Transferred. 

The following definitions grow out of the above 
study : 

Original sense-perception is that kind of sense-per- 
ception in which the mind interprets the sensations from 
one sense without the aid of the sensations from any 
other sense. 

Tra7isf erred sense-perception is that kind of sense- 
perception in which the mind interprets the sensations 



Studies in Psychology 173 

from one sense hy means of the sensations from some 
other sense. 

If one learns that the iron is hot by touching it, the 
mind interprets the sensations from the temperature- 
sense — one sense — only. The sense-perception is orig- 
inal. 

If one learns that the table is rough by looking at it, 
the mind interprets the sight sensations by means of 
touch sensations, and the sense-perception is transferred. 
It has been transferred from touch to sight. 

Value of Transferred Sense-perception. — The mind 
tries to economize in its work. So when it can save time 
or energy, or when it is more valuable or convenient, the 
mind transfers the sense-perception from one sense to 
another. We tell whether a watermelon is ripe by tap- 
ping on it. The physician tells whether the patient has 
pneumonia by listening to the sound made by the air 
passing through the patient's lungs. It is more con- 
venient and valuable to use transferred sense-percep- 
tion in these cases. 

Reasoning in Sense-perception. — In sense-percep- 
tion the mind always classifies the object which it per- 
ceives; that is, thinks it into some known class. But to 
think the object into some known class requires reason- 
ing. 

Reasoning, briefly, is comparing two ideas through 
the medium of a third. Thus a equals y; h equals y; 
therefore, a equals b. 

The mind sees an object and knows it as a rose, a 
ease of visual sense-perception. The mind thinks the 



174 Studies in Psychology 

object into the class rose; that is, classifies the object. 
And the following is the reasoning. 

This object has stamens united to the top of the 
calyx tube. 

The rose has stamens united to the top of the calyx 
tube. 

This object is a rose. 

The Products of Sense-perception. — Sense-percep- 
tion is a process and every process produces some sort of 
product or products. Sense-perception produces three: 
1. The percept. 2. The illusion. 3. Hallucination. 

The Percept. — One can not get the object he sense- 
perceives in mind, because the mind is mental and the 
object is material. But he does get something in mind 
which corresponds to the object, and this mental thing is 
the percept. This percept is an idea. But what is an 
idea? 

Perhaps no term in the English language is used in 
a wider and vaguer sense than the term, idea. Men say 
they have an idea of the universe, an idea of the solar 
system, an idea of Mohammedanism, an idea on the 
tariff, an idea of truth, an idea of emigration, an idea 
of a horse, an idea of a mosquito, an idea of a cell, an 
idea of the nucleus of the cell, an idea of a molecule, an 
idea of an ion, an idea of an atom, an idea of an electron, 
etc. So it seems that the term, idea, is a symbol for al- 
most any mental thing as a whole, but it is always a 
unit; that is, the smallest mental product. From the 
above study the following definition of an idea is 
reached: 



Studies in Psychology 175 

An idea is the smallest mental product correspond- 
ing to a thing as a whole. 

The percept is a mental thing, an idea. It is the 
idea reached by sense-perception. 

The idea of the object we perceive is the percept, the 
idea of the particular rose, of the particular tree, animal, 
house or man. The following defines it : 

A percept is an idea of a particular, material object 
present in time and space. 

The Illusion. — The mind thinks some times that 
it has a percept, but the mental product does not cor- 
respond with what seems to furnish the stimulus which 
occasions the sensations. Thus one thinks he sees two 
objects, when there is but one, or he thinks he sees the 
color green when he should see the color red. 

Or again one thinks he sees a wild animal when it 
is only a bunch of dried grass, or is sure he has seen a 
friend pass, as some one passed, when the friend was 
miles away. 

In each instance one has an illusion ; that is, he has 
a mental something in mind, he thinks it is a percept, 
but the supposed percept does not correspond with the 
external object. At the time the mind is deceived. 

A conclusion from the above study gives the follow- 
ing definition for an illusion: 

An illusion is a mental product which the mind 
thinks is a percept, hut which does not correspond with 
the external object. 

Illusions are of two kinds, those in which the sense 
organs are at fault, and those in which the mind is at 



176 Studies in Psychology 

fault. If an object appears double, the sense organ is 
at fault, but if a curtain is taken for a ghost or a robber, 
the mind is at fault. If red looks green, the sense organ 
is at fault, but if a stump is taken for a dog, the mind 
is at fault. There are thus illusions of two classes : 

1. Illusions of the senses. 

2. Misinterpretations. 

All cases of what is called color blindness are illu- 
sions of the senses. These illusions are due usually to 
some abnormal condition of the nerves of the sense or- 
gans. They are of importance in rail-roading, in manu- 
facturing, and signaling. 

All cases of mistaking objects in haste are cases of 
illusion by misinterpretation. A man saw a sheep which 
was eating the grass from around a grave rise up and 
look at him and was sure at first that he saw a ghost. 

Another saw a stump in the dark giving off a phos- 
phorescent glow and was certain he had met Satan. 

There are many common illusions of this kind. 
They are most numerous among the ignorant and super- 
stitious, but not confined to them by any means. These 
are the illusions with which the magician mostly deceives 
his auditors. 

Many most amusing and ludicrous mistakes are the 
result of illusions by misinterpretation. 

Hallucinations. — These are the most deceptive re- 
sults of sense-perception. In illusions some sort of ob- 
ject is always present, but in hallucinations no external 
object is present at all. Good people have heard things 
when there was nothing to hear; and good people have 



Studies in Psychology 177 

seen things when there was nothing to see, and no one is 
able in some of these cases to convince the person of his 
error. 

It is recorded that Martin Luther, when detained 
in a castle by his friends, saw the Devil tempting him 
and threw his inkstand at Him, broke it on the facing of 
the door and bespattered the wall with ink. Martin 
Lnther is said to have always believed he saw the Devil. 
Scientists think it was merely an hallucination. 

Many cases of visions, miracles, telepathic communi- 
cations, revelations, etc., have been in all probability 
nothing but hallucinations. The following is the formal 
definition : 

An hallucination is a mental product which is re- 
garded as a percept by the mind, hut which has no cor- 
responding external object. 

All classes of people are subject to hallucinations, 
but the ignorant, sentimental, superstitious, nervous, im- 
pulsive and unhealthy seem more subject to them than 
others. 

By some authors hallucination is treated as a class 
of illusion, and there are good reasons for so doing, and 
by others it is described as somewhat distinct from the 
illusion. The present studies treat it the latter way. It 
Is thought a little more helpful. 

"In distinction from illusion, which is essentially 
perception, (i.e., a consciousness of particular material 
things present to sense — though other things than those 
really perceived happen to be present), hallucination is 
the name given to the consciousness of objects felt to be 



178 Studies in Psychology 

physically present, when as a matter of fact no object 
of any kind is at hand." — Angell. 

"Hallucinations are closely related to illusions. 
Hallucinations have a slighter basis in sensation than 
illusion, and derive more from association." — Pillsbury. 

"There are illusive perceptions due to no present 
external cause. These internally originated illusions are 
often called hallucinations." — Halleck. 

Sense-perception and Apperception. — Many stud- 
ents have some difficulty because of confusion of the 
meaning of these terms ; also, some writers, it seems. 

Apperception, it is to be remembered, is an attribute 
of the mind and sense-perception a stage in the develop- 
ment of knowing. Apperception enables the mind to 
bring the past experience to bear upon the present ex- 
perience, and the present experience may be one of know- 
ing, feeling or willing. There could be no sense-percep- 
tion, memory or any other kind of knowing without ap- 
perception, attention, consciousness, etc. ; that is, with- 
out mental attributes. And attributes are more funda- 
mental than knowing, feeling and willing. Attributes 
are necessary to them. There are the three following 
distinctions between apperception and sense-perception: 

1. Apperception is a mental attribute, sense-per- 
ception is a stage in the development of knowing. 

2. Apperception is more fundamental than sense- 
perception. 

3. Apperception is a broader term than sense-per- 
ception. 

The Cultivation of Sense-perception. — By cultiva- 



Studies in Psychology 179 

tion of sense-perception is meant so exercising it as to 
change it from a more or less inefficient condition to one 
of high efficiency for use in living. This is popularly 
spoken of as making one a good observer, and that there 
is need of being a good observer almost every one agrees. 
There are several definite reasons for desiring to have 
well cultivated sense-perception. 

1. It gives one a great advantage in practical 
economic activity. 

2. It enables one to get so much more out of life. 
It makes life much more worth living. 

3. It adds considerably to one's appreciation of 
literature. 

4. It is the solid and concrete foundation for all 
kinds of education. 

5. It arouses and fosters the scientific spirit. 
First, the person who observes the various aspects of 

his environment carefully sees the things that need to be 
seen, while the one who has not this habit passes 
by unnoticed many of the essential things in the affairs 
of practical life. It is not usual for men and women to 
know the common trees of the community in which they 
were reared ; nor the common birds, the common friendly 
and injurious insects, the common mammal friends and 
mammal enemies, the common beneficent and injurious 
winds, the relief forms and soils, and the common stars, 
planets and constellations to be known in the community 
in which they were reared. Some people make a suc- 
cess of every business undertaking, others make a fail- 
ure of every business undertaking, and one reason for 



ISO Studies in Psychology 

the difference is that some can observe while others 
can not ; that is, some have trained sense-perception, oth- 
ers have not. 

Secondly, certainly the one who has eyes and can 
see, ears and can hear, a nose and can smell, a mouth 
and can taste, largely, whatever comes into such a posi- 
tion as to furnish a stimulus gets more out of living 
than the one who can do these things to a less degree. 
The one who loves nature gets much more out of life 
than the one who does not. He always sees something 
to admire, to attract, to look forward to, and to hope 
for. He gets happiness from winter; with glad expect- 
ancy he awaits the coming of spring; he gets life from 
the summer sunshine and developing nature, and sees 
with joy the maturity of autumn. 

"To him who in the love of Nature holds 
Communion with her visible forms, she speaks 
A various language." 

Fortunate is he who early learns to love fervently 
nature. It will prove one of his greatest blessings. 

Thirdly, there are many selections of literature 
which have beautiful pictures, but which must mean 
very little to one who has not observed nature. 
"Meadows trim with daisies pied, 
Shallow brooks and rivers wide." 
"Around it still the sumacs grow 
And the blackberry vines are running." 
"Singing she wrought and her merry glee 
The mockbird echoed from his tree." 
Such pictures are a source of much more interest 



Studies in Psychology 181 

and pleasure to one who has observed such as they rep- 
resent. 

Fourthly, the cultivation of sense-perception is the 
sure foundation on which to rear the educational struc- 
ture. Children read poorly, because they don't observe. 
People spell poorly because they have not learned to 
observe, because they have not learned how to observe. 
They are poor in arithmetic because they have not 
learned how to observe. They study about things which 
they do not understand because they have not observed 
them. Their geography is verbal memory largely be- 
cause they have not observed the things about which 
they study. 

"The education of the senses neglected, all after 
education partakes of a drowsiness, a haziness, an in- 
sufficiency which it is impossible to cure." 

Lastly, the cultivation of sense-perception arouses 
and fosters the scientific spirit. The scientific spirit is 
the spirit of search for the truth; the spirit that is not 
afraid to search for the truth; the spirit of investiga- 
tion that the truth may be found. It is the attitude 
of mind that makes anything short of truth hateful ; 
that believes in the ultimate triumph of truth. It is 
the spirit of free inquiry and free investigation, and its 
watchwords are experiment, observe, and think. 

The Method of Cultivating Sense-perception. — 
Sense-perception is cultivated by throwing students 
upon their own responsibility, and by leading them 
to find out things first hand for themselves ; by bringing 
them in sensuous contact with whatever they are study- 



182 Studies in Psychology 

ing that will admit of such contact, and by suggestions 
and questions stimulating them to find out truth for 
themselves. 

The spirit of the method of cultivating sense-per- 
ception may be obtained from the following: 

''Agassiz's pupils usually had excellently trained 
perceptive faculties as one result of his teaching. Since 
his pupils generally succeeded well in life, it will be 
profitable to notice how he trained them. A certain 
student who wished to be well grounded in zoology pre- 
sented himself at the professor's laboratory one morning. 
The professor immediately pulled a fish out of its jar of 
alcohol and said: 'You are to look at this fish carefully 
and tell me when I return how much you have seen. 
You must not cut it nor use any instrument upon it. ' 

The professor then left the student alone with the 
specimen. The student had seen fish before. He knew 
that they were oblong objects with fins and scales, but 
he looked at that special fish for ten long minutes. He 
w^as sure that he had seen all that was visible from the 
outside, and he started to tell the professor so. The 
museum was carefully searched, but the thoughtless in- 
structor had left the building. There was nothing for 
the disgusted student to do but to return to stare at the 
uninteresting fish. Feeling that his time Avas too valua- 
ble to be wasted in this way, he nevertheless looked at 
the fish for half an hour without seeing anything. Then 
he turned the fish over. He looked at it in the face ; he 
gazed at it from above, below, behind. Two hours 
passed and he was inexpressibly disgusted. He knew 



Studies in Psychology 183 

that it was a fish ; but he was sure of that before he came 
to the great Agassiz. 

The student then put the fish in the jar and went 
to lunch. When he returned he found that the pro- 
fessor had been there and gone away somewhere to re- 
main several hours. It seemed strange that such a man 
should be wanted for a teacher. Again the disgusted 
student stared at the fish. This was growing tiresome^ 
and to amuse himself, he began to count the scales. Feel- 
ing that this was nonsense, a happy thought struck him, 
and he proceeded to draw the fish. He had just made 
the interesting discovery that the fish had no eyelids, 
when Agassiz returned and remarked that a pencil was 
the best of eyes. He asked the student to tell what he 
had seen and looked disappointed at the shortness of the 
recital. 'You have not looked very carefully, keep on 
looking' said Agassiz, who then left the room. 

The student then went to work with a will, and, 
with his pencil, he began to make new discoveries, and 
to wonder how it was possible for him to see so little at 
first. For three long days he was made to gaze at the 
fish. Agassiz would occasionally return to listen to a 
recital of new discoveries, but would answer no ques- 
tions. ' ' 

Time to Cultivate Sense-perception. — From the ages 
of two to twenty is the proper period for cultivating 
sense-perception. If a person is not a fairly good ob- 
server at the age of twenty the chances are he never will 
be. Not that he could not be, but that the life of most 
persons is so much of a treadmill that the time and trou- 



184 Studies in Psychology 

ble are not taken in ninety-nine cases in a hundred to 
cultivate it. 

In any case, though, the cultivation of sense-per- 
ception is much more difficult after the age of twenty. 

Subjects to Cultivate Sense-perception. — There are 
a number of subjects which will, if properly taught, 
prove good to cultivate sense-perception. In the pri- 
mary schools nature study, geography, and primary lan- 
guage are all good. And in the secondary schools and 
-colleges and universities, botany, zoology, geology, chem- 
istry, physics and astronomy are among the best. And 
drawing, whether taught as a separate subject or in 
connection with other subjects, is of the highest value. 

Read : 

1. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 66-100. 

2. Pillsbury's Psychology, pp. 156-187. 

3. Angell's Psychology, pp. 122-160. 

4. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 156-174. 

5. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 213- 
225. 



CHAPTER XIII. 
Memory. 

General Nature. — Every experience one has leaves 
him somewhat different from what he was before he 
had the experience. This holds true whether the ex- 
perience be mental or physical. One's mind acts in a 
certain way to-day and to-morrow it acts in the same 
way a little more easily. Something from the first ac- 
tivity stayed Avith the mind, and so something from every 
activity stays with the mind; that is, the mind retains 
something from every activity. All that may with cer- 
tainty be said concerning the nature of what is retained 
is that it is the effect of the activity. This effect makes 
it easier for the mind to act again as it has acted before, 
and the mind because of this will react its experiences 
again with less stimulus, or provocation. And when it 
does react its past experiences it knows it is doing sof 
that is, it knows it has had this experience or that ex- 
perience before. 

Illustration. — One sees to-day for the first time in 
his life some poison ivy. Not knowing its poisonous na- 
ture he is in the act of examining its berries when with 
a show of much fear some one tells him how dangerously 
poisonous it is. He is strongly impressed with what he 
has heard. A month later in taking a walk, he finds 
himself among some bushes and vines and seeing that 
he is almost in contact with some poisonous ivy, he fairly 



186 Studies in Psychology 

runs away. He does not have to be told about it this 
time. 

We say he remembered his former experience. But 
an analysis shows he retained the effect of it, reacted 
it, and knew he had had something of the same experi- 
ence before, that is, identified it. 

This whole process just thought through is what is 
known as memory by psychologists, and it is the second 
stage in the development of knowing. The following 
<iefinitions formulate the above thought: 

Memory is the mind's process of retaining the effect 
of our experiences and of reacting and identifying them. 

Memoi^y is that stage in the development of know- 
ing in which the mind retains the effect of our experi- 
ences and reacts and identifies them. 

Elements of Memory. — The elements of memory are 
evidently three: 1. Retaining. 2. Reacting. 3. Identi- 
fying. One of course can not remember, if he can not 
retain. The mind would act the experience no more 
easily a second time than the first time unless something 
was retained from the first experience. But we doubt- 
less retain something of the effect of many of our ex- 
periences that we never react. There is no need for 
reacting them, so we do not do it. Thus while retaining 
is always necessary in memory, retaining alone does not 
insure memory. 

Unless the experience were in consciousness a sec- 
ond time, no one would say he remembers. Any one 
on the other hand would say he does not remember, and 
he would be right. There is no memory without react- 



^ Studies in Psychology 187 

ing. But as in the case of retaining, reacting does not 
insure memory. Any of us retain the effect of many 
experiences, and react the experiences without knowing 
we have ever had the experience before. And no one 
of us says he remembers under such circumstances. All 
of us say we do not. 

Illustration. — We meet some one who speaks to us, 
and says do you remember me. We often are compelled 
to say, I do not think I do. He gives us a further sug- 
gestion and then we say we do. Something was retained 
or we would not have known him at all. We were re- 
acting, because the same person was before us. But 
until he gave help by way of suggestion, we were not 
remembering, because we were not aware we had had the 
experience before. 

One may retain and react without remembering. 

If we retain the effect of the experience, react the 
experience, and know we have had the experience before, 
we always remember. 

Retaining. — The mind is not a storehouse into which 
we put mental things. The mind is energy manifesting 
itself in consciousness. The energy is stored in the brain. 
But just what eft'eet the mental experience has on the 
brain so that it occasions the mind to act again a little 
more easily than it acted before, no one knows. But, 
that there is some sort of trace left in the brain which 
is the physical basis of retaining, scientists are pretty 
certain. And it is this tendency, this effect of our ex- 
periences, on our minds which we retain. 

We do not retain ideas, we do not retain knowledge, 



188 Studies in Psychology 

for when we do not have them in consciousness, they 
have no existence, they are nowhere. An idea or a 
point of knowledge is the mind's working, or acting, in 
a certain way. When this acting is not going on, the 
idea or knowledge is not in existence. The activity the 
piano player puts forth is the playing he does. Where 
is the playing when he is not playing? It is not any 
place. It has no existence. So one's knowledge, since 
knowledge is activity, has no existence when it is not 
in consciousness. 

Rightly, in our present state of knowledge, all we 
can say is that we retain the effect of our experiences. 

Reacting, sometimes called reproducing, is simply 
acting again as the mind has acted before. 

Identifying, sometimes called recognizing, is know- 
ing that we have had the experience before, or it is 
knowing that we are reacting. In it the mind identifies 
the present experience with the past experience. 

The Law of Memory. — The mind remembers its ex- 
periences because of some suggestion, or cue, as Mr. 
James calls it. Mr. Halleck says he was one time in 
a distant city, and suddenly he remembered the campus 
at Yale. At first he could not account for the idea of the 
Yale campus appearing in mind. Then he was aware 
that he was hearing someone whistling a tune which he 
had heard whistled or sung on the campus at Yale. The 
idea of the tune was the suggestion, or cue, It is always 
this way with memory except in those cases where some 
stimulus breaks in upon us from the outside world. The 
sensation or sensations in those cases constitute the sug- 



Studies in Psychology 189 

gestion, or cue, instead of some experience which had 
been suggested by some previous experience. But in any 
case we remember by means of association. So the law 
of memory may be stated as follows : 

The mind rememhers wholly because of association. 

Strictly speaking there are not laws of memory as 
sometimes stated. The so-called laws of memory Avill 
be found upon careful analysis to be laws of association, 
or suggestion. This point will be elaborated in the 
later discussion. 

Association, — One thing puts us in mind of another 
because they have been associated. When the idea of 
the word, elephant, comes into consciousness, the idea 
of the object, elephant, comes into consciousness because 
they have been associated, or when the idea of the object, 
elephant, comes into consciousness, the idea of the word, 
elephant, comes into consciousness because they have 
been associated. 

When the idea of the object, apple, comes into con- 
sciousness, the idea of the word, apple, comes into con- 
sciousness because they have been associated, or when 
the idea of the word, apple, comes into consciousness, 
the idea of the object, apple, comes into consciousness 
because they have been associated. 

The idea, orange, may put one in mind of the idea, 
Florida, or the idea, Florida, may put one in mind of the 
idea, orange, because they have been associated. 

If we can find out what the mind has done with 
these two ideas which causes one of them to suggest the 
other, we will have found out just Avhat association is. 



190 Studies in Psychology 

It can not be resemblance which causes one to sug- 
gest the other, because there are hardly any two things 
more unlike than, for instance, the object, Florida, and 
the Avord, Florida, nor is there any other logical con- 
nection. But in these cases and in all other similar 
cases the thing that has occurred is that these ideas have 
been in consciousness at the same time or in close suc- 
cession. They thus became parts of one mental activity, 
so when the mind started in on this activity by bringing 
one idea into consciousness, it, according to the attribute 
of iterativeness, went on and brought the other idea into 
consciousness. 

The following definitions will formulate the above 
thought on the nature of association : 

Association is the mind's process of holding two or 
more expe^^iences in consciousness at the same time or in 
close succession. 

Association is the mind's process of making two or 
more experiences parts of one mental activity. 

Why the Mind Associates. — There are various rea- 
sons why the mind associates experiences or ideas. The 
following are some of the important ones: 

1. The mind associates experiences because of their 
resemblances. The mind associates the idea of Alex- 
ander the Great, with the idea of Napoleon, Daniel 
Webster with Demosthenes, and a star with the sun. 

2. The mind associates the idea of the cause and 
the idea of the effect. The mind associates the sting of 
a bee with inflamation and swelling ; a blow on the head 
with unconsciousness. 



Studies in Psychology 191 

3. The mind associates the idea of the whole and 
the idea of the part. The mind associates the idea of a 
wheel of a wagon with the idea of a wagon, the idea of 
a school with the idea of a teacher. 

4. The mind associates the means or instrument 
with the end. For instance, the mind associates the 
idea of a saddle with the idea of a ride on horse back; 
the idea, of a piano wdth the idea of music. 

5. The mind associates the ideas of things con- 
tiguous in space. Thus the mind associates a tree with 
a pool of water by which the tree stands; Chicago with 
Lake Michigan. 

6. The mind associates things arbitrarily ; that is, 
without there being any thought reason for its doing 
so. Thus it associates the idea of the word, dog, with 
the idea of the object, dog; the idea of the word, cow, 
with the idea of the object, cow. There is no reason in 
thought, so far as we know, why a cow should be called 
a cow, or a dog be called a dog. These are just arbitrary 
associations. 

There are other reasons why the mind associates 
experiences, but these are the main ones and are suf- 
ficient to show that associating ideas is much more than 
merely seeing likenesses between them. 

Classes of Association. — On the basis of time associ- 
ation divides itself into simultaneous and successive. If 
the experiences are in consciousness at the same time the 
association is simultaneous, but if the experiences suc- 
ceed each other closely in consciousness the association 



192 Studies in Psychology 

is successive. These truths may be formulated in the 
following statements: 

Simulta7ieous association is that kind of association 
in which the mind holds two or more experiences in con- 
sciousness at the same time. 

Successive association is that kind of association in 
which the mind holds two or more experiences in con- 
sciousness in close succession. 

Classes of Association on Basis of Reason. — On this 
basis, the basis of why the mind makes the association, 
there are in general two classes. In one class there is a 
thought, or logical, connection between the experiences 
associated. In the other class there is no logical connec- 
tion between the experiences associated. Thus the cause 
is logically connected with the effect; the means, or in- 
strument, with the end; but no such connection exists 
between the idea of the word, taMe, and the idea of the 
object, tahle. 

So on the basis of the reason for the mind's making 
the association, there are the following classes of associa- 
tion: 

1. Logical. 

2. Arbitrary. 

The following are formal statements for them: 
The logical association is that kind of association in 

which the mind forms thought connections between its 

experiences. 

The arbitrary association is that kind of association 

in which the mind does not form thought connections 

between its experiences. 



Studies in Psychology 193 

The Laws of Association. — Experiences come into 
consciousness in series, one following the other because 
of definite reasons. This following of ideas one after 
another in consciousness is called the sequence of ideas. 
The sequence of ideas obeys laws, and these laws are 
known as the laws of association. There are two kinds 
of these laws of association : 1. Primary. 2. Secondary. 

The Primary Law of Association. — When two or 
more experiences have been in consciousness together, 
either at the same time or in close succession, they be- 
come parts of one larger mental activity and are closely 
bound together. This union established between experi- 
ences is in all probability never entirely broken down. 
It may grow very weak, but some trace of it probably 
remains during the entire life of the individual. 

One may learn a Latin verb when he is sixteen years 
old and forget it in a short time, and never repeat it till 
he is sixty-six years old. Then if he attempts to re-learn 
it, he soon finds that something has remained with him 
during all those fifty years. Some traces of the connec- 
tions made there have not been entirely lost. 

This psychological fact is some encouragement to 
one in studying, even though he seems to forget the 
most he learns. 

The truth emphasized in this study is the truth 
called the primary law of association. The following 
formulates it: 

When two or more experiences have been held in 
consciousness at the same time or in close succession a 



194 Studies in Psychology 

connection is established between them which is never 
entirely lost during one's life. 

The Secondary Laws of Association. — It often hap- 
pens in our mental lives that one experience will at 
different times be associated with many other experi- 
ences, but not equally strongly. Some of the associations 
will be very strong and some of them moderately strong 
and some of them weak. For instance, the idea, (an 
idea is an experience), forest, at one time is associated 
with the idea, Indians; at another time with the idea, 
wolves; at another time with the idea of an excursion; 
at another time with the idea, springs ; at another time 
with the idea, panther; at another time with the idea, 
lumbering ; at another time with the idea, fires. Not all 
these connections are made equally strong, and the sec- 
ondary laws of association explain why they are not 
made equally strong. 

A secondary law of association is a law of associa- 
tion which explains why an experience is associated more 
strongly with some experiences than with others. 

Of these secondary laws there are six pretty well 
marked off, as follows : 

1. Correlation. 

2. Repetition. 

3. Emotion. 

4. Attention. 

5. Recentness. 

6. Disintegration. 

Correlation. — This law has reference to associations 
made between experiences by thinking, and the connec- 



Studies in Psychology 195 

tions are thought connections. If a cause is associated 
with an effect, an instrument with its work, a whole 
with a part, an object with another much like it, thought 
accompanies the association and the association is there- 
by made strong. This kind of association is, though, 
what has been previously studied as logical association. 
From the above the law may be formulated as follows : 

Those experiences held in consciousness together hy 
logical association are, other things equal, the most 
strongly associated. 

Illustration. — If at one time the idea Thomas Jeffer- 
son is associated with the Declaration of Independence, 
or the Louisiana Purchase, and at another time, with 
the planet, Venus, when again the idea Thomas Jefferson 
comes into consciousness, according to the law of corre- 
lation, the idea of the Declaration of Independence, or 
of the Louisiana Purchase should come into conscious- 
ness. Because there were thought connections between 
Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence, 
or the Louisiana Purchase, but none between him and 
the planet, Venus. And the reason is that the idea 
Thomas Jefferson is more strongly associated with the 
idea Declaration of Independence, or Louisiana Purchase, 
than with the idea Venus. 

Repetition. — It is evident that repetition renders 
our experiences more effective. And this is true of as- 
sociations as well as of other experiences. One can be 
made to learn and remember almost anjrthing, if it be 
repeated often enough in his presence, whether he de- 
sires to do so or not. So repeating associations makes 



196 Studies in Psychology 

them strong. This truth is formulated into a law as 
follows : 

Those experiences held together in consciousness the 
most frequently are, other things equal, the most strong- 
ly associated. 

Illustration. — If the idea, California, has been held 
in consciousness with the idea, Pacific Ocean, more fre- 
quently than with the idea, orange, when the idea, Cali- 
fornia, comes into consciousness the idea. Pacific Ocean, 
will come in rather than the idea, orange. This law is 
also illustrated well by the fact that when the idea of 
any object comes into consciousness almost always the 
idea of the name of that object comes into consciousness 
first, or if the idea of the name comes into consciousness 
the idea of the object comes into consciousness. These, 
the idea of the name and the idea of the object are re- 
peated in consciousness more often than any other as- 
sociations. 

In each case above the ideas came into consciousness 
as they did because of the associations having been made 
strong by repetition. 

Emotion. — Everyone knows that when we have a 
great deal of feeling accompanying an experience, we 
remember the experience well. If we are scared much 
at an experience we almost certainly remember that ex- 
perience well. If we are amused at some occurrence, we 
are apt to remember it well. So emotion, or feeling, ac- 
companying association makes the association strong. 
Because of this some experiences seem to burn their way 



Studies in Psychology 197 

into our lives. This truth is formulated into a law as 
follows : 

Those experiences held together in consciousness 
with the highest degree of feeling are, other things 
equal, the most strongly associated. 

Illustration. — A boy was crossing a bridge on horse- 
back when a broken board in the bridge flew up at one 
end because of the horse's stepping upon it at the other 
end. The horse becoming frightened at this, jumped, 
threw the rider and fell at full length off the end of 
the bridge into the mud and water some eight or ten 
feet below. Now, when this man sees a broken board 
in a bridge, he thinks of this experience in preference to 
others, though broken bridge boards have been associated 
with other experiences in his life. And this is because 
the association was made so strong by the feeling con- 
nected with it. 

It seems as if nearly any feeling accompanying an 
association will make it strong. It may be interest, 
anger, fear, embarrassment, hope, surprise, love, hate, 
pleasure, pain, and many others. 

Attention. — It is a truism that we remember well 
what we pay careful attention to, and that we remember 
poorly what we give but slight attention. This fact 
exists because good attention makes a strong association 
and poor attention makes a weak association. The for- 
mulated statement of this truth is as follows : 

Those experiences held together in consciousness 
with the highest degree of attention are, other things 
equal, the most strongly associated. 



198 Studies in Psychology 

Illustration. — If one associates the idea, elm tree, 
with the idea, horse, but gives it little attention at one 
time, but at another time associates the idea, elm tree, 
with the idea, wet ground, but gives attention and 
notices that elm trees grow best in such ground, when 
the idea, elm tree, comes into consciousness the idea, wet 
ground, will come into consciousness in preference to 
the idea, horse And this will be true because the as- 
sociation between the idea, elm tree, and the idea, wet 
ground, will be stronger than the association between 
the idea elm tree, and the idea, horse. 

Becentness. — Experiences in consciousness recently 
are more easily remembered than those which have not 
been in mind for a long time. This is because all associa- 
tions grow weak with time unless repeated. But even 
though it be the first time an association has ever been 
made, if it be recent, we may well remember the experi- 
ences associated. This truth formulated into a law is 
as follows: 

Those experiences held in consciousness together 
the most recently are, other things equal, the most 
strongly associated. 

Illustration. — If one has at one time associated the 
idea, Detroit, with the French in America, and more 
recently has associated the idea, Detroit, with the auto- 
mobile industry in America, when the idea, Detroit, 
comes into consciousness, according to the law of recent- 
ness, the idea of the automobile industry in America 
will come into consciousness. And this will be because 
the association between the idea, Detroit, and the idea of 



Studies in Psychology 199 

the automobile industry is stronger than the association 
between the idea, Detroit, and the idea of the French in 
America. 

Disintegration. — Experiences which stand out defin- 
itely and clearly in consciousness are much more easily 
remembered than those which are vague and confused. 
It is in the light of this truth that one says I want to 
understand that well, because I want to remember it. 
We remember better, of course, because the association 
is stronger when the thing is clear; that is, has no 
entangling relations. The formal statement of this 
truth is as follows: 

Those experiences held in consciousness together the 
freest from entangling relations are, other things equal, 
the most strongly associated. 

Illustration. — If the idea, the tariff, is at one time 
associated with the idea, the development of manufactur- 
ing, the relations between the two being clearly seen, 
and at another time is associated with the idea, immigra- 
tion, the relations between the two being confused, when 
the idea of the tariff comes into consciousness, the idea 
of the development of manufacturing will come into con- 
sciousness, according to the law of disintegration, in 
preference to the idea of immigration. And this will 
occur because of the stronger association between the 
idea, tariff, and the idea, development of manufacturing, 
than between the idea, tariff, and the idea, immigration. 

Each of these laws of association seems to have de- 
veloped in our lives in the evolution of the species be- 
cause of its survival value. And if such be the case it 



200 Studies in Psychology 

will find its justification some way in human behavior. 
So we may valuably trace their connection with school 
work to a small degree, at least. 

The law of correlation justifies organizing our 
work. Any kind of work that is unorganized is wasteful 
of both time and energy, and this truth applies with un- 
usual force in all school work. Any school subject not 
organized teaches one neither how to remember nor to 
think in the best way. To organize is to think, and to 
think is to learn how to remember in the best way. So 
the meaning of the law of correlation in terms of be- 
havior is, organize. 

The law of repetition justifies frequent reviews in 
school work, but not without discrimination. Reviews on 
the things essential for guidance in human behavior are 
among the most valuable school exercises. Such things 
in the light of the law of repetition may be properly 
repeated till the association is so strong that it will never 
fail one when needed. 

The law of emotion justifies the effort to make school 
work interesting. It is almost self-evident that there 
can be no good school work without a good degree of 
interest, but oftentimes the conditions for school work 
are the determining factors of interest as well as the 
efforts of the teacher. And too much embellishment may 
arouse indirect interest and preclude the direct interest, 
the interest which ultimately possesses inherent Value. 
Interest, it will be remembered is a feeling. 

The law of attention justifies the teacher in demand- 
ing the attention of his students. No very good school 



Studies in Psychology 201 

work is likely to occur in which students do not feel it 
a duty to give attention. The student who does nothing 
but what he likes to do, does no more, in principle, than 
the animal, savage and child. The lesson ought to be 
thoroughly learned that there is strength born of do- 
ing one 's duty against his inclination. This is the silent 
precept of the law of attention. 

The law of recentness justifies reviews before exam- 
inations. But justifies in a more important sense the 
preparation for any kind of behavior whatever which 
depends upon accurate intelligence, in refreshing our 
minds upon required points of truth. The precept here 
is accuracy of intelligence requires recent intellectual 
preparation. 

The law of disintegration justifies the teacher's 
unwillingness to permit any point to pass by which is not 
clear to the learner ; also, the unwillingness on the part 
of the learner to pass by points in school work which 
are not clear to him. The silent command here is under- 
stand every point perfectly clearly. 

Results of Association. — When one experience is as- 
sociated with another experience, and one of them later 
comes into consciousness the mind is carried back to the 
other experience. A connection has been established be- 
tween the experiences and by way of this connection the 
mind goes from one to the other. Thus there is a con- 
nection between the idea of the word, stone, and the 
idea of the object , stone, and this connection has been 
established by associating these ideas. But again we say 
there is a relation between the idea of the word, stone,. 



202 Studies in Psychology 

and the idea of the object, stone. So it must be that one 
of the results of association is relation. 

Relation. — This term comes from re, meaning hack 
and latus, meaning home. By dropping the ^^us'^ and 
adding ion, the act of, we have the term relation, literal- 
ly meaning the act of bearing back. Now this connection 
between experiences resulting from associating them is 
the relation. So we have the following formal definitions 
for it: 

Relation is the connection the mind makes hetween 
its experiences hy holding them in consciousness at the 
same time or in close succession. 

Relation is the connection the mind makes hetween 
its experiences hy making them parts of the same mental 
activity. 

Kinds of Relations. — The mind makes relations be- 
tween the idea of the cause and the idea of the effect; 
between the idea of the instrument and the idea of the 
end; between the idea of the whole and the part, and 
the idea of one object and the idea of another similar ob- 
ject, but it also establishes relations between the idea of 
the figure 8, and the idea of the number 8, a very differ- 
ent sort of relation. Thus there are grounds for the two 
classes of relation : 

1. Logical. 

2. Arbitrary. 

The logical relations are such as thinking, or in- 
ference, helps establish. Thus knowing the whole we can 
think out to some extent the part, or knowing the cause 
we can think out to some extent the effect. 



Studies in Psychology 203 

The arbitrary relations are those which the mind 
makes without the aid of thought, or inference. No one 
could ever think out the name of a river, or very many 
other names of objects, without having been told at 
sometime the name. How would one ever be able to 
know that a dandelion is called a dandelion, or Tarax- 
acum Dens-leonis, without having been told, and what 
reason is there any way for calling this object a dande- 
lion ? The association is arbitrary and so is the relation. 

Suggestion. — When two or more experiences have 
been in consciousness together and afterward one of 
them appears in consciousness, something often causes 
the mind to go on and bring into consciousness the other 
or others. This seems to be the stimulating influence of 
the first experience or idea. That an idea is a stimulus 
to the mind seems very clear, but so is any other sort 
of mental experience. One speaks the single word, 
mother, in the presence of a crowd, or the single word, 
-fire, and many minds are stimulated to call into con- 
sciousness various experiences, and the stimulation of 
the mind by the experience was the occasion of the ac- 
tivity, or was the suggestion. This then may be formu- 
lated into the following definition for suggestion: 

Suggestion is stimulating the mind by an experience 
to call into consciousness another experience which has 
been associated with the stimulating experience. 

Suggestion is a second result of association. Sug- 
gestion may be the stimulating effect of an experience 
aroused by a word, oral or written, a gesture, or any sort 
of physical activity. The experience may be aroused 



204 Studies in Psychology 

intentionally or unintentionally by other persons or by 
one's self or by impersonal things. 

The laws of suggestion are the same in name as the 
laws of association. 1. Primary. 2. Secondary. 
The primary law is stated as follows: 

When two or more experiences have heen in con- 
sciousness at the same time or in close succession, and 
afterward one of them appears in consciousness it tends 
to stimulate the mind to bring the other or others into 
consciousness. 

The secondary laws of suggestion are the same in 
number and name as the secondary laws of association. 
They are: 1. Correlation. 2. Repetition. 3. Emotion. 
4. Attention. 5. Reeentness. 6. Disintegration. 

These laws may be stated nearly as the laws of as- 
sociation are stated, as follows: 

Correlation. — Those experiences held in conscious- 
ness together by logical association are, other things 
equal, most likely to suggest each other. 

Repetition. — Those experiences held in consciousness 
together the most frequently are, other things equal, 
most likely to suggest each other. 

Emotion. — Those experiences held in consciousness 
together with the highest degree of feeling are, other 
things equal, most likely to suggest each other. 

Attention. — Those experiences held together in con- 
sciousness with the highest degree of attention are, other 
things equal, most likely to suggest each other. 

Eecentness. — Those experiences held together in 



Studiejs in Psychology 205 

consciousness the most recently are, other things equal, 
the most likely to suggest each other. 

Disintegration. — Those experiences held together in 
consciousness the most free from entangling relations 
are, other things equal, the most likely to suggest each 
other. 

These laws of suggestion, likewise the laws of as- 
sociation, do not oppose each other, but mutually work 
together for the efficiency of memory. For instance, if 
the cause suggests the effect by the law of correlation, 
if repetition, emotion, and attention are called to the aid 
of correlation, the tendency for the idea of the effect to 
come into consciousness when the idea of the cause comes 
in will be greatly strengthened. These laws mutually 
help each other. 

Classes of Memory. — On the basis of development 
there are four classes of memory: 

1. Recognition. 

2. Remembrance of the Particular. 

3. Remembrance of the General. 

4. Recollection. 

Recognition. — Recognition is the least developed 
kind of memory and is most like sense-perception, but 
it is somewhat in advance of sense-perception in develop- 
ment. In recognition the object is always present as it 
was in sense-perception, and the object is always particu- 
lar. In addition to re-perceiving the object the mind al- 
ways knows that it is reacting the activity corresponding 
to the object at a different time from that of the former 
activity, and always at a somewhat different place. 



206 Studies in Psychology 

The advance in development of recognition over 
sense-perception consists of three things: 

1. Knowing that the mind has known the particu- 
lar object before. 

2. Knowing the object in more time relations ; that 
is, in both present and past time. 

3. Knowing the object in more place relations. 

Illustration. — If one looks out of his window, sees 
some object on the street and knows it to be an automo- 
bile, but is not aware that he has ever seen this particu- 
lar one before, the mind's activity is merely sense-per- 
ception. But if the automobile should be some particular 
one he has known before, the mind's activity is a case 
of recognition, providing he is aware he has known it 
before. 

One passes down the street and meets his friends, 
and says he recognizes each one. He is using the term, 
recognize, just right, for in each case he is re-knowing 
his friend in an act of recognition. The object, his 
friend, is particular, present, and is known to have been 
known before. 

Rememhrance of the Particular. — ^Remembrance of 
the particular is the next higher kind of memory. It is 
much like recognition. The object known is always a 
particular object, but is never present in space. 

The process of remembrance of the particular is as 
follows : the mind has an experience, some part of which, 
or the whole of which has been associated with the idea 
of a previously known object. From the suggestion of 
this associated experience or element the mind reacts 



Studies in Psychology 207 

the activity, appropriate to the previously known object 
and remembers it. 

The main advance in development of remembrance 
of the particular over recognition is that it enables the 
mind to think of objects when they are not present. 
This is a large advance, for to be able to think of objects 
only in their presence would detract greatly from the 
mind's power of thought. 

Illustration. — One sees a basket of fruit sitting in a 
show window, and it suggests to him a particular fruit 
farm he has known in Oregon or Virginia. From the 
suggestion of the basket of fruit the mind thinks the 
whole activity appropriate to the fruit farm previously 
known, and remembers it. 

Bememhrance of the General. — The next higher 
kind of memory is remembrance of the general. In this 
kind of memory the mind remembers a general idea, or 
general notion, or class. If, when a child is given a piece 
of crayon and told to make triangles on the board, he is 
able to do so, it is because he remembers the general idea, 
triangle. 

The mind's process in the remembrance of the gen- 
eral is as follows: the mind gets an experience in con- 
sciousness which has been associated with the general 
idea. This experience suggests the general idea, and the 
mind remembers it. 

The advance in development of remembrance of the 
general over remembrance of the particular is that it 
enables the mind to deal with classes, to know them and 
think about them. This is a greater advance than one 



208 Studies in Psychology 

is likely to appreciate at first. It saves the mind a great 
deal of time and a great deal of energy. One who could 
think only with particular ideas could never advance 
beyond the stage of infancy in thinking. 

Illustration. — A teacher held up an overshoe and 
asked the students what it suggested to them. A student 
said it suggested a flatboat to him. The teacher asked 
what one and the student replied no particular one, just 
the general idea, flatboat. 

Recollection. — Recollection is the most developed 
kind of memory. It is characterized by a special effort 
to get hold of some associated line of experiences which 
will suggest the thing to be remembered. 

The process of recollection is as follows: the mind 
tries to remember something and does so partly, but 
there is some part of the activity lacking. The mind is 
aware that there is a missing part, and makes a special 
effort of the will to bring into consciousness some associ- 
ated line of experiences to suggest the missing part. If 
it succeeds, the activity is one of recollection. 

Illustration. — One sees a flower, but can not remem- 
ber its scientific name — the missing part. One then tries 
to think where he first saw the flower, how its name 
looked on the page of the book used as the key, when he 
identified it, etc. and thus succeeds in recalling the name. 

A gentleman stepped into a store and saw a man 
whose face seemed familiar and whose voice also sound- 
ed familiar, but whose name and the place where he had 
been known he could not remember. He then made an 
effort to get a hold on some associated line of experience 



Studies in Psychology 209 

to suggest the name and circumstances under which he 
had been known. He went back to the different places 
in which his life had been spent for five years and at 
length thus remembered the missing part, the name and 
circumstances under which the gentleman had formerly 
been known. 

The advance in development of recollection over 
the other three kinds of memory is in (1) the effort in- 
volved; (2) in the numher of relations grasped. In the 
effort to follow up some associated line of experiences to 
suggest the missing part of the experience to be re- 
membered, many relations are grasped. 

On another basis there are the classes of memory 
which William James calls (1) the desultory memory; 
(2) the philosophic memory. These classes are made on 
the basis of the kind of association involved. 

The Desultory Memory. — The desultory memory is 
such memory as one uses in learning almost isolated 
facts, as, the names of the letters of the alphabet or 
symbols of the forms of the letters; or the name of a 
tree as the symbol of the object itself. The memory 
which most psychologists say we use in remembering the 
length of rivers, the names of cities, the populations of 
provinces, the principal parts of verbs, the spelling of 
many words, etc., is of the desultory kind. Logical re- 
lations play no part in it. The following is the formal 
definition for it: 

The desultory memory is that hind of memory in 
which the mind remembers through arbitrary association. 

The Philosophic Memory. — The philosophic memory 



210 Studies in Psychology 

is the kind of memory which we use in remembering the 
effect by inference from the cause or the cause by in- 
ference from the effect, or by which we can reason to the 
thing we wish to remember. It is the kind we use in 
remembering work which is well organized. By use of 
this kind of memory we remember why Chicago is a 
large city; why the Panama canal will be beneficial to 
the world; why Oregon is a fine fruit country; why the 
United States is attracting more immigrants than any 
other country in the world. In short, it is the kind of 
memory in which we remember things by seeing the 
reasons for these things. The following is the formal 
definition for it: 

The philosophic memory is that kind of memory in 
which the mind remembers things through logical as- 
sociation. 

The Cultivation of Memory. — The popular notion 
of the cultivation of memory has a good deal of error 
in it. Popularly it is a favorite thought that any kind 
of exercise of the memory will add to the efficiency of 
memory for any kind of memory work ; that the general 
memory will become efficient by exercise after the fash- 
ion of the biceps muscle's becoming strong by exercise 
for any work we wish to turn it to. For instance, it is 
popularly thought that if one has a poor memory for 
people's names, he could, for instance, train his memory 
by learning by heart Gray's Elegy, the squares and 
cubes of numbers to five hundred, and the names of the 
muscles of the human organism, so that he would have 



Studies in Psychology 211 

improved much in remembering people's names; that is, 
general exercise will improve the general memory. 

Recent studies lead to the belief that there is no 
truth in this popular thought. 

Professor William James says on this point: '*It 
follows also, from what has been said, that the popular 
idea that ^the Memory % in the sense of a general elemen- 
tary faculty, can he improved hy training, is a great mis- 
take.'' 

Colvin and Bagley say: "The question of the im- 
provement of the memory is an important one. In the 
first place it should be remembered that an 'all round' 
memory training is impossible. It has been well said 
that we do not have ' memory ', but * memories ' ; that is, 
we remember some things well and others badly. In- 
deed, the very fact that my mind is impressed with cer- 
tain details may mean that I do not attend to others, 
and hence they are not likely to be stamped on my mind 
so that they can later be recalled. If I am interested 
in learning certain formulae in mathematics, I may en- 
tirely forget the engagement that I made with a friend. 
Usually, persons who are 'forgetful' forget certain 
things only and remember others very well. We call 
them forgetful simply because they do not keep in mind 
those matters that we consider important. Memory can 
not then he strengthened as we would strengthen a mus- 
cle, merely hy exercising it in committing any sort of 
material/' 

If one in studying mathematics seems to improve 
his memory for history or poetry, the improvement does 



212 Studies in Psychology 

not consist in making the memory more efficient but in 
learning better how to go about it to remember ; that is, 
in learning better methods of remembering. The mem- 
ory will remain the same, but one learns better how to 
use it. 

A story is told of Abraham Lincoln of an incident 
analogous to what seems to be the cultivation of memory. 
Mr. Lincoln was passing through southern Indiana and 
asked permission to stay for the night at a little, house 
by the roadside. He was granted the favor by the lady 
of the house, who told him that her husband was not 
at home, but would be home soon. While she was pre- 
paring supper, Mr. Lincoln noticed a fiddle hanging on 
the wall, and asked permission to use it. He found the 
fiddle out of tune, tuned it and played some selections 
on it, and then placed it on the bed. Soon the husband 
appeared and supper was served. After supper the 
lady, both she and her husband being fond of music, 
asked Mr. Lincoln to play some. He picked up the 
:fiddle from the bed, and played while the husband sat 
enraptured with the music. At the close of two or 
three pieces, the husband said, "Mary, I would give a 
thousand dollars for such a fiddle as that. ' ' 

It was the same fiddle but there was so much differ- 
ence in the way it was being used. 

It is the same memory but there is so much differ- 
ence between knowing and not knowing how to use it. 

^^The best way to improve the memory is to improve 
our methods of memorizing.' ' — Colvin and Bagley. 

Remembering then that the only improvement of 



Studies in Psychology 213 

memory is to be obtained in learning better how to use 
memory, its method of improvement will consist in pro- 
perly applying the laws of association. 

Application of the Law of Correlation. — The appli- 
cation of this law in cultivating memory consists in 
working out the thought relations between the things to 
be remembered; of organizing our subjects or lessons. 
This was the secret of the excellent memories of Herbert 
Spencer and Charles Darwin. Mr. Darwin organized all 
the facts of organic life around the principle of evolu- 
tion, and Mr. Spencer organized all facts around the 
principle of universal evolution. 

The cultivation of memory in this way consists in 
building up the many sided and complex systems of as- 
sociation on the basis of the logical relations between the 
things we wish to remember. This is the cultivation of 
the philosophic memory. 

The following from Professor William James helps 
in understanding the thought on this point: 

*'An educated memory depends on an organized 
system of associations ; and its goodness depends on two 
of their peculiarities: first, on the persistency of their 
associations; and, second, on their number." 

''The 'secret of a good memory' is thus the secret 
of forming diverse and multiple associations with every 
fact we care to retain. But this forming associations 
with a fact, — what is it but thinking ahout the fact as 
much as possible? Briefly, then, of two men with the 
same outward experiences, the one who thirties over his 
experiences most, and weaves them into the most system- 



214 Studies in Psychology 

atic relations with each other, will be the one with the 
best memory. 

But, if our ability to recollect a thing be so largely 
a matter of its associations with other things which thus 
become its cues, an important pedagogic consequence 
follows. There can he no improvement of the general or 
elementary faculty of memory; there can only he im- 
provement of our memory for special systems of associat- 
ed things; and this latter improvement is due to the 
way in which the things in question are woven into as- 
sociation with each other in the mind. Intricately or 
profoundly woven, they are held; disconnected, they 
tend to drop out just in proportion as the native brain 
retentiveness is poor. And no amount of training, drill- 
ing, repeating, and reciting employed upon the matter of 
one system of objects, the history-system, for example, 
will in the least improve either the facility or the dura- 
bility with which objects belonging to a wholly disparate 
system — ^the system of facts, of chemistry, for instance- 
tend to be retained. That system must be separately 
worked into the mind by itself, — a chemical fact which 
is thought about in connection with other chemical facts, 
tending then to stay, but otherwise easily dropping out." 

*'Your memory for facts of a certain class can be 
improved very much by training in that class of facts, 
because the incoming new fact will then find all sorts of 
analogues and associates already there; and these will 
keep it liable to recall. But other kinds of facts will 
reap none of that benefit, and, unless one has also been 
trained and versed in their class, will be at the mercy of 



Studies in Psychology 215 

the mere crude retentiveness of the individual, which, as 
we have seen is practically a fixed quantity. Neverthe- 
less, one often hears people say: 'A great sin was com- 
mitted against me in my youth: my teachers entirely 
failed to exercise my memory. If they had only made 
me learn a lot of things by heart at school, I should 
not be, as I am now, forgetful of every thing I read and 
hear.' This is a great mistake : learning poetry by heart 
will make it easier to learn and remember other poetry, 
but nothing else; and so of dates, and so of chemistry, 
and geography." 

The cultivation of memory according to the law of 
correlation thus consists of 'building up multiple and 
diverse systems of associations. 

Application of Law of Repetition. — Repetition 
helps to fix anything in mind, so repetition will help in 
any kind of memory. It does not have to be thoughtless, 
blind repetition, or rote learning, but may be repetition 
of the associative system. It may be repetition of what 
we remember by the philosophic memory. In these 
cases repetition works with and helps correlation. 

But a vast amount of mental stuff must be remem- 
bered by the desultory memory ; remembered when there 
is no logical connection between the things we remember. 
The remembering of the words of a language, the letters 
of an alphabet, the symbols of numbers, the figures, the 
height of mountains, the lengths of rivers, the popula- 
tions of cities, and distances of all sorts are examples 
of things that can be learned only by repetition. So 



216 Studies in Psychology 

repetition is not to be scorned at or slighted in cultivat- 
ing memory. 

One will save himself a great deal of disappoint- 
ment in life if he does not expect to remember those 
things which he does not think over often. If one should 
go to a foreign land where he would not hear his mother 
tongue spoken for ten years, then return to his native 
land, he would find that he would have difficulty in re- 
membering his own language so as to speak it. 

Application of the Law of Emotion. — Interest is a 
very general term for all sorts of feeling which the mind 
connects with an object. Interest strengthens all as- 
sociations. Then one must be interested in what he wants 
best to remember. If he can not, he may as well under- 
stand at the start that he is not likely to remember well. 
The inability to be interested in school work is due to 
two or three causes : 

1. Immaturity of mind. 

2. Inherent worthlessness of the individual. 

3. Bad presentation of the subject to the learner. 
Many times a student finds himself not interested 

in work at the beginning, but if he has inherent worth 
and will stick to his subject he can work up an interest. 
And such he must do in many of the important things 
of life. 

So the law of emotion commands us to get interested 
in what we would remember. 

Application of Law of Attention. — ^No good atten- 
tion, no good memory, is a truism. The mind must 
work for what it gets, if it expects it to stay with it after 



Studies in Psychology 217 

it gets it. The one who can not pay attention is as clay 
in the hands of his environment. People trifle with 
themselves by placing the blame on something else than 
themselves when they do not pay attention to what they 
should attend to. If one pays good attention and ob- 
serves details, it will help wonderfully in remembering. 
And one may as well know at first that if he does not 
make the required effort to attend to his work, it will 
prove a handicap and will baffle his efforts for success 
and happiness throughout his entire life. 

The silent precept of the law of attention is attend 
to what you ought to attend to at little cost or at great 
cost. 

Application of the Law of Recentness. — All associa- 
tions grow weak with time. So to be sure our memories^ 
will serve us most efficiently in cases where accuracy of 
memory is demanded, we should depend upon recent as- 
sociations; the recent going over what is to be remem- 
bered. To neglect to do so is to neglect to do our duty 
oftentimes. 

Application of the Law of Disintegration. — We re- 
member best what we see clearest, because what we see 
clearest is freest from entangling relations. A man who 
spent many years in studying memory has said ''One 
of the most valuable rules for remembering is a well 
first knowing. ' ' It will be found upon examination that 
many cases of failure to remember are due to the fact 
that the thing to be remembered was not clearly under- 
stood. A clear understanding is a wonderful aid to 
the memory. 



218 Studies in Psychology 

The precept here is, be sure to understand what you 
expect to remember. 

Mnemonics. — Mnemonics is a means of helping the 
memory to do its work. It consists in remembering some 
idea, object or experience to be associated with the thing 
the mind especially wishes to remember. Thus if one 
has difficulty in remembering the colors of the spectrum 
in their order, violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange 
and red, he learns to spell the word, vibgyor, and be- 
cause each succeeding letter in this word is the first let- 
ter of a color in order, he remembers the colors. 

"Thirty days hath September, April, June and 
November; 

All the rest have thirty-one 

Save February which alone, etc." 

is used to remember the number of days in the different 
months of the year. 

The art of employing mental objects purposely to 
associate with the thing we wish to remember is 
mnemonics. 

Value of Mnemonics. — Mnemonics helps the mind 
sometimes to remember and so are of some use, but 
psychologists are pretty well agreed that one could never 
<3hange a bad memory to a good one by the use of 
mnemonics. They are of only limited use. 

"There are many artificial systems of mnemonics, 
some public, some sold as secrets. They are all so many 
devices for training us into certain methodical and 
stereotyped ivays of thinking about the facts we seek 
to retain.'* 



Studies in Psychology 219 

"Apart from the extreme difficulty of finding words 
that are appropriate in this exercise, it is clearly an 
excessively poor, trivial and silly way of 'thinking* 
about dates." — James. 

Dreams. — Both memory and imagination are in- 
volved in dreams. There are four points regarding 
dreams which the psychology student should know. 

1. The mind in dreams obeys the laws of associa- 
tion as well as in waking hours. 

2. Our dreams are always made up of old mater- 
ial, though the imagination frequently makes wonderful 
new combinations out of this old material. 

3. We are semi-conscious in dreams and do not 
hold before us a purpose with which we associate our 
experiences. Lacking a purpose to hold our minds in 
line, they do most unreasonable and fanciful things. 

4. So far as known dreams do not foretell the 
future events in any way more than can be known 
through the ordinary -ways of getting knowledge. 

Forgetting. — Forgetting is losing from memory 
that which we have learned. When we get out in life 
after leaving school we forget the most of what we 
learned in school. But not every trace of the effect of 
the learning is lost. Something stays with us from 
every experience. If it were necessary for us to learn 
our Latin or Greek again it would be easier for us than 
at first. We are a little further along, even though we 
do forget, than we would have been had we never 
learned. 

*'It has been definitely determined that tve forget 



220 Studies in Psychology 

what we have learned very rapidly at first and then 
much more slowly. If we are studying something in 
which there is little meaning, in which we rely on im- 
pression very largely and on association but slightly^ 
a large amount of the material learned will have faded 
from our minds in the first few hours after we have 
stopped learning. What remains after this leaves us 
much more slowly. In memorizing something that has 
meaning, we find that we forget it less rapidly, although 
the fact still remains that the rate of forgetting is more 
rapid at first than it is later on. It has been found that 
if the subject studied is to be remembered for any length 
of time without a large loss in the first few hours, it 
is necessary to study it beyond the point of merely un- 
derstanding it. In other words, if the person wishes to 
retain what he is learning, he must go over it again and 
again, even after he is convinced that he has memorized 
it," — Colvin and Bagley. 

Mind Wandering. — Every one has had the experi- 
ence of formally reading over a page and at the end 
not knowing a single thing in it. The mind was wan- 
dering ; that is, the mind was doing other work than that 
we purposed to do. Very much like the one who starts 
on a journey and is attracted to something on this side 
the road and goes to look at it, then comes back to the 
road and goes on for a time, then is attracted by some- 
thing on the other side, forgets for the time what he is 
doing, and goes to look at it, etc. 

Mind wandering is the mental process in which our 



Studies in Psychology 221 

minds depart against our wishes from doing that which 
we purposed to do. 

Mind wandering is a loss of mental control. The 
mind in wandering obeys the laws of association, and, 
in fact, the mind wanders because of these laws. There 
are several ways in which the mind wanders, some of 
which are the following: 

1. In reading or studying the mind comes to some 
idea, and goes off at a tangent, so to speak, and follows 
out what this idea suggests instead of going forward 
with connections in which the idea is found. Thus in 
reading the sentence. Most beautiful orange groves lie 
hidden in the valleys beyond that snow-capped range of 
mountains, the mind might pick up the word orange, 
which would suggest orange blossom, then go to mar- 
riage, family, courts, divorces, unhappiness, and so on. 
This is not an uncommon way for the mind to wander. 

2. The mind wanders because of some stimulus 
breaking in upon it from the outside. Thus one may be 
studying his lesson, when he hears some one singing 
''The Heavens Are Telling" and from this suggestion 
the mind follows out a series of associated ideas before 
returning to the lesson under consideration. 

3. The mind wanders because of some bodily dis- 
comfort, as cold, heat, a headache, a toothache. The 
mind centers itself on the discomfort and follows out 
the train of ideas it suggests to the neglect of the mental 
work intended. 

4. The mind will be drawn to any important in- 
terest away from the intended mental work. If one has 



222 Studies in Psychology 

a mother or father dangerously ill, he finds it difficult 
to hold his mind on his work. 

Remedies for Mind Wandering. — It is doubtful 
whether there is any such thing as a cure for mind 
wandering, strictly speaking. That is to say, if one finds 
himself of a type of mind such that his mind wanders 
to such an extent that it inconveniences and annoys him, 
it is probably due to the character of his nervous sys- 
tem with which he was born, and which he will take 
with him throughout his life. He thus will always have 
this to contend with, and whatever improvement comes 
will not come in changing one's type of mind. 

Definite purposes and strong interests in what one 
is doing will do more than all other things to hold the 
mind in line. 

If one studies a lesson with the definite purpose in 
mind of being able to make an outline or synopsis of it 
from his understanding of it, he will find his mind does 
not wander so easily as when he has a less definite pur- 
pose in view. One can listen to a sermon or lecture in 
the same way. This is a most excellent mental hahit 
to form and keep. 

If one 's interest in a thing has become a passion, he 
will find his mind will not wander very much from it, 
or if it does, it will soon get back. So the more one 
gets into a subject the less his mind will wander, because 
the more he gets into it, the greater will be his interest. 

Probably the only help for mind wandering lies in 
the development of (1) definite purposes; (2) absorbing 
interests. 



Studies in Psychology 223 

The Advance of Memory in Development over Sense- 
perception. — Memory is a higher stage in the develop- 
ment of knowing than sense-perception. Its advances 
over sense-perception are : 

1. The mind knows it has had the experience be- 
fore. 

2. Memory deals with the past and present time, 
sense-perception only with the present. 

3. Memory deals with objects both present and not 
present in space, sense-perception with objects only 
present in space. 

Memory Involved in Sense-perception. — All is in 
all in psychology; that is, any complete mental activity 
involves every other mental activity to some extent. 
Therefore, memory is involved in sense-perception, and 
in two ways at the least. 

1. Logically in sense-perception the mind always 
classifies the object perceived; that is, puts it in some 
known class. But to think the sense-perceived into a 
class one must remember the class. Thus remembrance 
of the general is involved in sense-perception. 

2. Again the main thing the mind does in sense- 
perception is to interpret the sensations. But interpret- 
ing the sensations is grasping the likeness and difference 
between present and past sensations. In order to get 
the past sensations before the mind it must remember 
them. Thus the second way in which memory is in- 
volved in sense-perception is in remembering past sen- 
sations. 



224 Studies in Psychology 

Read: 

1. Angeirs Psychology, pp. 184-202. 

2. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 188- 
214. 

3. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 243- 
281. 

4. James' Talks to Teachers on Psychology, pp. 
116-130. 

5. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 176-191. 

6. Halleek's Psychology, pp. 101-149. 



CHAPTER XIV. 
Imagination. 

General Nature. — Sense-perception begins with the 
sensation and ends with an idea — ^the percept. Memory 
begins with any sort of present mental experience and 
ends with identifying it with a past mental experience. 
Imagination begins with an idea and ends with an 
image. 

The mind has the ability of forming an idea and 
then of putting this idea into a mental image, or pic- 
ture. If some one tells us to close our eyes and look at 
the following described apple with the mind's eye, the 
process of forming the picture is the process of imagina- 
tion. 

A large red apple, three inches in diameter, almost 
spherical, with a white stripe one-fourth inch wide on 
one side and a dark-red stripe one-half inch wide on 
the opposite side, lying on a plate sitting on a stand 
in the center of a room. 

The pictures, or images, of imagination may be al- 
most like objects which have been seen or they may be 
almost entirely different; that is, highly idealized. It 
makes no difference though how much they are idealized 
the imagination depends upon memory to produce the 
material for its images. The ancients imagined a huge 
dog, Cerberus, with three immense heads, whose body 
bristled with snakes in the place of hairs, and whose 



226 Studies in Psychology 

barking resembled peals of thunder, as the guardian 
of Hades. There is nothing new in this picture, but the 
combination. They were familiar with dogs, heads, 
snakes and peals of thunder. Memory reproduced these. 
What is true of this case, is true of all cases of imagina- 
tion. Imagination is thus dependent upon sense-per- 
ception and memory for the materials which it builds 
into its images. 

The image made by imagination is always a par- 
ticular thing; that is, an image having attributes which 
separate it from every other thing. 

From the foregoing study, the definition of imagina- 
tion is as follows: 

Imagination is that stage in the development of 
knowing in which the mind embodies an idea in a par- 
ticular form or image. 

Image. — An image is a mental thing, a mental pro- 
duct. If an object, as a rose, is present, and we know 
it is a rose, we have a mental product which is appropri- 
ate to the rose, in our minds, but we do not call it an 
image. We call it an idea. But if afterward we repro- 
duce the product when the rose is not present to the 
senses, we say we have an image of it. So it seems that 
what are called images are sensible products ; that is, 
products that originally the mind obtained through the 
senses. There is the fact known to the mind, though, 
that external stimulus to the product is absent. 

Inference from the above study gives the following 
definition of an image : 

An image is a mental revival of a sensible mental 



Studies in Psychology 227 

product without the presence of the external stimulus. 
We see a farm house when the farm house is not 
present — a visual image. We hear the ringing of the 
college bell, when the bell is not ringing — an auditory 
image. We feel the roughness of sandpaper, when we 
are not touching sandpaper — a tactual image. We smell 
the clover blossoms when there are no clover blossoms 
to smell — an olfactory image. We taste the strawberry 
when there is no strawberry to taste — a gustatory image. 
We feel the warmth of the fire when there is no fire — 
a temperature image. We feel the resistance of weight 
when there is no weight — a muscular image. 

Kinds of Images. — From one point of view there 
are as many kinds of images as there are senses: 1. 
Visual. 2. Auditory. 3. Tactual. 4. Olfactory. 5. Gus- 
tatory. 6. Temperature. 7. Muscular. 

Most persons have more visual images probably 
than any other kind. But the one who thinks that we 
have only visual images does not grasp the meaning of 
the term image fully. To him who is bom blind there 
can be no visual images. Mr. Hays of Argos, Indiana, 
who has been blind all his life tells me he has no visual 
images at all. A blind man thought scarlet must re- 
semble the sound of a trumpet. 

From another point of view there are images which 
almost correspond to some existing object, as the image 
of a tree we have just passed ; and images which do not 
correspond to any known object, as the Centaur. These 
classes are sometimes called: 1. Literal images. 2. Con- 
structive images. 



228 Studies in Psychology 

Strictly speaking there are no literal images. No 
one is ever able to image a thing so that the image will 
correspond with the object in every detail. There are 
certain to be some little differences. They may be small, 
but an analysis will always reveal them. 

*'We may, therefore, state as a law the fact that 
images never exactly reproduce the original object. They 
are subject to constant change from loss of certain ele- 
ments, from the addition of elements belonging to differ- 
ent experiences, and from changes in the retentive brain 
tracts. ' ' 

But some images are much more nearly literal rep- 
resentatives of known objects than others, and the mind 
is aware of this difference in the purpose of its effort. 
At one time it tries to make a literal image, at another 
time it is the intention to change, idealize and construct. 
We may sum this up as follows : 

An image is literal just to the degree to which it 
corresponds with some known object. 

An image is constructive just to the degree to which 
it does not correspond to any known object. 

We study a vase, go into another room and try to 
make an exact drawing of it. The image we draw from 
is approximately literal. 

We picture a horse with wings flying through the 
air. The image is constructive. 

The Ways in Which the Mind Forms Imaginative 
Products. — There are several ways in which the mind 
makes its pictures. The chief ones follow : 

1. The mind forms approximately literal images 



Studies est Psychology 229 

of objects. One may look at a house, shut his eyes and 
image as accurately as he can. One makes a drawing 
to show a friend the exact condition of a grove after 
a storm. In each case the image the mind forms is as 
nearly literal as possible. 

2. The mind forms images of the separated parts 
of things. One imagines the head of a horse without 
the body; the hand writing on the wall; the hand pro- 
truding from the water holding the sword; the claws 
of the eagle ; the tooth of the serpent, or beak of a bird. 

In forming imaginative products of this kind, the 
mind employs dissociation. It dissociates things from 
their usual concomitants. 

3. The mind may form images by putting together 
images of separated objects. 

The minds of the Ancients gave us many classical 
illustrations of this point. The following are some of 
them: Centaur, the head and trunk of a man joined to 
the body of a hoi'se. Cerherus, a dog with three heads, 
snakes for hairs, barking that resembled thunder, who 
guarded the entrance to Hades. Harpies, birds with 
the heads of maidens, bodies of vultures and claws of 
eagles. Pegasus, a horse with wings who could fly across 
the heavens. Mercury, a god with sandals propelled by 
the wings of a bird. 

In forming products in this way, the mind employs 
both dissociation and association. Dissociation separates 
the parts and association puts them together. 

4. The mind forms imaginative products by mini- 
fying the images of known things. 



230 Studies in Psychology 

In Gulliver's Travels, Swift mentions the Lillipu- 
tians, little people so small that they had to use ladders 
to climb up on Gulliver's body, though Gulliver was 
just an ordinary sized man. The fairies, the brownies, 
the dwarfs are products of the minifying work of the 
mind in imagination. 

This kind of imagination is used much by children. 
With their limited experience, mostly experiences with 
persons, they go in imagination from a person of ordi- 
nary size to one very much smaller. This has something 
to do with their love for f airie stories. 

5. The mind forms imaginative products by mag- 
nifying the images of known things. 

Gulliver in his travels met men seventy-two feet 
high in the land of Brobdingnag. In this land Gulliver 
was given to the baby to play with and almost lost his 
life by having the baby to put his head into its mouth. 
Ulysses on his return to Greece after the destruction 
of Troy was shipwrecked on the island where lived 
Polyphemus, a giant of the race of Cyclops. Polyphe- 
mus was nearly a hundred feet tall, had a pine tree for 
a walking stick, and had just one eye as large as a 
saucer. The Ancients pictured Atlas as a giant large 
enough to carry the heavens on his shoulders. The 
Norsemen pictured the Midgard Serpent large enough 
to encircle the earth. The Hebrew imagination gave us 
Goliath. 

Children use this kind of imagination a great deal, 
too. It is again easy to magnify persons, with whom 



Studies in Psychology 231 

most of their experiences are connected, and thus have 
a giant. 

6. The mind forms images by selecting, adapting 
and fitting images into larger constructive images. 

The automobile, the sewing machine, the phono- 
graph; a statue, a poem, and a painting are produced 
by the mind's working with images in this way. 

Classes of Imagination. — On the basis of develop- 
ment there are three classes of imagination: 

1. Eeproductive. 

2. Mechanical. 

3. Constructive. 

The Reproductive Imagination. — This kind of imag- 
ination is much like memory, but it is a little in advance 
of memory. If one should look at an apple as long as 
he desired then go into another room and try to em- 
body his idea of the apple into a drawing there would 
be places in which memory would fail. These places 
would not be left as gaps in the drawing but would be 
filled out, and the imagination would do this. 

Or one may observe a table or chair as long as he 
desires, then go from the presence of it, and try to 
make as accurate a representation in drawing as he can 
of the object, still he will find many little places where 
memory fails and the imagination must come to the 
rescue. 

In these cases the idea is reproduced by the memory 
and imagination embodies it in an image as nearly liti 
eral as it can. Such imagination is the reproductive, 
and the following is the formal definition for it : 



232 Studies in Psychology 

The reproductive imagination is that kind of imag- 
ination which makes images as nearly literal as possible. 

Illustration. — One sees a beautiful suburban home 
and wishes to describe it to a friend. He describes the 
situation, the size, shape, material, color and architec- 
ture of the house; the driveway, the lawn, walks, flow- 
ers, shrubbery, fountain, swing, hammock and shade 
trees; the forest, the lake, the stream and the hill in 
the background. He makes the picture to correspond 
with the home and its surroundings as nearly as he can, 
but it is safe to say imagination comes to the rescue of 
memory in many places. 

This is the work of the reproductive imagination; 
that is, to make images as nearly literal as the mind can. 

The Mechanical Imagination. — As was seen in 
previous discussion the mind forms incongruous images 
by putting together images of parts, or changing images 
in some other inconsistent way. Thus the mind forms 
an image of man's legs from the knees down attached 
to a cucumber, or a pumpkin attached to a man's body 
in the place of his head. In these images, consistency, 
congruity, proportion and reason are entirely ignored. 
The mind arbitrarily makes the images. This is the 
work of the mechanical imagination. 

This kind of imagination is a development from the 
reproductive imagination. It is the images of the re- 
productive imagination which the mind changes to make 
the images of the mechanical imagination. These are 
changed in any sort of arbitrary way. The following 
statement is the formal definition : 



Studies in Psychology 233 

The mechanical imagination is that kind of imag- 
ination in which the mind forms images by arbitrarily 
changing the images of the reproductive imagination. 

This is called the mechanical imagination because 
in it the mind works unreasonably, unthinkingly, in- 
consistently ; that is, mechanically. 

The mind in mechanical imagination may form 
images by: 

1. Combining images of the reproductive imagina- 
tion. 

2. Separating the images of the reproductive imag- 
ination. 

3. Minifying the images of the reproductive imag- 
ination. 

4. Enlarging the images of the reproductive imag- 
ination. 

The Constructive Imagination. — This kind of imag- 
ination is also called creative imagination. It is the 
work of the mind in using the images of the reproductive 
imagination and the mechanical imagination in building 
up complex images. The images of the reproductive 
and mechanical imagination are changed, adapted, or 
fashioned to fit into the proper place in the complex 
image. This process of building up an image by fash- 
ioning the images of the reproductive and mechanical 
imagination is the constructive imagination. It is seen 
to be based upon and developed from the other two 
kinds. The following is the formulated definition for it : 

The constructive imagination is that kind of imag- 
ination in which the mind makes complex images by 



234 Studies in Psychologi? 

adapting the images of the reproductive and mechanical 
imagination. 

Illustration. — Some one's mind formed the idea of 
a machine that would run on the ordinary roadway 
propelled by its own power. The idea must have been 
vague at first. There were summoned before the mind 
the images of pieces of wood, iron, steel, copper, brass, 
aluminum, rubber, asbestos, fiber, porcelain, etc. But 
these put together as they appeared at first would never 
make anything that would run. The various images 
are fashioned so each one will fit into its appropriate 
place in the image — ^the mental automobile. And this 
complex image has become an objective reality. 

An enumeration of some of the objective products 
of the constructive imagination may help to clarify the 
idea somewhat. They are: 1. Mechanical inventions — 
the sewing machine, the locomotive, the typewriter, the 
adding machine, the self -binding harvester, the watch, 
the steamship, the aeroplane, the trolley car, etc. 2. 
Architecture — Notre Dame cathedral, the English par- 
liament house, the Vatican at Rome, etc. 3. Sculpture — 
Venus de Milo, Moses, the Laocoon Group, etc. 4. 
Paintings — Cistine Madonna, Mona Lisa, the Angelus, 
etc. 5. Music—' ' II Trovatore, " the " Requiem, " ' ' Chor- 
al Symphony," "Tanhauser," etc. 6. Literature — The 
Tempest, Divine Comedy, Paradise Lost, Iliad, etc. 
These are but a few of the wonderful objective realities 
produced by the constructive imagination. 

Characteristics of the Constructive Imagination. — 
There are three characteristics of this kind of imagina- 



Studies in Psychology 235 

tion worthy of further study: 1. It is always more 
purposive than the other kinds of imagination. 2. It is 
more selective than any other kind of imagination. 3. 
It involves thinking to a greater extent than the me- 
chanical and reproductive imagination. 

In forming images in the constructive imagination 
the mind has some purpose it is trying to realize, and 
this purpose is definite and reflective. This purpose al- 
ways determines largely the character of the image 
made, too. 

In the invention and improvement of the automo- 
bile, hundreds of images have come into the minds of 
the different inventors, have been dismissed or fashioned 
under the influence of the guiding purpose, which was 
never lost sight of in all the minutia of detail. 

The architect in planning a building has a definite 
purpose to be carried out and never loses sight of this 
purpose even though there are thousands of images to 
be adapted in the one large complex image. 

In adapting the images to suit the mind's purpose, 
many images come into consciousness, but will not do, 
so are rejected. The mind has an array of images pass- 
ing before it that it may select the ones it can incorpo- 
rate into the large complex image. It, of course, rejects 
most of its images. It is conceivable that the inventor, 
the architect, the poet and the painter use only a small 
number of aU the images that come into their minds. 
Thus the constructive imagination is selective to a high 
degree. 

Building complex images adapted to a reflective 



236 Studies in Psycholog-s 

purpose involves thinking. One of the elements of 
thinking is comparing experiences. An image is one 
kind of experience. The inventor, the architect, the 
painter, the musician, or the poet in building his com- 
plex images is constantly comparing the images of the 
reproductive and the mechanical imagination to get the 
ones adapted to the consistency of the whole. And this 
is thinking. No one thinks harder than the inventor or 
the poet in selecting appropriate images for his inven- 
tion or his poem. Constructive imagination is thus 
characterized by a high degree of thinking. 

The Constructive Imagination and Progress. — Pro- 
gress in both the sciences and the arts is closely connect- 
ed with the constructive imagination. 

It has been thought that there exists a degree of 
antagonism between the imagination and the scientific 
habit of mind; also, that the scientist must adhere to 
fact and not indulge in the exercise of his imagination. 
This view is in error. Most of the advances in science 
have first been grasped in imagination and then the act- 
ual experiment, observation, and thinking have proven 
them concrete realities. The imagination usually leads 
and the scientific investigation follows, proves and veri- 
fies. Imagination thus instead of being a hindrance to 
scientific investigation is a necessity to it. 

And in the useful arts and fine arts imagination 
always leads and blazes a trail for the guidance of other 
mental activities. Of the useful arts, the printing 
press, the steamboat, the locomotive, the telegraph, the 
telephone, the automobile, the aeroplane, etc., are ex- 



Studies in Psychology 237 

amples of the objective products of the constructive 
imagination. 

Of the fine arts, the Olympian Zeus, the CoUossus 
of Rhodes, the Parthenon, the Horse Fair, the Aurora, 
Apollo Belvidere, the Tempest, Hamlet, the "Messiah," 
''The Creation," etc. are examples of the work of the 
constructive imagination. 

In truth we usually appreciate only to a small de- 
gree, unless we are special students of the subject, how 
inseperably the constructive imagination is connected 
with progress in both the sciences and the arts. 

Limits of the Imagination. — While the imagination 
is the freest of the stages of knowing it is still not an 
unlimited power of the mind. The imagination is limit- 
ed in two ways: 

1. It is limited to the material furnished by sense- 
perception and reproduced by memory in the making 
of its images. Nothing can ever appear in imagination 
the material of which has not at some time been furn- 
ished by sense-perception. A man born blind and who 
has remained so has no visual images. A man deaf 
from birth has no auditory images. 

2. And again the imagination is limited in that 
one can not imagine the infinite. No one can imagine 
the beginning of time nor the end of time. No one can 
imagine the end of space, nor a sphere large enough to 
occupy all space. 

Experience and Imagination, — One's imagination is 
likely to be most active in the direction of his most im- 



238 Studies in Psychology 

portant experiences. This point is illustrated in the 
Norseman's idea of heaven. 

'*The Norseman painted his heaven, Valhalla, from 
the suggestions of his own personal experience, which 
was mostly in the direction of fighting and eating. Val- 
halla was an enormous palace roofed with shields. Spears 
were the pillars which supported the ceiling. The seats 
were cushioned with coats of mail. The gleam of flash- 
ing swords warmed the hall. The amusements consist- 
ed of eating and drinking and fighting. A river of 
ale ran close by Valhalla. The heroes gorged themselves 
on the flesh of a magic boar, which was renewed every 
night. They ate and drank until they could hold no 
more, fell down upon the floor where they had been 
feasting, were awakened in the morning by the blast of 
a horn,then they all grasped their weapons and rushed 
out to the battlefield. All day long they fought, putting 
each other to sleep with the sword. At nightfall a 
magical horn was blown, and every hero's wounds were 
healed. Then there was the mad rush for the river of 
ale and the flesh of the boar. ' ' 

Had the Norseman been asked what else heaven con- 
tained, he probably would have asked what else it could 
contain. 

Influence of Imagination on Body. — People often 
imagine certain things that have no foundation in fact. 
The effect of so doing may be even greater than if the 
thing imagined were a reality. There are many illustra- 
tions of this in life. 

A man who said that under no circumstances could 



Studies in Psychology 239 

he eat mutton, nor could he eat at the table where it 
v/as served, it was so offensive to him, ate of mutton day 
after day when it was served on the table and called beef. 

A man carried a potato in his pocket to cure the 
headache. He had had the headache frequently for 
years, when he was told to carry a potato in his pocket 
and it would prevent his having the headache. He did 
so, and said it was a certain cure, for he never again had 
the headache so long as he carried the potato. 

Mr. Halleck illustrates this point as follows: 

*'A member of a family purchased some perfectly 
fresh meat and it occurred to him that the dinner table 
would afford a good opportunity of testing the power 
of imagination on the senses, so he remarked that he 
was sorry he had not some Frenchmen as guests at din- 
ner, since the meat would have exactly suited them, as it 
was so gamy and tender that it would not hang on the 
butcher's hook. Several at once perceived an unmistak- 
ably putrid taste, and one member of the family, unable 
to endure the odor, left the table. '^ 

"Were it not for this power of the imagination, 
the majority of quack nostrums would disappear. In 
most cases bread pills properly labeled, with positive as- 
surance of certain cure accompanying them, would 
answer the purpose far better than these nostrums, or 
even much better than a great deal of the medicine ad- 
ministered by regular physicians. 

Warts have been charmed away by medicines which 
could have had only a mental effect. Dr. Tuke gives 
many cases of patients cured of rheumatism by rubbing 



240 Studies in Psychology 

them with a certain substance declared to posses magic 
power. The material in some cases was metal ; in others, 
wood, in still others wax. He also recites the case of a 
very intelligent officer who had vainly taken powerful 
remedies to cure cramp in the stomach. Then *he was 
told that on the next attack he would be put under a 
medicine which was generally believed to be most ef- 
fective, but which was rarely used.' When the cramps 
come on again, *a powder containing four grains of 
ground biscuit was administered every seven minutes, 
while the greatest anxiety was expressed (within the 
hearing of the party) lest too much should be given. 
Half drachm doses of bismuth had never procured the 
same relief in less than three hours. For four successive 
times did the same kind of attack recur, and four times 
was it met by the same remedy, and with like success. ' 

A house surgeon in a French hospital experimented 
with one hundred patients, giving them sugared water. 
Then with a great show of fear, he pretended that he 
had made a mistake and given them an emetic instead 
of the proper medicine. Dr. Tuke says: 'The result 
may easily be anticipated by those who can estimate the 
influence of the imagination. No fewer than eighty — 
four-fifths — were unmistakably sick'." 

A story is told of a criminal sentenced to death, 
who was given to the surgeons to experiment with. He 
was told that he would be bled to death. At the ap- 
pointed time of his execution he was placed in a room 
separated from another room by a partition. Through 
a hole, just large enough for his arm, in this partition, 



Studies in Psychology 241 

his arm was drawn. His arm was pricked and water 
just the temperature of the blood was arranged so as to 
run down his arm from the wound and drop in a basin 
below. He could hear the blood, as he thought, dropping 
into the basin and the frequent comment of the attend- 
ants on the flow of the blood and the weakening pulse, 
also the statements of the surgeons as to the time he 
would die. According to the account he died at almost 
the precise time at which he would have died had he 
actually been bled to death. 

Many people think that the effect of the imagination 
in this way applies only to abnormal or weakminded peo- 
ple. Such is an error. Any one may be influenced 
largely by his imagination after the manner indicated 
above. 

Classes of Imagination on Basis of Effort. — Imag- 
ination on this basis may be divided into : 1. Receptive. 
2. Productive. 

Receptive Imagination. — In reading a story in a 
book or listening to any one telling a story, the process 
of forming images is not due to one's own initiative, 
but due to the suggestion of another. This is the kind 
of imagination which has been named receptive, and the 
following is the formal definition for it : 

Receptive imagination is that kind of imagination 
in which the mind forms images at the suggestion of 
another. 



242 Studies in Psychology 

Illustration. — Form the images in the following and 
the imagination is of the receptive kind: 

The splendor falls on castle walls 

And snowy summits old in story; 

The long light shakes across the lakes 

And the wild cataracts leap in glory. 
Productive Imagination. — When one of his own ac- 
cord makes from his stock of ideas pictures, such as the 
writer of stories or the person who tells original stories, 
the mind forms images because of its own initiative. 
This is what the poet does, what the inventor does, what 
the castle builder does and what the day dreamer does. 
Such imagination is the kind which is called the pro- 
ductive, and the following defines it : 

The productive imagination is that hind of imagina- 
tion in which the mind forms images because of its own 
initiative. 

Illustration. — If one composes a story in which 
there appears a scene in which a child falls into deep 
water and is rescued by a stray dog, which is then 
adopted by the parents of the child and given a good 
home so long as he lives, his imagination is of the pro- 
ductive kind. It is under his own direction. 

Fancy. — This term, also, spelled fantasy and pha^i- 
tasy, has been used to mean the same as imagination. 
But this use of the term is hardly warranted. The term 
imagination has a broader significance than the term 
fancy. No one probably would say the reproductive 
imagination is the work of fancy. If one tries to image 
a tree just as he has seen it, he does not regard his image 



Studies in Psychology 243 

the work of fancy. And again the making of a prac- 
tical piece of machinery, as a potato planter, though the 
work of the constructive imagination, is not the work 
of the fancy. The fancy deals with the impractical. 
But a horse with wheels in the place of feet, fairies, 
ghosts and goblins, the work of the mechanical and con- 
structive imagination, are also the work of fancy. These 
are the lighter, less serious forms, of the mechanical and 
constructive imagination. From the above we thus have 
the following statement for fancy: 

Fancy is the lighter forms of the mechanical and 
constructive imagination. 

The story, Cinderella, abounds in fancy. Aladdin's 
Wonderful Castle, and A Midsummer Night 's Dream 
have fine fanciful images in them. 

Cultivation of the Imagination. — ^^From its char- 
acter the cultivation of the imagination is somewhat 
different in general from the cultivation of any other 
stage of knowing. The cultivation of the other stages 
of knowing consists in strengthening them, when pos- 
sible, by exercise. But the imagination in some ways 
needs to be made more active and in some ways checked 
in its cultivation. 

There is an opinion handed down to us from pre- 
ceding generations, and held by some at present, that 
the imagination needs to be suppressed or eradicated 
in the interest of truth. This thought manifests itself 
in the opposition to fiction as a whole by some parents 
and some moral teachers. But the imagination does not 
need suppression, it needs direction. 



244 Studies in Psychology 

Our schools furnish abundant opportunities for the 
cultivation of the imagination. The subjects in the 
schools which will cultivate the receptive imagination 
are geography, history, literature, nature study, natural 
science, especially astronomy, and drawing. 

Among these geography is usually placed first as 
suited to cultivate imagination. And it is a certainty 
that almost every lesson calls into activity the imagina- 
tion. In forming mental pictures of mountains, plains, 
valleys, plateaus, rivers, forests, springs, lakes, corn 
fields, wheat fields, cotton fields, peoples, cities, and hun- 
dreds of other things, the child must use largely his 
imagination. 

A point to be recognized though in this connection 
is, that the imaginative pictures are always formed out 
of the elements of one's experience and that, for this 
reason, no proper cultivation of the imagination by 
geography can be induced in the learner whose mind is 
characterized by a poverty of first-hand contact with 
geographical material. This means that in the absence 
of the concrete work in home geography and field work, 
geography can not be largely valuable in cultivating 
imagination. 

If the foundation be well laid in contact with na- 
ture in home geography and in field work, geography may 
be made one of the most valuable subjects for cultivat- 
ing the imagination; otherwise, it can not. 

What is true of geography in this respect is true of 
the other subjects mentioned. 

The subjects in school which cultivate the pro- 



Studies in Psychology 245 

ductive imagination are primary language, composition, 
drawing and modeling. The story telling bj^ the learner 
either orally or in writing, the descriptions and simple 
narrations, lead the learner to form pictures at his own 
direction. Writing is the most usual and the best means 
of cultivating this kind of imagination. 

The one who has an undeveloped imagination will 
miss largely the following in life: 

1. The interest and pleasure that make life worth 
living. 

2. Sympathy for other persons, which makes 
friends for himself and himself unselfish and charitable. 

3. That which makes for a good conversationist, 
entertaining and entertainable. 

Dangers of the Imagination. — There are some dan- 
gers of the imagination which each psychology student 
should be aware of. 

1. The image forming activity of the mind may he 
developed out of proportion to the judgment, and thus 
make one impractical. Such persons as have done this 
are easy prey for all sorts of dishonest promoters. They 
are easily induced to undertake various sorts of im- 
possible things. Since they form vivid pictures of the 
success of an undertaking, not having judgment in pro- 
portion, they easily learn to believe in such success. 
Such disproportionate development of the imagination 
is ruinous to any man or woman. 

2. Imaginary achievement may replace real 
achievement. ''While the individual is reveling in the 
delights of imaginary situations there is developing with- 



246 Studies in Psychology 

in him a taste for such highly colored experiences, and, 
before he is aware of it, the commonplaces of a world of 
reality may become unbearable. Stern duties will not 
be met, and imagining one's self conqueror of an im- 
portant or difficult situation will take the place of per- 
severing endeavor, which alone can overcome. Firm- 
ness of character is thus in danger of giving away." 

' ' There are many persons who have never succeeded 
in the world's struggle for the simple reason that they 
never could effectively distinguish between what they 
pictured to themselves as achieved and what they had 
actually accomplished. There are not a few of life's 
failures who have earned millions of dollars in their 
minds; who in fancy have been social reformers and 
leaders of men ; who have written books, invented flying 
machines, and become captains of industry, through the 
mere thinking that these things were accomplished; 
in a word, who could never quite distinguish between 
the thought and the deed." 

"Heaven is not reached at a single bound; 
But we build the ladder by which we rise 
Prom the lowly earth to the vaulted skies, 
And mount to its summit round by round." 
Day dreaming promotes this danger, and much 
popular fiction reading is dangerous from the same point 
of view. 

3. Imagination may become corrupting because it 
is a power as responsive in picturing the evil as in pic- 
turing the good. What one lets his mind dwell upon in 
imagination will influence his activity. If our minds 



Studies in Psychology 247 

come in contact with corrupting influences and we pic- 
ture what these suggest and dwell upon these pic- 
tures there is great danger of them becoming real in 
our lives. 

The silent precept here is fill your mind full of 
the good. 

The Advance of Imagination over Memory. — Imag- 
ination is an advance in development over memory, and 
this advance consists of, at any rate, three things: 

1. Imagination fills out the gaps left 'by memory. 

In remembering any concrete object there are al- 
ways places where memory fails the mind. We re- 
member partly, but many times not wholly. One may try 
to remember a thing he knows as well as he knows his 
own house, but he will always find that there are places 
which memory can not fill out. He does not know just 
how the joints at the corners are made, or just the ap- 
pearance of the waU three feet at the right of the door, 
or shape of the front steps in detail. If any one is not 
sure of this point, let him take any object well known 
and draw it from memory and see the many ways in 
which the drawing fails to exactly represent the object. 
The mind fills up these gaps left by memory with the 
imagination. It endeavors to fill them up in such a way 
as to be consistent with what is remembered. 

If the imagination did not do this work, the mind 
could not think of things as complete wholes, only in 
fragments. Thus this is a very important work which 
the imagination does, and a distinct and essential ad- 
vance of imagination over memory. 



248 Studies in Psychology 

2. Imagination deals with past, present and future 
time, memory ivith the past and present. 

Sense-perception deals strictly with the present 
time, memory with the present and the past, but imag- 
ination has almost no time limits. This is a second im- 
portant advance of imagination over memory. It is 
important because without it the mind could not think 
definitely of particular things in the future. And think- 
ing definitely of particular things of the future de- 
termines largely how we must act towards the future; 
that is, determines our behavior. 

3. Imagination is a much freer function of the 
mind than memory. In memory the mind has no free- 
dom. It must reproduce the experience as it was or it 
does not do its work the best. To fail to reproduce ac- 
curately is to fail to remember well. So memory is lim- 
ited to the past experience. No such limitation of the 
imagination exists. It is the freest activity of the mind 
there is. When Irving said Ichabod Crane's ** hands 
dangled a mile out of his sleeves", it would do for the 
imagination, but it would not do for memory. When 
Lowell said that every clod feels an instinct within it 
which ''climbs to a soul in grass and flowers," it was 
good imagination, but it would have been exceedingly 
poor memory. When Emerson said a bumblebee is an 
animated torrid zone, his imagination was good, but it 
would have been poor memory. 

Read: 

1. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 227- 
242. 



Studies in Psychology 249 

2. Piilsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 188- 
214. 

3. Angell's Psychology, pp. 161-183. 

4. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 192-201. 

5. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 150-179. 



CHAPTER XV. 

Conception. 

Thinking. — Psychologists have sometimes divided 
knowing into (1) presentation; (2) representation and 
(3) elaboration, or thinking, or thought. Sense-percep- 
tion has been called presentation. Memory and imagina- 
tion have been called representation, and conception, 
definition, judgment, reasoning, systematization and in- 
tuition have been called elaboration, or thinking. 

Now, thinking is a somewhat various and varied 
process, and the term, thinking, is one of those general 
and more or less vague terms which people are ac- 
customed to use. Most persons are not able to tell ac- 
curately what they do mean by the term. 

In a somewhat general way though all of us have 
some idea of what thinking is, and we distinguish be- 
tween thinking and sense-perceiving and remembering. 

An analysis of our mental furniture shows us that 
what we call our knowledge is a great stock of ideas. 
We have an idea, tree, an idea, house, an idea, Socrates, 
an idea, Confucius, an idea, virtue, an idea, truth, an 
idea, honesty. In short, everyone has a great stock of 
ideas, some many thousands. Students of this question 
say many men and women have more than one hundred 
thousand ideas, and in the light of recent studies this 
does not seem too high an estimate. 

Now these ideas and some other experiences which 



Studies in Psychology 251 

usually are not called ideas are the material with which 
the mind deals when it thinks. The mind must have 
material out of which to make its thoughts. One can 
no more think without material to use in thought than 
one can eat without something to eat. 

The mind compares these ideas and other exper- 
iences, assorts and puts them in groups, and asserts the 
relations between them. This is the mind's way of 
elaborating or working on its experiences, and this is 
the process which is called thinking. Thus thinking 
consists of three things: 

1. The comparing our mental experiences — ideas, 
sensations, feelings, etc. 

2. The assorting and grouping our mental exper- 
iences. 

3. Asserting the relations between them. 

The formal statement of thinking then is as follows : 

Thinking is tlie mental process of comparing our 
experiences, assorting and grouping them and asserting 
the relations between them. 

Thinking ability is possessed by the human species 
to a higher degree than by any other species. Animals 
lower than man remember and sense-perceive in many 
cases to higher degree than man, but they think only 
feebly when compared to man's thinking. 

Mr. Halleck's good illustration on what progressive 
thought has done for man is as follows: ''Geologists tell 
us that ages ago there lived in England bears, tigers, 
elephants, lions and many other powerful and fierce 
animals. There was living contemporaneous with them 



252 Studies in Psychology 

a much weaker animal, that had neither the claws, the 
strength, nor the speed of the tiger. In fact this human 
animal was almost defenseless. Had a being from an- 
other planet been asked to prophesy, he would undoubt- 
edly have said that this helpless animal would be the 
first to be exterminated. And yet every one of those 
fierce creatures has succumbed either to the change of 
climate or to man's inferior strength. The reason was 
that man had one resource denied the animals, the power 
of progressive thought. The land sank, the sea cut off 
England from the main land^ the climate changed, and 
even the strongest animals were helpless. But man 
changed his clothing with the changing climate. He 
made fires; he built a retreat to keep off death by cold. 
He thought out means to kill or subdue the strongest 
animals. ' * 

This illustration is not to show that animals do not 
think, but to show how feeble must be their thinking 
when compared with man's progressive thinking. 

Tkinhing Involved in All Knowing. — It is easy for 
the psychology student to fall into the habit of thinking 
that the stages of knowing develop chronologically ; that 
at first the mind sense-perceives for a time, then remem- 
bers for a time and then imagines for a time and so on. 
Such of course is not the nature of the mind's activity 
in the stages of knowing. The mind acts as a unity in 
any stage of knowing. That is to say, every stage of 
knowing has every other involved in it in some way. No 
such a thing as one stage in isolation, sense-perception, 
or memory, for instance, exists. One stage has one pre- 



Studies in Psychology 253 

dominating element, though, and another stage another 
predominating element. 

Thinking in Sense-perception. — Thinking is in- 
volved in sense-perception. It is noticeable that the 
chief element in thinking is comparison, and it will be 
remembered that the chief thing the mind does in sense- 
perception is to interpret the sensations. Interpreting 
sensations is seeing the likenesses and differences be- 
tween the present and past sensations. Seeing the like- 
nesses and differences between the present and past 
sensations is comparison, the chief element of thinking. 
Therefore, thinking is involved in sense-perception. 

Thinking in Memory. — In memory the mind retains 
the effect of its experiences and reacts and identifies 
them. The element that insures that the process will 
be memory is identifying. Identifying is seeing the 
likeness between the present experience and the past 
and knowing that the mind has had the experience be- 
fore. Seeing the likeness is comparing, the chief ele- 
ment in thinking. Therefore, thinking is involved in 
memory. 

Thinking in Imagination. — In that class of imagi- 
nation which was studied and called the constructive, 
the mind selects the images of the reproductive and 
mechanical imagination and adapts them to their posi- 
tion in the complex image. In selecting and adapting 
the mind compares the images so as to get the ones best 
adapted. But comparison is thinking. Therefore think- 
ing is involved in the constructive imagination. 



254 Studies in Psychology 

Conception. — The first stage in the development of 
knowing which helps to make up thinking is conception. 

An idea has previously been defined as the smallest 
mental product corresponding to anything as a whole. 
Ideas are made of attributes, and a single idea, while 
most usually made up of several attributes, may con- 
sist of a single attribute. 

For instance, the idea table has in it material, form, 
color, size, weight, purpose, etc, but take these away and 
we have destroyed the idea, table. The idea, whiteness, 
is made up of the one attribute only. Some ideas are 
made up of attributes that enable the mind to know the 
object to which they refer from all other objects; some 
are made up of only one attribute, and some are made up 
of the common attributes of a group of objects. 

The mind's process in forming the idea made up 
of the common attributes of a group of objects is called 
conception. One's idea of a bird is an idea obtained 
through conception. In this idea, we find vertebrate, 
biped, egg-laying, feather-producing, etc., attributes 
common to all birds. 

From the above the formal definition of conception 
is: 

Conception is the mind^s process of forming ideas 
made up of the common attributes of classes of objects. 

The Logical Steps in Conception. — The mind takes 
five logical steps in the process of conception. 

First, the mind examines a number of particular 
objects; that is, it senses them by one or more of the 
senses. It may see, hear, touch, taste, or smell them. 



Studies in Psychology 255 

In short, the mind gets some kind of idea of each one 
through the senses. 

Secondly, the mind sees how the particular objects 
studied in the first step are alike and different. It does 
not see these likenesses and differences simultaneously 
in all the objects, but takes them up in succession. 

Thirdly, the mind centers its attention upon the 
attributes which one of these objects possesses, and which 
every other one possesses; that is, upon the common 
attributes, and drops out of consciousness the objects 
with their particular attributes. That is to say, the 
mind draws away the common attributes and changes 
them in consciousness from attributes to objects of 
thought. 

Fourthly, the mind thinks that these common at- 
tributes which it has known as belonging to the particu- 
lar objects which it has examined belong to many others ; 
that is, to the whole class. 

Fifthly, the mind would give this class, or general 
idea, a name if it should not have one, but in most cases 
of conception, the class has a name, so the mind merely 
thinks the name. 

These five logical steps in conception are called: 

1. Examination of particular objects. 

2. Comparison. 

3. Abstraction. 

4. Generalization. 

5. Denomination. 

Examination of Particular Objects. — There was a 
time in the life of each one of us when he did not know 



256 Studies in Psychology 

what a bird was, but every one of us now has an idea 
of a bird. If we got our idea in a natural way, we saw 
or heard, or touched, possibly, a first bird, a second bird, 
a third bird, and so on. Each of these birds was dis- 
tinct, separate from all things, so was particular. The 
mind must have gone through similar steps in getting 
its general ideas of the various classes it knows, if it 
got these ideas naturally. And this is what is meant by 
the examination of particular objects. 

Comparison. — When the mind examined the first 
bird, if it formed any idea of a bird, it probably had 
some attributes in this idea not to be found in all birds, 
possibly some particular color. But the next bird, and 
the next, and so on were seen not to contain some of 
the particular attributes, because the mind compared 
these with the first one known, and the third with the 
second, and so on. This process of seeing the likenesses 
and differences of the first, second, third and fourth, etc., 
is the process of comparison. In the case of birds some 
of these likenesses are (1) backboned; (2) warm blood- 
ed; (3) oviparous; (4) feather producing; (5) bipeded- 
ness. 

Abstraction. — The word abstraction is from ab, 
meaning from, and traJio, meaning I draw. The form 
tractus, the participle of tralio, means drawn. The ion 
means act of. So abstraction means literally a drawing 
away. So the triangular question is, what is drawn 
away, from what is it drawn, and what does the draw- 
ing? In conception the common attributes are the 
things which are drawn away, and they are drawn away 



Studies in Psychology 257 

from the particular objects examined in the first step. 
The mind draws them away and changes them from at- 
tributes to mental objects. So abstraction in conception 
may be defined as follows : 

Abstraction in conception is the mind's process of 
taking the common attributes away from, the particular 
objects studied and changing them to mental objects. 

Generalization. — In conception the mind selects the 
common attributes of the particular objects examined 
and naturally thinks that these attributes belong to all 
the objects of that kind, including those the mind has 
not examined. For instance, the mind has examined, 
may be, one hundred squirrels and has found that they 
all climb trees, and now thinks that squirrels, that is, 
all squirrels, climb trees. This process of thinking that 
what is true of particular cases is true of the whole 
group, is the mind's process of generalization. The fol- 
lowing is the definition for it : 

Generalization is the mind's process of extending 
the common attributes of the particular objects studied 
out to all the objects of the class. 

Generalizing too QuicMy. — It is quite possible to 
generalize too quickly; that is, from the study of too 
few particular objects. This, of course, leads the mind 
into error. For instance, if one should study snakes, 
and would examine a rattlesnake, and find poison glands 
and fangs; then a copperhead, and find poison glands 
and fangs; then a southern moccasin, and find poison 
glands and fangs, he might generalize that snakes, that 
is, all snakes, are venomous. But such a generalization 



258 Studies in Psychology 

is erroneous. As a matter of fact, most snakes are not 
venomous. 

Generalizing from One Particular — It has been 
questioned whether the mind can generalize from the 
study of one particular. The mind can and often does 
do so. The writer has seen but one Gila Monster, which 
he dissected some years ago. It was found to be a lizard 
in many respects, with poison glands and fangs, oval 
eyes, thick stout head, fangs in lower jaw and some 
fifteen or sixteen inches in length. From this one case, 
his mind thinks of Gila Monsters as vertebrates, reptiles, 
venomous lizards. Many similar cases of generalizing 
from one particular may be found in any one's life. 

Generalizing and Accurate Thinking. — There is a 
close connection between good generalizing and skill in 
thinking. One who lacks skill in thinking will generalize 
often with respect to contingent, or accidental attributes, 
whereas the skiUful thinker is very careful about gen- 
eralizing with respect to such attributes, but pushes out 
quite boldly with respect to essential and fundamental 
attributes. For instance, no careful generalizer would 
feel safe, after having seen only fifty red squirrels, in 
asserting that all squirrels are red, because red color 
is not a fundamental characteristic of squirrels. But 
he would feel safe in asserting that all squirrels are 
vertebrates, quadrupeds, and rodents. He could make 
this last generalization from the study of one squirrel 
and be safe. 

Humanity had generalized for a long time that all 
swans were white, and then black swans were found in 



Studies in Psychology 259 

Australia. The generalization was with regard to a 
non-essential attribute. 

Herbert Spencer's wonderful ability as a thinker 
lay largely in his marvelous power of accurate generali- 
zation. 

Denomination. — In case the mind were studying a 
class of objects without a name, the last step in con- 
ception would be to give the class a name; that is, as- 
sociate some name with the class. In this way some- 
body's mind must have given all classes names. But 
in most cases the class one is getting the idea of in con- 
ception was named many years ago. So in most cases 
the last step in conception is merely thinking the name 
of the class. 

The value of the name of the class is greater than 
one at first might think. It is very much like the label 
on the different articles which the druggist has on his 
shelves for sale. It enables the mind to remember and 
think about its general ideas without confusing them. 

The Product of Conception. — The product of concep- 
tion is an idea. This idea has several names. It is called 
a concept, a general idea, a general notion, or a type 
idea. This idea is made up of a number of the common 
attributes of a class of objects. It is always made up 
of more than one common attribute but is never in all 
probability, made up of all the common attributes of a 
class of objects. It hardly seems possible that any one 
has all the common attributes of any class of objects, 
however well known, in his concept of that class. One 



260 Studies in Psychology 

never knows any class so well as that. The following is 
the definition for a concept : 

A concept is an idea made up of a number of the 
common attributes of a class of objects. 

The symbol of the concept is the common noun; 
that is, the common noun expresses the concept. Thus, 
horse, tree, house, book, desk, apple, cherry, man, boy, 
girl, etc. are symbols of one's concepts of these things. 

Aspects of the Concept. — The mind can look at the 
concept from two points of view. First, it may think 
of how many common attributes there are which make 
up the concept. Secondly, the mind may think of how 
many particular objects the concept is the type of. These 
two aspects of the concept are respectively called in- 
tension and extension. Other terms used interchange- 
ably with intension are intent and content. Another 
term used interchangeably with extension is extent. If 
the mind is thinking of the number of common attributes 
in the concept, as, for instance, the number of common 
attributes in the concept, triangle, it is thinking of the 
intension of the triangle. It may be stated as follows: 

The intension of a concept is that aspect of the con- 
cept which refers to the number of common attributes 
that make it up. 

If the mind thinks of the number of particular ob- 
jects which the concept is the type of, it thinks of the 
extension of the concept. It may be put as follows : 

The extension of a concept is that aspect of the con- 
cept which refers to the number of particular objects 
of which the concept is a type. 



Studies in Psychology 261 

A large extent to a concept necessitates a smaller 
content than a smaller extent. Thus the concept, trmn- 
gle, has a larger extent than the concept, isosceles trian- 
gle, but the isosceles triangle has a larger content than 
the triangle. Again the concept, horse, has a larger ex- 
tent than the concept, draft Jiorse, but the draft horse 
has a larger content than horse. The concept, mosquito, 
has a larger content than the concept, insect, but a small- 
er extent. Increasing the content of the concept may 
thus decrease the extent, or increasing the extent may 
decrease the content. 

The Two Views of the Concept. — The term, concept, 
is used in various ways by writers on psychology and 
philosophy, but a study of these ways will show two 
pretty definite uses of the term indicating the two fol- 
lowing views: 1. The popular view. 2. The scientific 
view. 

Popularly, the term is used interchangeably with 
the term, idea. In this sense there are particular con- 
cepts and general concepts. In this sense, one's idea of 
Napoleon, one's idea of flowers, of truth, of gravitation, 
of religion, of anything whatever, real or ideal, actual 
or imaginary, physical or mental, is a concept. This is 
a broad vague view of the concept, not sufficiently defin- 
ite for much scientific help. 

Scientifically, the term, concept, is used just as we 
have been using it in these studies, to mean an idea 
made up of a 7iumher of the common attributes of a 
class of objects, or as some writers call it, a type idea. 

Formation of Concepts in Actual Life. — In actual 



262 Studies in Psychology 

life concepts are formed as follows: the mind observes 
some objects of a class for the first time and gets a sort 
of tentative, or trial, concept which usually contains at- 
tributes not possessed by all the objects of the class; 
then the mind observes other objects of the same kind 
and begins to drop from the concept any attributes 
which are not common and perhaps to add some com- 
mon attributes not at fii'st observed ; and this process of 
changing the concept because of further experience is 
continued until just those attributes which belong to 
each object of the class remain. 

Illustration. — The mind naturally gets its general 
ideas from the observation of particular objects. Sup- 
pose the first barn a child sees is a square one, painted 
red, with roof sloping but one way, and containing only 
hay and com. From this particular object, the mind's 
concept of barn will contain square form^ red color, a 
roof sloping hut one way, and filled with hay and corn. 
To be brief, the mind from the study of particular ob- 
jects goes on correcting its concept of barn by dropping 
out attributes, and possibly adding some, until just those 
attributes remain which are possessed in common by 
barns. 

This is the mind's natural way of forming its con- 
cepts in life. "When it examines the first particular ob- 
ject it forms a trial concept taking all the logical steps. 
Then it examines another particular object and again 
repeats all the logical steps to correct this tentative con- 
cept, and the mind thus goes on till the concept becomes 
pretty accurate. 



Studies in Psychology 263 

Ideas. — The idea was studied to some extent under 
sense-perception. It was found there that the term, 
idea, is pretty general, and often vague in its applica- 
tion, but that it is the smallest mental product corres- 
ponding to anything as a whole. 

It seems that it might be helpful at this stage of 
the study to discuss the classes of ideas to a limited 
extent. 

Classes of Ideas. — Some ideas are formed from the 
particular attributes of some objects, as one's idea of 
Thomas Jefferson, or one's own hat; some are formed 
from the common attributes of classes of objects, as one 's 
idea of city, or child; some are formed from taking a 
single attribute away from an object or objects and 
changing it from an attribute in the mind to a mental 
object, as, one's idea of whiteness or roughness. 

Thus, from the way the mind forms the ideas, 
there are three classes of ideas : 1. Particular. 2. Gen- 
eral, or concept. 3. Abstract. 

Particular ideas are made up of the attributes of 
particular objects; general ideas are made up of the 
attributes common to a group of objects, and an abstract 
idea is made up of a single attribute thought away from 
an object or a group of objects and changed in the mind 
to a mental object. 

Again, some ideas correspond to objects, as one's 
idea, hill, or one's idea, automobile; some ideas corres- 
pond to attributes, as one's idea, new, or one's idea, 
large; and some ideas correspond to relations, as one's 
idea of the connection between an explosion and the re- 



264 Studies in Psychology 

port, or one's idea of the conection between oxidation 
and heat. 

Thus, on the basis of what they correspond to, there 
are three classes of ideas: 1. Substantive ideas. 2. 
Attributive ideas. 3. Relational ideas. Substantive 
ideas correspond to objects ; attributive ideas correspond 
to attributes, and relational ideas correspond to rela- 
tions. 

Thirdly, some ideas exist singly, as one's idea, hookj 
or one's idea, sim; some exist in groups taken as one 
thing in which one is more important than the others, as 
one's idea, a large luhite Jiouse, or mi honest, courteous 
man, and some are made up of two or more ideas of 
equal importance connected by some relational idea, as 
one's idea, bread and butter, or one's idea, industry and 
honesty. 

Thus, on the basis of form, there are three classes 
of ideas: 1. Simple ideas, 2. Complex ideas. 3. Com- 
pound ideas. Simple ideas exist singly; complex ideas 
exist in groups containing one or more ideas of greater 
importance than the others, and compound ideas con- 
sist of two or more ideas of equal importance connected 
by one or more relational ideas. 

Conditio7is of Concepts. — One's concepts are condi- 
tioned by his experience. One who has only limited ex- 
perience will find his concepts limited in number and 
limited with respect to accuracy, while one of wide ex- 
perience has opportunity for many more concepts and 
for much more accurate ones. 

The followinof from Mr. Halleck illustrates this 



Studies in Psychology 265 

point: *'A certain Norwegian child ten years old had 
the quality white, firmly imbedded in his concept man. 
Happening one day to see a negro for the first time, 
the child refused to call him a man, until the negro's 
other qualities compelled the child to revise his concept 
and to eliminate whiteness. If that child should ever 
see an Indian or a Chinaman, the concept would under- 
go still further revision. A girl of six, reared with in- 
temperate father and brothers, had the quality of 
drunkenness firmly fixed in her concept of man. An- 
other boy, until in his teens, thought that man was a 
creature who did wrong not from determination but 
from ignorance ; that any man would change his course 
to the right path, if he could only understand that he 
was going wrong. Happening one day to hear of a 
wealthy man who was neglecting to provide comforts for 
his aged mother in her last sickness, the boy concluded 
that the man did not know the mother's condition. 
When he informed the man, the boy was told to mind 
his own business." 

The Concept and the Image. — The mind can not 
image the concept, for to do so would require an image 
which contains only the common attributes of a class. 
No such image can be made. No one can image a horse 
which consists of only the common attributes of horses. 
The image of a horse must have some color in it, and 
there is no color common to all horses. Every image i» 
a particular thing. Every concept is a general idea, 
or a type idea. 

It is, of course, true that the mind can form an 



266 Studies in Psychology 

image which will contain all the attributes which make 
up a concept, but it also always contains more than the 
concept ; that is, some particular attributes. This is not 
imaging the concept, it is embodying a concept in an 
image, which has more attributes in it than those pos- 
sessed by the concept. 

Advance of Conception in Development. — Concep- 
tion is a higher stage of knowing than sense-perception, 
memory or imagination. It's development consists in 
one thing: The mind in sense-perception, memory and 
imagination deals predominantly ivith particular ideas 
while in conception it deals with general ideas. This 
is a large widening of the relations grasped, for general 
ideas are so much wider in application than particular 
ideas. Thinking with them saves a vast amount of time 
and energy for the mind. 

"It is evident that the conceptual type of behavior 
is more economical than the perceptual type, since the 
former extends its meaning over a much wider field of 
experience than does the latter. It is therefore highly 
important that rational thought make use of the concep- 
tual mode of thinking, as, indeed, it does to a very large 
extent. ' ' 

Read : 

1. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 306- 
307. 

2. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 204-213. 

3. Angell's Psychology, pp. 206-222. 

4. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 220- 
228. 

5. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 183-191. 



CHAPTER XVI. 
Definition. 

Nature of. — The next stage in the development of 
knowing after conception is definition. This is not 
treated by many psychologists as a separate stage of 
knowing and many do not treat it at all. But since it 
has characteristics which clearly separate it from any 
of the usually accepted stages of knowing, it seems bet- 
ter to consider it a separate stage. 

Views of Definition. — There are more or less gener- 
ally held two views of definition. That held by people 
who have not made a very careful study of definitioUj 
which may be termed the popular view, since most peo- 
ple hold this view; and that held by people who have 
made a scientific study of definition, which may be 
termed the scientific view, since scientists hold this view. 

The Popular View. — The popular view of definition 
is that definition is some kind of formal statement, oral, 
written, or printed, to be learned and committed to 
memory for future use ; the idea being that it may help 
one at some time in some distressing situation by en- 
abling him to remember or to think out some desired 
knowledge. This view regards definition as a product, 
and a physical thing. 

It is probable that ninety-nine out of every hundred 
persons when they think and speak of definition, think 



268 Studies in Psychology 

and speak of it according to the popular view, in nearly 
every instance. 

'^Definitions are usually treated as mere formal 
statements to be recited and lodged away in memory, 
rather than thought processes in fundamental forms of 
mental activity." 

The Scientific View. — Definition in this more funda- 
mental view is a mental process, the mental process 
which lies back of the formal statement, definition as a 
physical product. The psychology student is interested 
in the mental process of definition much more than in 
the physical product. 

An examination of the mind's process of forming a 
definition under natural conditions will reveal the na- 
ture of definition. 

Let the thing to be defined be the triangle. The 
mind examines a particular triangle noting its attri- 
butes; then it examines a second particular triangle, 
noting its attributes ; then a third, and so on. The mind 
selects out from these particular triangles just those 
common attributes that enable it to perfectly definitely 
think what a triangle is. That is, it selects the common 
attributes essential to the definition of the triangle — the 
essential common attributes. It finds them to be the 
following : 

1. The triangle is a polygon. 

2. It has just three sides. 

The mind now thinks these two essential common 
attributes of triangles together in the form of a thought ; 
that is, the mind makes a synthesis of them in the form 



Studies in Psychology 269 

of a thought, which is as follows : A triangle is a poly- 
gon having just three sides. This, it is evident, is a 
definition of the triangle, and the mind's process of 
making this synthesis is the mental process of definition. 
This put in the form of a definition is as follows : 

Definition is the mental process of making a syn- 
thesis of the essential common attributes of a class of 
objects in the form of a thought. 

That the synthesis is made in the form of a thought 
may be known from the fact that the language unit 
which expresses the definition is a sentence, and the 
sentence is well kno^vn to express a thought. So the 
form of the mental product, a definition, is that of the 
thought. 

Illustration. — The mind's natural process in defin- 
ing the noun must have been as follows: it examined 
several particular nouns in sentences and found the fol- 
lowing to be true of each : 

1. It is a substantive word. 

2. It names the idea of an object. 

The mind then made a synthesis of these truths as 
follows: A noun is a substantive word which names 
the idea of an object. This process though is defining 
the noun. 

The process of making the synthesis of the essen- 
tial common attributes in definition is analyzable into 
three smaller steps as follows : 

1. The mind acts the name of the class to be de- 
fined. 



270 Studies in Psychology 

2. It puts the class to be defined into the next 
larger known class. 

3. It sets the class to be defined off from all other 
classes within the larger known class. 

Illustration. — All language is known to be made up 
of three language units, the word, the sentence and 
discourse. So, a good definition for the sentence may- 
be stated as follows : Th e sentence is that language unit 
ivhicJi expresses a thought. In this definition of the 
sentence, ^'The sentence' ' shows the mind has acted the 
name of the class to be defined; ^'is that language unif 
shows the mind has put the sentence, the class to be de- 
fined into the class, language units, the next known class 
larger than the sentence; and '^ which expresses a 
though f shows that the mind has set the sentence, the 
class to be defined off from the word and discourse, the 
other classes within the larger known class, language 
units. For the word expresses an idea and discourse ex- 
presses a series of coherent thoughts. 

What is Defined. — The mind always defines a class, 
never a particular object. When the mind defines the 
adjective the definition is for all adjectives; that is for 
the class, adjective. When the mind defines the prism, 
the definition is for all prisms; that is, for the class, 
prism. And so with the definitions for triangle, cylin- 
der, bird, reptile, and fish. 

There seems at first thought to be exceptions to this 
truth in definitions for such ideas as character, faith^ 
honor, culture, etc., but a little analysis causes the seem- 
ing exceptions to vanish. The triangle the mind defines 



Studies in Psychology 271 

is made up of one, two, three, four and so on instances 
of the idea defined. It is these instances that make up 
the class. So in the definition of the idea, faith, it is 
instance one, instance two, instance three and so on that 
make up the idea faitli which is defined. 

Definition Must Be Inclusive and Exclusive. — In 
logical definition all of the particular objects of the class 
defined must be included. That is to say, the definition 
must be of an idea which is a type of every particular 
object of the class. Thus the definition of a bird, A bird 
is an animal that grows feathers, is inclusive, for every 
bird grows feathers. It fits them all, so to speak. But 
the definition so called, A hird is an animal that flies, 
is not inclusive, for ostriches and some other birds do 
not fly. Such are, strictly speaking, not definitions, but 
merely inaccurate attempts at definition. 

Again definitions must exclude all objects except 
those in the class defined. The definition, A hird is an 
animal that grows feathers, is exclusive, for there is 
nothing but birds which grows feathers. But the defini- 
tion, A Mrd is an animal that flies is not exclusive, for 
there are other animals that fly. Bats, butterflies and 
so on, fly. Definitions to be logical and accurate must 
thus be inclusive and exclusive. 

Logical Steps in Definition. — The logical steps in 
definition, deduced from the above study are as foDows : 

1. The mind examines particular objects of the 
class to be defined. 

2. The mind selects out the essential common at- 
tributes of these objects. 



272 Studies in Psychology 

3. The mind makes a synthesis of these common 
attributes in the form of a thought by : 

a. Acting the name of the class to be defined. 

b. Placing the class to be defined into the next 
larger known class. 

c. Setting the class to be defined off from all other 
classes within the larger known class. 

These steps are, it is seen, general and special. The 
first two general steps, strictly speaking, are intro- 
ductory to the third general step, the definition proper^ 
the synthesis of the essential common attributes. The 
special steps are the steps into which the definition may 
be analyzed; that is, the steps into which the synthesis 
of the essential ideas of a class may be analyzed. 

Laws of Definition. — There are certain truths of 
the mind's activity in definition that are always to be 
found when the process of definition is logical and ac- 
curate. These are called the laAvs of definition and for 
correct defining are as follows: 

1. The mind must act the name of the class to he 
defined. 

2. The mind must place the class to he defined 
into the next larger known class. 

3. The mind must set the class to he defined off 
from all other classes in the larger known class. 

Definitions in harmony with these laws of necessity 
are logically accurate. 

Definition, Description and Synonym. — A clear dis- 
tinction is to be seen between logical definition and de- 
scription; also, between the statement of a definition and 



Studies in Psychology 273 

a synonym. Definition is a limiting process of thought 
and deals with a class of objects as such. It selects just 
enough of the common attributes of a class of objects 
to enable the mind to limit the class; that is, think it 
perfectly definitely. Description is the mind's process 
of dealing with a particular object as such, not with a 
class as such. The mind in description seeks many more 
attributes than the mind does in definition and the pro- 
cess is not so economical. The mind may, of course, 
describe a class, but when it does it treats the class as 
a particular object and not as a class. A diflference be- 
tween a description of a class and a definition is that 
in the description of a class the mind selects as many 
attributes of the class as it can, but in definition only 
enough attributes to limit the class; that is, to think it 
definitely. Thus definition is not even a description of 
a class as has sometimes been said. 

A statement of a logical definition is to be dis- 
tinguished from a synonym. The statement of a defini- 
tion expresses the essential nature of the class defined 
and is a sentence. A synonym is a word which has the 
same or nearly the same essential signification as some 
other word of the same language, and may be used in- 
terchangeably with it. 

Errors in Definition. — The mind frequently falls 
into error in definition. This may be seen from the com- 
mon errors to be found in the statements of definitions 
in almost all kinds of textbooks. Some of the common 
errors occur in the following ways: 

1. The attempted definition is untruthful either in 



274 Studies in Psychology 

part or wholly; as, ''A sentence is a thought expressed 
in words/' and **The predicate of a sentence is that 
which is asserted of the subject." In the first case a 
sentence is not a thought either expressed or unex- 
pressed. The sentence is a physical thing, so much ink 
on paper, or so much disturbance of the air, while the 
thought is a mental thing, something in the mind. 

In the second case the predicate of the sentence ex- 
presses the idea asserted of the idea which the subject 
of the sentence expresses. The assertion is mental and 
is between mental things. 

So neither of these attempted definitions is true. 

2. The attempted definition is not helpful; as, *'A 
noun is the name of an object." This in reality is no 
definition at all. There are no names that are not names 
of objects, if one puts the right meaning in the term ob- 
ject. So '*an object" adds nothing to the meaning, and 
the definition is a noun is a name, but so is a name a 
noun, and the thought goes in a circle. The mind is 
not advancing in such attempts at definition. 

3. The attempted definition is not inclusive; as, 
* ' The subject of a sentence is the name of that of which 
something is thought." This definition is true of sub- 
jects of sentences only when they are nouns, not when 
they are pronouns. In the sentence. He is free, whom 
the truth makes free, **He," the subject does not name 
at all. The attempted definition does not include sub- 
jects of sentences when they are pronouns, so is not in- 
clusive. 

4. The attempted definition is not exclusive; as 



Studies in Psychology 275 

"An adjective is a word which modifies a noun or pro- 
noun. ' ' Nouns and pronouns used as possessives modify 
the noun, and the appositive modifies the pronoun, and 
according to the above definition would be adjectives; 
that is, they are not excluded by the definition. In the 
sentence, William's father lost his fortune, both ** Wil- 
liam ^s" and "his" modify nouns, but neither is an ad- 
jective. This attempted definition is evidently not ex- 
clusive. 

Yalue of Definition. — The value of exercise in log- 
ical definition as an aid in the development of knowing 
is not likely to be overestimated. While it is probably 
true that to help in good thinking in any system of 
thought the exercise in logical definition must be in that 
system, it is beyond doubt that definition is a great in- 
tellectual developer. One who is accurate in logical 
definition in history is certain to be a good thinker in 
history. One who is accurate in logical definition in 
sociology or ethics is certain to be a good thinker in 
these subjects. Slovenly thinking and accurate defini- 
tion are incompatible. Thus logical definition is an exer- 
cise of the highest value in education. 

" It is a process of thinking which brings into unity 
the individual and universal — the problem of all 
thought, and which brings the learner into unity with 
the world of thought, the end of all learning. This is 
its primary educational value. 

The power to discern unity in the midst of diversi- 
ty; to detect essential likenesses amidst engrossing and 
non-essential differences ; to find the enduring under the 



276 Studies in Psychology 

mask of obtruding, accidental, and superficial attributes^ 
is a fundamental characteristic of every well-trained 
mind. To define is not simply to unify individuals; 
but, in unifying, to find their essential nature. The 
common nature in which they are unified is the essential 
nature of each individual. Hence the habit of think- 
ing in the form of definition is the habit of thinking 
the true nature of things ; which is the primary function 
of the mind. 

This unifying act of mind is complex; and has a 
richer significance in training than at first appears. It 
requires accurate, thorough, and methodical observation- 
precise discrimination through comparison and contrast ; 
abstraction of that which abides after differences have 
been cancelled; and generalization, by holding in mind 
the differences of individuals while binding them into 
the unity of their common nature. So that while train- 
ing to correct habits of definition, the teacher is carry- 
ing forward a large number of related habits. Too 
much cannot be said, therefore, by way of urging the 
teacher to train the student in the power of logical 
definition; since it is a form of activity by which he 
comes into unity with the world of thought." — Tomp- 
kins. 

Why the Mind Defines. — The mind defines in think- 
ing the world, physical and spiritual, in which we live. 
The mind's defining is not an accident, but is because 
of some need. This need is the need for definiteness. 
When the mind makes its maximum effort to think the 
essential nature of a thing definitely it thinks it in the 



Studies in Psychology 277 

form of definition. So the mind defines in order to 
reach its highest efficiency in thinking the essential na- 
ture of a thing definitely. 

Advances of Definition. — Definition is a liigiier 
stage in the development of knowing than conception. 
Its advances over conception are as follows : 

1. Definition is more definite than conception. 

2. Definition is more economical than conception. 

3. Definition is more discriminating than concep- 
tion; it enables the mind to distinguish between the es- 
sential and the non-essential. 

That definition is more definite than conception is 
evidenced in the fact that we all have concepts of many 
things which we can not define. Each one of us has 
a concept of a hat, stove, horse, and so on, but it is 
probable that most of us cannot define these ideas with- 
out further study. We can not define them because we 
have not thought them sufficiently definitely. 

That definition is more economical than conception 
appears in the fact that in conception the mind deals 
with as many common attributes as it can discover. 
but in definition it deals with fewer, only the essential 
ones, and yet it knows better the general idea in defini- 
tion than in conception. This saves the mind's time and 
energy. 

That definition is more discriminating than concep- 
tion we know, because the mind must differentiate the 
essential common attributes from the accidental, con- 



278 Studies in Psychology 

tingent or non-essential. This differentiating makes the 
idea of the class defined stand out in bold relief — a very- 
necessary thing in definition. 

Read : 

1. Thompkin's Philosophy of Teaching, pp. 186- 
193. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Judgment. 

Character of Stages of Knowing, — Some of the 
stages of knowing may be seen to be idea-forming 
stages, some to be conserving stages and some to be re- 
lating stages, predominantly. In sense-perception the 
mind forms ideas of particular, material external ob- 
jects — percepts. In conception the mind forms ideas 
made up of the common attributes of classes of objects 
— concepts^ So sense-perception and conception are the 
idea-forming stages in the development of knowing. 

In memory the mind forms no new ideas but con- 
serves the effects of one's experiences, reacts and iden- 
tifies them. In imagination the mind, strictly speaking, 
forms no new ideas but embodies its ideas in images. 
This helps the mind to remember its ideas and to work 
with them in thinking. So while imagination is not so 
strictly a conserving stage of knowing as memory, its 
main function is conservative. Thus memory and imag- 
ination are predominantly conserving stages in the de- 
velopment of knowing. 

In definition the mind is chiefly concerned in 
grasping and making a synthesis between its general 
ideas. It also discriminates very definitely between 
ideas of classes ; that is, between general ideas. All this 
is the mind's way of emphasizing the process of grasp- 
ing relations. 



^80 Studies in Psychology 

In judgment the miijd carries this process of grasp- 
ing relations a little further than it does in definition, 
which will appear a little later in these studies. Each 
of the remaining stages of knowing, up to intuition, 
further engages the mind's process of grasping relations^ 
which also will appear a little later in these studies. 

So definition^ judgment, reasoning, and systematiza- 
tion are predominantly relating stages in the develop- 
ment of knowing. 

Distinguishing Elements in the Stages of Knowing. 
— Each stage in the development of knowing, while in- 
Tolving every other stage, has something in it which 
enables one to know it from every other stage; that is, 
distinguishes it from every other stage. This element is 
the distinguishing element. The following will formu- 
late : 

The distinguishing element of any stage of know- 
ing is that eleme^it ivhich enables one to know it from 
any other stage. 

In Sense-perception. — The distinctive thing the 
mind does in sense-perception is to interpret sensations. 
It matters not what one may be doing, he may be trans- 
lating a sentence in Latin, he may be observing an ex- 
periment in chemistry or physics, he may be solving 
a problem in trigonometry or algebra, he may be identi- 
fying a specimen in botany, zoology, or geology, just 
in so far as he is interpreting the sensations, so much 
of the process is sense-perception. 

The distinguishing element in sense-perception is 
the interpretation of sensations. 



Studies in Psychology 281 

hi Memory. — The distinctive thing the mind does 
in memory is to know that it has had the experience 
before. The mind retains in memory, it reacts in mem- 
ory, and it identifies in memory, and it would seem that 
any one of these three elements would distinguish mem- 
ory from the other stages of knowing. But one fre- 
quently retains without remembering, and he also fre- 
quently reacts without remembering, so while these two 
elements are distinctive to memory the act of memory is 
not complete with them. They do not guarantee that 
the mind is remembering. But if the mind is knowing 
that it has had the experience before, the activity is 
always one of memory. This knowing that one has had 
the experience before not only separates memory from 
the other stages of knowing, but it is the essential ele- 
ment of memory, and also the distinguishing element 
of memory. 

The distinguishing element of memory is the identi- 
fication of the present experience with the past. 

In Imagination. — In imagination the mind forms 
images freely. In memory the mind forms images, but 
lacks freedom in doing so. One must react the experi- 
ence accurately, and inability to do so detracts from the 
efficiency of memory. No memory is regarded good be- 
yond the degree to which one reacts the experience ac- 
curately. And when an idea, this more or less accurate 
idea may by the imagination be embodied in an image. 
But this imaging is limited by the necessities of memory. 

In imagination the imaging is free. Any amount 
of changing, idealizing, does not detract from the effici- 



282 Studies in Psychology 

ency of the act of the imagination. The mind is con- 
scious of this and works in imagination under the in- 
fluence of this consciousness. 

The distinguishing element in imagination is the 
free imaging activity of the mind. 

In Conception. — In conception the mind deals pre- 
dominantly with common attributes of groups of ob- 
jects. Conception is the class-forming stage in the de- 
velopment of knowing. To form ideas of classes the 
mind must see the common attributes of the class which 
do not extend beyond the class and also which do not 
belong to other classes. That is to say, it must grasp 
the class common attributes. For instance, in forming 
a concept of birds the mind sees they are animals, verte- 
brates, and bipeds, but these common truths are not dis- 
tinctive of birds. They are universal common attri- 
butes. But feather-growing is a distinctive attribute of 
birds; it is a class common attribute, and this is what 
the mind emphasizes in conception. 

The distinguishing element in conception is grasp- 
ing the class common attributes of a class of objects. 

In Definition. — In definition the mind selects the 
essential common attributes of a class of objects and 
thinks them into a thought. It is not interested in aU 
the common attributes of a class of objects, but just 
those necessary to enable it to think the idea of the class 
perfectly definitely. And it thinks the class as definitely 
as it is able to do by making the synthesis of these es- 
sential common attributes in a thought. This is the 
dominant and distinguishing thing in definition. 



Studies in Psychology 283 

The distinguishing element of definition is the syn- 
thesis of the essential common attributes of a class of 
objects. 

Judgment. — Judgment is the next stage in the de- 
velopment of knowing after definition. In this kind of 
mental activity the mind grasps and asserts the relation 
between ideas. In sense-perception the mind gets par- 
ticular ideas, in conception it gets general ideas, and 
abstract ideas in abstraction. In judgment the mind 
grasps and asserts the relations between them. 

For example, the mind of man had general ideas of 
coal and fuel for years before it ever grasped the rela- 
tion between them. When at last it grasped this rela- 
tion it asserted that coal is a fuel. This process of grasp- 
ing the relation between the idea, coal, and the idea, 
fuel, and asserting it is the mind's process of judging. 
The formal definition of judgment is thus as follows : 

Judgment is the mind^s process of grasping the re- 
lation between two ideas and asserting it. 

In judgment the mind takes the ideas by twos. 
The ideas may be simple; as, Man is mortal; they 
may be complex; as, That distinguished hero is also 
a poet of renown; or they may be compound, as, 
Bread and butter is healthful and nutritious. But in 
any event the mind groups them by twos in judgment. 

In judgment the mind may assert the relation be- 
tween any two kinds of ideas ; that is, between two par- 
ticular ideas; between two concepts; between two ab- 
stract ideas; between a concept and an abstract idea, 
and between a particular idea and an abstract idea. 



284 Studies in Psychology 

The definition of judgment that it is the mind^s 
process of grasping and asserting the relation between 
concepts is not accurate, unless one uses the idea concept 
in the popular sense. It is not inclusive. 

The idea, assert, is an idea usually only vaguely 
understood, yet it is much used in both psychology and 
grammar. An analysis of assertions which all agree 
are assertions reveals the fact, first, that all assertions 
are mental things; relations between experiences, and 
are in the mind; secondly, that such a relation can be 
opposed or defended, and that where the assertion is 
lacking there is nothing to defend or oppose. For in- 
stance, the large tree does not express an assertion, neith- 
er, does it express anything to be denied or defended, 
but the tree is large expresses an assertion. It also ex- 
presses a relation which can be opposed or defended. 
From which the following statement for an assertion is 
reached : 

An assertion is a relation of such a character that 
it admits of opposition or defense. 

The Steps in Judgment. — The act of judgment is 
a triple activity of the mind; that is, a one act made 
up of three. Each one of these three acts is a step in 
judgment, and they are as follows: 

1. The mind acts the idea of some object as an un- 
differentiated whole. 

2. The mind brings into consciousness some re- 
lated idea. 

3. The mind grasps and asserts the relation be- 
tween these two ideas. 



Studies in Psychology 285 

Illustration. — In the judgment, Peaches are fra- 
grant, the mind acts the idea, peaches, just as a whole 
thing, at this stage no element being separated from 
the idea, peaches; that is, as an undifferentiated whole. 
Then the mind brings into consciousness the idea, fra- 
grant, and lastly it asserts the relation between these 
ideas. 

Product of Judgment. — The product of an act of 
sense-perception is a percept; of an act of conception, 
a concept; of an act of definition, a definition; of an 
act of judgment, a judgment. Judgment is thus both a 
process and a product. It has previously been defined 
as a process and may be defined as a product as follows : 

A judgment is a mental product which the mind 
reaches hy asserting the relation between two ideas. 

Judgments as products are thought of as negative 
or positive, depending upon the character of the rela- 
tion asserted. Thus the sentence. The building is not 
beautiful expresses a negative judgment, and the sen- 
tence. The fragrance of the rose is delightful expresses 
a positive judgment. 

Elements of the Judgment. — Each judgment con- 
sists of three essential elements resulting from the three 
activities making up the judgment. They are called 
(1) the psychical subject; (2) the psychical predicate, 
and (3) the psychical copida. 

Each of these is an idea; the psychical subject the 
idea of which something is asserted ; the psychical predi- 
cate that which is asserted, and the psychical copula is 



286 Studies in Psychology 

the assertion. The following are the formal statements 
for them: 

The psychical subject is the idea of which something 
is asserted. 

The psychical predicate is the idea which is asserted 
of the psychical subject. 

The psychical coptda is the assertion between the 
psychical subject and the psychical predicate. 

Judgments of Intension and Extension. — There are 
two reasons why the mind would use any judgment, 
which may be seen from the following. Suppose the 
judgment were Dogs are useful, the mind might have 
the abstract idea, useful, in consciousness and might be 
thinking of the various things possessing this attribute ; 
it might think horses are useful, cows are useful, houses 
are useful, books are useful, and dogs are useful. In 
this case the mind thinks the judgment in order to en- 
large the extent of the idea useful. 

But suppose the mind were thinking all the attri- 
butes of dogs that it could, and would think, dogs are 
faithful, dogs are strong, dogs are friendly and dogs 
are useful, it would think dc^s are useful to increase 
the intent of the idea, dogs. 

These two reasons of the mind for thinking a judg- 
ment give grounds for the two aspects of judgments: 
1. Intension. 2. Extension. Other terms are, for in- 
tension, intent and content; for extension, another term 
is extent. 

These are frequently spoken of as judgments of in- 
tension and judgments of extension. But they are but 



Studies in Psychology 287 

two aspects of the same judgment, and every judgment 
may be a judgment of extension and a judgment of in- 
tension at one time, depending upon the mind's attitude 
toward it. 

The following obtained from the above study will 
formulate these two kinds of judgments: 

A judgment of intension is a judgment whose predi- 
cate is referred to its subject to increase the intent of 
the subject. 

A judgment of extension is that hind of judgment 
in which the subject is referred to the predicate to in- 
crease the extent of the predicate. 

Increasing the intent of the subject is adding to 
the attributes which make up the idea. 

Increasing the extent of the predicate is adding to 
the number of objects of which the predicate is true. 

In a series of judgments of content the subject may 
remain permanent; that is, the same idea may be the 
subject of each judgment, while in a series of judgments 
of extent the predicate may remain permanent ; that is, 
the same idea may be the predicate of each judgment. 

Truth. — The mind has an idea of something which 
it thinks as truth. What truth is in content may vary 
greatly with different minds, but in form truth is the 
same to all minds. Any mind regards that as truth 
which when asserted in a judgment in no way conflicts 
with any other judgment of the same mind. If one re- 
gards the judgment, the mosquito is an unmitigated 
nuisance, as a truth, it is because he has no other judg- 



288 Studies in Psychology 

ments which conflict with the relation asserted in the 
judgment. The following will formulate this thought: 
Truth to each mind is relation asserted in a judg- 
ment which is not in conflict with any other judgment 
of the same mind. 

**It must not be thought from this that the mind 
has any ready-made test existing within it by whose 
application it can decide upon the falsity or truth of 
any judgment. There is no simple criterion or rule for 
determining truth which can be applied immediately 
to every judgment; the only criterion is relation to the 
whole body of acquired knowledge, or the acquired sys- 
tem of relations, so far as it is realized. The worth of 
the criterion will evidently depend upon the degree in 
which the intelligence has been realized and knowledge 
acquired. ' ' 

Belief. — Belief is perhaps feeling rather than know- 
ing; that is, emotional rather than intellectual. But 
belief is always founded on judgment. The judgment 
acts and belief accompanies it. 

**To believe a thing is to regard it as true. The 
most important point regarding the psychology of belief 
is the recognition that it is not a separate state of 
mind over and beyond the judgment, but is a necessary 
accompaniment of it. Every act of intelligence, every 
assertion, that is, of a relation, is believed to be true. 
Intelligence must recognize its own existence, its own 
workings; and thus recognition is belief." 

We believe a thing because in so far as we have 
tested it with our intelligence, our judgment asserts it 



Studies in Psychology 289 

as a reality. This confidence in one's own intelligence 
is belief. We may formulate it as follows : 

Belief is the feeling of confidence in the efficiency 
of one^s own intelligence. 

Belief grows out of desire and hope and vivid 
imagination very easily and unobtrusively because of 
its emotional nature, unless one applies to his desires, 
hopes and imaginative pictures the critical action of the 
judgment. 

Doubt. — Doubt is as natural and healthy in the de- 
velopment of knowing as belief. It is the correlation of 
belief. One must doubt one thing frequently in order 
to learn to believe the opposite. Both doubt and belief 
are legitimate accompaniments of the developing intel- 
ligence. 

*'But the mind learns, in growing experience, that 
not every judgment does agree with the conditions of 
universal intelligence; that is, it discovers that some 
of its judgments contradict others. It thus arrives at 
a state of suspense ; it is not sure whether this particular 
judgment agrees or not with itself, with the whole sys- 
tem of knowledge. It learns that a great many, perhaps 
most of its judgments, have to be corrected with grow- 
ing experience, and thus it learns to assume a state of 
suspended judgment. It no longer assumes truth as the 
child 's mind does ; it waits for evidence. ' ' 

Doubt, it appears, is a state of mind in which the 
mind is not willing to judge because of a possible con- 
flict in its judgments. This thought may be formulated 
as follows : 



290 Studies in Psychology 

Doubt is the feeling of suspense of judgment be- 
cause of a possible conflict resulting from an act of 
judgment. 

Belief is a pleasant feeling and too often results in 
a feeling of self-sufficiency that is detrimental to de- 
velopment of the intelligence. Doubt is an unpleasant 
feeling which stimulates to intellectual endeavor, that 
the suspense may be removed. Each has its function 
in the growing intelligence of the individual. 

Advance of Judgment. — Judgment is an advance in 
development over definition, just as we would expect. 
In definition the mind asserts the relation between gen- 
eral ideas; that is, relations between the idea of some 
class and an idea of another class made up of the es- 
sential common attributes of the class defined. But in 
judgment the mind asserts the relations between all 
sorts of ideas — between more kinds of ideas than it 
does in definition. 

The advance of judgment over definition is that in 
judgment the mind asserts the relation between more 
kinds of ideas than it does in definition. 

Distinguishing Element. — The sine qua non of 
judgment is the assertion. No assertion, no judgment. 
It matters not what else the mind may be doing in so 
far as there is assertion involved, there is judgment in- 
volved. 

The distinguishing element of judgment is the as- 
sertion of the relation between ideas. 

Symbol of Judgment. — The sentence expresses the 
judgment, or is the symbol of the judgment. So the 



Studies in Psychology 291 

relation of the sentence to the judgment is that of the 
symbol to the thing symbolized, and the relation of 
judgment to the sentence is that of the thing symbolized 
to the symbol. The judgment and the thought are iden- 
tical; that is, each has the relation of identity to the 
other. In psychology the proposition is identical with 
the thought or the judgment. 
Read : 

1. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 213-220. 

2. Angell's Psychology, pp. 223-234. 

3. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 229- 
232. 

4. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 191-194. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

Reasoning. 

The Stages of Knowing. — Sense-perception begins 
with a sensation and ends with an idea — a percept; 
memory begins with any sort of present mental experi- 
ence and ends by identifying this present experience 
with some past mental experience; imagination begins 
with an idea and ends with an image ; conception begins 
by examining a number of particular objects and ends 
with an idea — a concept; definition begins with the ex- 
amination of particular objects and ends with a defini- 
tion; judgment begins with two ideas of any kind and 
ends with a judgment; reasoning begins with two judg- 
ments and ends with a third judgment reached because 
of the relation between these two. 

Nature of Reasoning. — In each judgment there are 
three ideas involved, and in a somewhat similar way in 
reasoning there are three judgments involved, and they 
are so related that the third one is a conclusion from 
the other two, or it is an inference from the other 
two. Thus having the two judgments, Man is mortal, 
and William is a man, the mind reaches the third 
judgment, William is mortal. This process of reaching 
the third judgment through the relation of the other 
two is reasoning. The definition for it is as follows : 

Reasoning is the mind's process of reaching a judg- 



Studies in Psychology 293 

ment because of the relation between two preceding 
judgments. 

This act of reasoning is the basis of the principle, 
*'Two things that equal the same thing are equal to 
each other. ' ' 

In the act of reasoning following, 

Horses are useful. 

Maud is a horse. 

Maud is useful. 

H. =u. 

M. == h. 

M = u. ; that is, u. equals H., M. equals h., there- 
fore, M. equals u. 

Classes of Reasoning. — A popular question is. What 
are the classes of reasoning? and the popular answer is 
(1) Inductive; (2) Deductive. This popular question 
is ambiguous because it admits of more than one answer. 
Any question on the classes of reasoning, to be definite, 
must give the basis of classification, for there are several 
different classes of reasoning depending upon the basis 
chosen. 

Implicit and Explicit Reasoning. — The mind often 
forms a judgment when it is not at all conscious that this 
judgment is reached because of the relation between 
two preceding judgments, but analysis always shows 
that the two preceding judgments are to be found, 
though not in consciousness. Thus when the mind thinks 
this is a rainy day, it has, as a rule, in consciousness 
only this one judgment. But an analysis shows that 
the two judgments. Rainy days are days having certain 



294 Studies in Psychology 

characteristics, and This day is a day having these char- 
acteristics, are the two preceding judgments from which 
the judgment, This is a rainy day, was inferred. 

But again the mind reaches a judgment from the 
relation between two preceding judgments, when all 
the judgments are in consciousness; as when the mind 
reasons Dynamite is a violent explosive. This material 
is dynamite. This material is a violent explosive. 

So on the basis of the number of judgments in con- 
sciousness, there are two classes of reasoning: 1. Im- 
plicit reasoning. 2. Explicit reasoning. 

The above thought on these kinds of reasoning 
formulated gives the following : 

Implicit reasoning is that kind of reasoning in 
which one or more of the three judgments are not in 
consciousness. 

Explicit reasoning is that hind of reasoning in 
which all the three judgments are in consciousness. 

The mind uses the implicit reasoning much more 
than it does the explicit, in the ordinary affairs of life. 
In the implicit reasoning only one judgment may be in 
consciousness, and many, many times this is the case; 
but there are also many cases in which two judgments 
are in consciousness. Implicit reasoning at first thought, 
hardly seems to be reasoning at all. A psychological 
analysis, however, shows the true nature of the process. 

Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. — Again the 
mind in reasoning examines particular objects, discovers 
the truths of these and reasons from these particular 
truths to truths of the whole class; that is, to general 



Studies in Psychology 295 

truths. It reasons that what is true of the particular 
objects is true of the whole class, as follows : 

These objects are birds. 

These objects grow feathers. 

Birds grow feathers. 

But the mind may start with a general truth and 

reason that what is true of the whole class must be true 

of the particular objects of that class, as follows : 
Birds grow feathers. 
This object is a bird. 
This object grows feathers. 

Thus on the basis of whether the mind goes from 
a particular truth to a general truth in reasoning or 
from a general truth to a particular truth there are two 
classes of reasoning. 1. Inductive reasoning. 2. De- 
ductive reasoning. 

The following are the formal definitions : 
Inductive reasoning is that kind of reasoning in 
which the mind goes from partictdar truth to general 
truth. 

Ex. — This object has voluntary motion. 
This object is an animal. 
Animals have voluntary motion. 

Deductive reasoning is that kind of reasoning in 
which the mind goes from general truth to particidar 
truth. 

Ex. — Animals have voluntary motion. 
This object is an animal. 
This object has voluntary motion. 

Particular truth is truth which is true of particu- 
lar objects, or cases. General truth is truth which is 
true of classes, or of all the cases of a kind. 



296 Studies in Psychology 

Basis of Induction. — The term, inductive reasoning, 
for convenience is shortened to the term, induction; and 
deductive reasoning, to deduction. The question. What 
right has the mind to assume that what is true of par- 
ticular cases is true in general? suggests itself. This, 
it is evident, is the assumption of induction, and with- 
out this assumption, that what is true of particular cases 
is true of all cases of the kind, there could be no induc- 
tive reasoning, nor any other kind of reasoning for that 
matter. 

This assumption has its explanation in conduct or 
behavior. In the evolution of life those animals whose 
behavior was in harmony with the law, that nature mani- 
fests itself uniformly, were the ones who survived and 
those whose behavior was not in accord with this law 
perished. The surviving ones passed on to their off- 
spring this nervous reaction to the uniformity of na- 
ture 's phenomena, and through variation and selection it 
intensified into instinct. This instinct proved so valua- 
ble to all animal life that behavior in accord with it has 
conduced to survival. 

Thus the basis of inductive reasoning is the instinct- 
ive assumption that 7iature*s laws are uniform. 

The evidence of the correctness of the assumption 
is the guidance it gives us in behavior. The one who 
touches fire and gets burned assumes that it will burn 
again, if touched. The assumption does well to live by. 
A tree produces apples one year, and we assume it will 
produce apples again, not pumpkins, when it produces 
anything. So the test of the correctness of the assump- 



Studies in Psychology 297 

tion in behavior has proved out so well that the assump- 
tion has become a habit of mind. 

Deduction, Identification and Induction. — There 
are three judgments in every act of reasoning, and the 
mind uses a different kind of reasoning in reaching each 
judgment. This will appear from the following: 

Man is mortal. 
William is a man. 
William is mortal. 

In reaching the judgment, William is mortaly the 
mind uses regular deduction, as the above, the conclu- 
sion being, 'William is mortal. In reaching the judg- 
ment William is a man, the mind uses the following,, 
which is called identification: 

Man is mortal 
William is mortal. 
William is a man. 

the conclusion being William is a m^n. In reaching the 
judgment, Man is mortal, the mind uses induction, as: 
follows : 

William is a man. 
William is mortal. 
Man is mortal. 

the conclusion being, Man is mortal. 

It is evident that here is basis for three classes of 
reasoning. So on the hasis of the kinds of reasoning the 
mind uses in reaching the three judgments in any kind 
of reasoning, there are three classes of reasoning: 1.. 
Deduction. 2. Identification. 3. Induction. 



298 Studies in Psychology 

The following will further illustrate these classes: 

Deduction. 
Man is mortal. 
Socrates was a man. 
Socrates was mortal. 

Identification. 
Man is mortal. 

Socrates was mortal. 

Socrates was a man. 

Induction. 

Socrates was mortal. 

Socrates was a man. 

Man is mortal. 
It is evident that the form of identification given 
here is not valid reasoning; is not good logic as some 
would say. If the general truth stated in the first propo- 
sition could correctly be put in the negative form, 
Nothing hut man is mortal, then the conclusion, Socra- 
tes was a man, would be valid. 

But even though this mode of identification does 
reach only probably truth, there perhaps is no other 
tind of reasoning used more by the mind. When one^s 
mind thinks any particular object into a class the 
chances are nine in ten that it employs this very kind 
of reasoning. One sees some object and thinks it is a 
horse, a tree, a house, a man, a book, a dog, a bird, a 
bee, a boat, etc., etc. and in almost every case the mode 
of identification illustrated above is used; that is, the 
mode which leads to only probable truth. 

In identification the mind reaches a judgment in 



Studies in Psychology 299 

the conclusion which unites some particular object as 
such with a class as such. 

The Syllogism. — For purposes of study in psychol- 
ogy the syllogism may be considered as the formal act of 
reasoning thought of as a whole thing. The syllogism 
is thus composed of three propositions, or judgments. 
The first two of these propositions in the syllogism are 
called the premises and the third one is called the con- 
clusion. 

There are also in the syllogism three terms: the 
major terrn^, the minor term, and the middle term. As 
seen above a proposition in the syllogism is a judgment, 
but a term is always an idea, and there are two terms 
in each proposition, the predicate and the subject of the 
judgment. 

These terms may be known from their position in 
the judgments. The predicate of the conclusion is in- 
variably the major term. Since each term occurs twice 
in the syllogism, it is also always found in one of the 
premises. The subject of the conclusion is invariably 
the minor term. It is also always found in one of the 
premises. The term found in both the premises but not 
found in the conclusion is the middle term. Thus in the 
syllogism. 

Sponges are animals. 
This object is a sponge. 
This object is an animal. 

the idea, an animal, is the major term; the idea, this 
object is the minor term, and the idea, sponge, is the 
middle term. 



300 Studies in Psychology 

It is to be seen that the middle term is a medium 
for comparing the other two. The idea, sponge, is a 
medium for comparing the idea, this object, with the 
idea, an animal. This, the fact that it is a medium of 
comparison, seems to be why it is called the middle 
term. Of the other two terms the one in the predicate 
of the conclusion is larger in extent than the one in the 
subject. And this seems to be the reason for the terms 
major and minor. 

The premises are major premise and minor premise 
depending upon the terms found in them. The major 
term is always found in the major premise and the 
minor term in the minor premise. Thus in the syllo- 
gism expressed above, the judgment, sponges are animals 
is the major premise, and the judgment, this object is a 
sponge, is the minor premise. 

It was observed above that in the syllogism the 
mind compares the minor term and major term through 
the medium of the middle term, that the syllogism is 
the formal act of reasoning, and that a term is an idea, 
therefore we reach the following definition for reason- 
ing: 

Reasoning is the mind's process of comparing two 
ideas through the medium of a thii'd. 

Figures of the Syllogism. — The judgments arranged 
in a certain order in the syllogism are called a figure of 
the syllogism. Since the mind in reaching the judg- 
ments in any kind of reasoning arranges the judgments 
in general in three orders, there are three figures of 



Studies in Psychology 301 

the syllogism. They are called first figure, second figure 
and third figure. The following illustrates them : 

I. 

Animals have voluntary motion. 

This object is an animal. 

This object has voluntary motion. 

II. 

Animals have voluntary motion. 
This object has voluntary motion. 
This object is an animal. 

III. 

This object is an animal. 

This object has voluntary motion. 

Animals have voluntary motion. 

The first figure of the syllogism is used by the mind 
in deduction; the second by the mind in identification, 
and the third, by the mind in induction. 

The Distinguishing Element in Reasoning. — In 
reasoning the mind grasps the relation between two 
judgments and thereby forms a third judgment. It 
forms this third judgment from two ideas compared in- 
directly; that is, through the medium of a third, and 
this is the distinctive thing in reasoning. 

The distinguishing element in reasoning is the com- 
parison of two ideas through the medium of a third. 

Advance of Reasoning. — The advance of reasoning 
over judgment is to be found in the further development 
of the mind's relating activity. The mind grasps all 
the relations in one act of reasoning which it grasps in 
three acts of judgments and in addition what relations 



302 Studies in Psychology 

there are between the judgments. This may be put as 
follows : 

1. The act of reasoning is more complex than an 
act of judgment. 

2. The mind grasps relations between judgments 
in reasoning; in judgment, the relation between ideas. 

Read : 

1. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 220-231. 

2. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 216- 
237. 

3. Angell's Psychology, pp. 235-255. 

4. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 194-203. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

Systematization. 

Unity of Stages of Knowing. — While our method of 
study of the development of knowing is necessarily of 
such a character as to tend to lead one to think that 
the different stages develop in succession, such is in 
reality not the case. The development of knowing is 
a unity, each stage involving to some degree every other 
stage. The method of exposition in these studies is an 
analytic one, in which the mind abstracts the stages one 
by one from the unified whole and studies them. The 
study begins with the stage in which the fewest relations 
are grasped, sense-perception, and proceeds from stage 
to stage in the order of the broadening and deepening 
of the mind's relating activity. 

Reasoning in the Lower Stages. — There is nothing 
that shows this unity of knowing better than to see 
how reasoning is involved in each stage of knowing 
from sense-perception to judgment, inclusive. 

In sense-perception the mind, as was seen in the 
study of sense-perception, always classifies the object 
sense-perceived. This object is ahvays a particular ob- 
ject. Thus the mind unites a particular object with 
some class. But this asserting that a particular object 
belongs to some class is identifying the object, and 
identification is one of the classes of reasoning. Usually 
only one judgment is in consciousness, so the reasoning 



304 Studies in Psychology 

is implicit. Thus the reasoning involved in sense-per- 
ception is identification and is implicit. 

In memory the mind identifies some present experi- 
ence with some past experience, but this process of 
identifying is again the reasoning called identification 
and it, too, is usually implicit. The syllogism is as fol- 
lows : 

A past experience has certain characteristics. 
This present experience has these characteristics. 
This present experience is identical with the past, 
to some degree. 

In the constructive imagination the mind forms 
complex images by adapting the images of the reproduc- 
tive and mechanical imagination. This requires the 
adaptation of means to end, and this involves reasoning 
as follows : 

Images adapted and combined make suitable com- 
/ plex images. 

These are adapted and combined images. 
These make suitable complex images. 

The reasoning in this case is deductive and implicit. 

In conception the mind forms general ideas from 
the study of particular objects; that is, goes from the 
particular to the general, and this is just what the 
mind does in inductive reasoning. So inductive reason- 
ing is involved in conception. 

In definition the mind from the study of particular 
cases picks out the essential common attributes of them 
and makes a general assertion of these. This is again 
going from the particular to the general and is inductive 



Studies in Psychology 305 

reasoning. So inductive reasoning is involved in defini- 
tion. 

In judgment it appears that the mind may go from 
the particular to the general, from the general to the 
particular, or may put the particular object in a class; 
that is, a judgment may be a conclusion from any kind 
of reasoning. So induction, identification, and deduc- 
tion are involved in judgment. They are always im- 
plicit. 

This is but one of the ways of showing the unity of 
the stages in the development of knowing. 

Nature of Systematization. — The mind in judgment 
grasps the relation between ideas ; in reasoning it grasps 
the relation between judgments, and in systematization 
it grasps the relation between acts of reasoning and 
unifies them into a whole which we call a system. Each 
truth is what it is, because of its connection with and 
dependence upon other truths. 

''Reasoning is the act of mind which recognizes 
this dependence, and develops the modes of connection. 
But reasoning confines itself to the special relations 
which connect facts. It does not deal with the truth 
that all these relations are also related to each other, and 
are factors of one harmonious whole." 

It is in systematization that this harmonious whole 
is made. The following is the formal definition for 
systematization : 

Systematization is the mind^s process of grasping 
the relations among the truths reached by reasoning and 
forming them into an organized whole. 



306 Studies in Psychology 

The Products of Systematization. — In a general 
way the product of systematization is systematized 
knowledge. In any department of knowledge, as in the 
knowledge of plant life, or in the knowledge of animal 
life, the various truths unified on the basis of an organ- 
izing principle constitute a science. And all sciences 
unified on the basis of some inclusive organizing prin- 
ciple constitutes philosophy. The mind in systematiza- 
tion does both; that is, unifies the various truths that 
make the various sciences, and unifies the various sci- 
ences into philosophy. 

Thus the products of systematization are two: 1. 
Science. 2. Philosophy. Science is unified knowledge 
and philosophy is unified science. 

**It is in result what we call 'science' and 'philoso- 
phy', which are not only knowledge, but coordinated 
knowledge arranged in connected form. Each special 
branch of science is one form of this attempt at har- 
monious system. Philosophy is the attempt to systema- 
tize or arrange in their organic unity all special 
branches of science. No isolated science fulfills the end 
of knowledge or is complete system, because in it the 
analytic activity predominates over the synthetic. Sci- 
ence in its completeness, including the synthetic func- 
tion, is philosophy." 

The Distinguishing Element. — The thing which 
makes systematization different from the other stages 
of knowing is its wide unifying activity. It unites acts 
of reasoning into a coherent whole. 

The distinguishing element of systematization is 



Studies in Psychology 307 

grasping the relations among truths reached hy reason- 
ing. 

Advance of Systematization. — It is evident that 
systematization is a further development of the mind^s 
relating activity. In systematization the mind grasps 
all the relations it grasps in acts of reasoning, and in 
addition the relations among these relations ; that is, the 
relations among the truths reached by reasoning. 

These advances pointedly are as follows: 

1. Systematization is more complex than reasoning. 

2. Systematization is more elaborate than reason- 
ing. 

3. In systematization the mind grasps the relations 
between the truths reached by reasoning. 

The Cidtivation of Thinking. — The cultivation of 
conception, definition, judgment, reasoning and systema- 
tization is best studied together under the general head 
of the cultivation of thinking, because whatever cul- 
tivates one of these stages in the development of know- 
ing cultivates all. 

Skill in thinking is simply skill in seeing the essen- 
tial relations of things; that is, seeing the relations be- 
tween things correctly and doing it readily. Now the 
mind can not see relations between things when it does 
not know things. This is the same as saying the mind 
can not think unless it has material to think about and 
to think with. So there are in general two things to 
be gained in the development of thinking as follows: 

1. The mind must gain a stock of knowledge, facts 
or ideas and remember them,. 



308 Studies in Psychology 

2. The mind must gain the ability rightly to see 
the relations between these materials of thought. 

It is well known that ignorant persons can not 
think well. They have nothing to think about and 
with. As well expect one to build a house without 
material and tools as to expect one to think without a 
stock of knowledge. People with minds potentially good 
are easily made to believe all sorts of superstitions and 
other foolish things in the absence of exact knowledge. 

Again one may remember facts of knowledge, but 
if he possesses no ability to trace out their relations 
rightly he can not think. Indeed one may have a mar- 
velous memory for desultory facts and events and yet be 
positively stupid in thinking. But combine these two, 
a mind stored with the essential facts of men and things 
and the ability to trace out rightly and readily the rela- 
tions among them and we have a thinker of the highest 
order. 

From this study the inference is that cultivation 
o£ thinking consists of two things: 

1. The storing our minds with the essential facts 
of men and things. 

2. The acquiring the ability to see rightly and 
readily the relations among these facts. 

The first of these is to be done by the pursuit of 
subjects in which the essential facts of men and things 
are to be learned. These subjects are chemistry, physics, 
zoology, botany, geology, astronomy, geography, physi- 
ology, psychology, history, sociology, etc. 

The second of these things, the acquiring of ability 



Studies in Psychology 309 

in rightly and rapidly tracing out relations, is to be 
gained from the pursuit of those subjects which require 
exercise in tracing relations, and the kind of relations 
one most needs in thinking. 

Now it will be remembered that there are two kinds 
of relations in general: 1. Logical relations. 2. Arbi- 
trary relations. The arbitrary relations are such as 
those of a symbol with the idea which it symbolizes, or 
as the relation between a certain date and an event, or 
crowd of men and the number of men in it. 

Logical relations are such as can be woven into a 
system, and can often be thought out. Some of them 
are as follows: 1. Relations of identity, or similarity. 
2. Relations of whole and part. 3. Quantitative rela- 
tions. 4. Relations of time and place. 5. Relations of 
cause and effect. 6. Relations of instrument and end. 
7. Relations of purpose and means. 

Now those studies which require us to trace out 
these logical relations are the ones which will improve 
us in ability to think. 

But there is another question here which is called 
the question of transfer of training; that is to say, how 
much does training one to think in chemistry, for in- 
stance, develop the power to think in history f 

"It is frequently asserted that mathematics trains 
reasoning, classics memory, and so on. These asser- 
tions are based altogether on assumption and apparently 
assume an out-of-date psychology. ' ' — Pillsbury. 

So it is not certain that tracing out logical rela- 
tions in one system of relations, the mathematics system. 



310 Studies in Psychology 

for instance, will improve one's ability to think in other 
systems of thought. 

General observation would seem to answer this 
question in the negative, but at present the question is 
not fully settled. 

This much is true, though, the subjects best to give 
exercises in tracing out logical relations are: 1. The 
sciences: chemistry, physics, zoology, botany, physiol- 
ogy? geography, psychology, sociology, etc. 2. The his- 
tories and literatures. 3. The mathematics: arithmetic^ 
algebra, geometry, etc.; and others not so good are: 1. 
Languages : spelling, reading, Latin, Greek, German, etc. 
2. Commercial subjects: stenography, book-keeping,, 
typewriting, commercial law, etc. 3. The arts: penman- 
ship, drawing, painting, music, etc. 

Now any of these best subjects may be of very little 
value in developing thinking power if improperly 
taught. If they are made mere exercises of the memory 
their value is very small. But, if they are dwelt upon, 
thought over, recited upon and woven into a system, 
and organized around some fundamental principles, 
they will give the learner power of thought, if he is 
capable of it. 

This study would lack something were not the time 
for the cultivation of thought studied. The answer to 
the question, when best cultivate thinking? has in a way 
been indicated already. 

One may best acquire the essential facts of men and 
things in youth and early manhood or womanhood. He 



Studies in Psychology 311 

may successfully improve his power of rightly tracing 
relations any time in youth or adult life. 

A summary of the points in this study are: 

1. The cultivation of thinking consists of (1) stor- 
ing one's mind with the essential facts of men and 
things; (2) in gaining the ability to trace out the rela- 
tions of these rightly and readily. 

2. The first is done by learning and remembering 
the truths of the subjects dealing with these things. 

3. The second is done by studying rightly those 
subjects which deal with logical relations. 

4. No subject is good to give power of thought if 
badly taught, or badly studied. 

5. It is not certain that training in one system of 
relations gives increased power of thought in another 
system. 

6. Some groups of subjects are better than others 
to train in thinking. 

7. Thinking may be cultivated at any time in life, 
but youth and early adult life is the opportune time. 

Read: 

1. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 231-233. 

2. Halleck's Psychology, pp. 222-238. 

3. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 298- 
324. 



CHAPTER XX. 

Intuition, Instinct, Animal Intelligence. 

Nature of Intuition. — The complete knowing of an 
object, using the term object to mean what is in conscious- 
ness at any time — the content of consciousness, consists 
in grasping fully the two aspects of it, the particular 
and universal. By so doing the mind completely uni- 
fies it with other objects and completely distinguishes 
it from other objects. Only so is any object fully 
known. 

The stages of knowing from sense-perception to 
imagination, inclusive, emphasize the particular, or dis- 
tinguishing, aspect of content of consciousness; but the 
stages of knowing from conception to systematization, 
inclusive, emphasize the universal, or relating, aspect 
of consciousness. No stage up to and including sys- 
tematization stresses to any thing near an equal de- 
gree both aspects of an object, the- distinguishing and 
relating. 

Two Views of Intuition. — ^No psychological term in 
common use is used more indefinitely and erroneously 
than this term, intuition. Popularly intaition is used 
to mean the process in which knowledge comes to the 
mind in some inexplicable way, falls down from the 
sky, springs up from the ground, or comes from no one 
knows where, nor why, a sort of inspiration, vision, or 
just-because kind of knowledge suddenly and accommo- 



Studies in Psychology 313 

datingly appearing in consciousness. This view is the 
popular view of intuition, and its chief characteristics 
are its vagueness and mysteriousness. 

There is another view held by a smaller number of 
people who have been students of the question and who 
have found the first view to lack any foundation in fact. 
This second view, which regards intuition a stage in the 
development of knowing in which the mind's activities 
may be studied and understood, may for the purpose of 
study be called the special view. Thus the two views of 
intuition are ; 1. The popular view. 2. The special view. 

The Popular View. — The popular view, as said, is 
vague and indefinite in the minds of most persons. It is 
often confused with innate ideas and instinct. But 
psychologists are agreed that there are no such things 
as innate ideas and that instinct is not knowing at all. 
In so far as this view has any definiteness it regards in- 
tuition as the process of getting knowledge directly; that 
is, without referring the present experience to any past 
experience. 

Mr. Dewey says the following on this point: *' In- 
tuition is often conceived to mean a purely immediate 
act, or one taking place without the recognition of any 
relation of independence. * * * * Something per- 
ceived by intuition is supposed to be just what it is by 
virtue of its own independent existence. We are in a 
position to recognize that there can not possibly be in- 
tuition of such a kind. Every act of mind involves 
relation; it involves dependence; it involves mediation." 

The Special View. — According to this view, intui- 



314 Studies in Psychology 

tion is the highest kind of knowing ; that is, the highest 
stage in the development of knowing. It is the stage 
in the development of knowing in which the mind gets 
the most complete knowledge of any object and does it 
most easily. 

As seen before there is no stage in the development 
of knowing from sense-perception to systematization in 
which the mind places equal emphasis upon both the par- 
ticular and universal aspects of any object of thought. 
Evidently such knowing would be the highest kind of 
knowing for it would give the mind the most complete 
knowledge of any content of consciousness. Now in- 
tuition is the stage in the development of knowing in 
which the mind stresses somewhat equally both aspects 
of any object of thought, the particular and the univer- 
sal. This is one of the characteristics which makes it the 
highest kind of knowing. 

And again knowing which the mind engages in with 
the least difficulty obtrudes itself into consciousness 
least. This work of the mind is similar to almost any 
kind of work one does in this respect, that the easier 
the work is to do the less attention we give to it, as we 
usually say; that is, the less it obtrudes itself into con- 
sciousness. On the other hand the more difficult the 
work is to do the more attention we have to give to it; 
that is, the more it obtrudes itself into consciousness. 
Walking becomes so easy, playing a piano so easy, that 
the mind directs the activities almost unconsciously. 
One can repeat a verse of poetry or recite a declension 
in Latin almost unconsciously, so easy have these be- 



Studies in Psychology 315 

come for one. But the originals in geometry the first 
time one works through them, and translating Caesar's 
bridge obtrude themselves almost painfully into one's 
consciousness. Work that the mind does unconsciously 
is done implicitly, and work that the mind does con- 
sciously is done explicitly. 

Now in intuition, the highest kind of knowing, and, 
since the highest, the easiest kind of knowing, the mind 
does more work unconsciously than in any other stage 
of knowing; that is to say, intuition is the stage of 
knowing in which the mind does its work most implicit- 
ly. And sense-perception is the stage of knowing in 
which the mind does its work most explicitly. 

From the above study the following definition of in- 
tuition is reached: 

Intuition is the mind^s process of most implicitly 
and fully grasping any object of thought in both its 
particular and universal aspects. 

A botanist is said to know a plant more intuitively 
than one who is not a botanist. A mathematician is said 
to solve a problem more intuitively than one who is not 
a mathematician. A zoologist knows an animal more 
intuitively than one who is not a zoologist. They do, 
because their minds do the work so much more fully, 
implictly and easily than the minds of others. 

Origin of the Popular View of Intuition. — It is not 
difficult to see how the popular view of intuition origi- 
nated. People found themselves having points of knowl- 
edge which they could not account for, because the pro- 
cess of such knowledge was so implicit and so easy. And 



316 Studies in Psychology 

in the absence of any explanation for it, it has been called 
supernatural knowledge, inspired knowledge, vision, 
presentiment and finally intuitive knowledge, or intui- 
tion. And from this the conclusion was reached that 
intuition was the process of getting knowledge from 
some unknown place in some inexplicable way. 

As previously stated, many writers have confused 
intuition and instinct; for this reason and because in- 
stinct is such an important factor in all human behav- 
ior, a little study of it will be here undertaken. 

The Nature of Instinct, — Man and the lower an- 
imals are constantly acting as a result of their own ex- 
perience and because of tendencies they have at birth. 
Fundamental to an understanding of the activities of 
both human beings and the lower animals, is an under- 
standing of these innate or inherited tendencies. These 
tendencies manifest themselves in both the obtrusive 
muscular and mental activities and the unobtrusive, 
subtler activities of feeling. These innate tendencies to 
act and feel are in a general way instincts. 

''They have a profound influence on the develop- 
ment of both feelings and actions. All through life they 
serve as a background for the acquired capacities. They 
also color feeling and determine action when experience 
fails. They often conflict with the acquired and explicit 
knowledge where that knowledge has been fully de- 
veloped. ' * 

Instincts are common to a group — a species, a 
genus, or even larger groups, as the instinct to save 
one's life in time of danger, the instinct in persons to 



Studies in Psychology 317 

perform the actions necessary to take the first food, the 
instinct of the bird to build its nest, etc. These ten- 
dencies have been valuable to the individual and the 
group in its evolution for survival, and are valuable at all 
times for guidance when intelligence does not furnish 
guidance ; that is, before intelligence has developed or 
when for any reason intelligence is in abeyance. They 
have proven valuable to ancestors for survival and 
have been transmitted to offspring as inherited tenden- 
cies to reaction, due to certain conditions of the nervous 
system. From the above study the following definition 
is reached. 

Instinct is inherited tendency common to a group 
to feel and act in some specific way when the proper 
stimulus occurs. 

Origin of Instinct. — In the evolution of a group in- 
dividuals vary at birth greatly. No two are exactly 
alike. These variations may be of such a character as 
better to fit the individuals to live in their environment 
or they may be of such a character as to handicap the 
individuals in their struggle for existence. It is well 
known that the offspring inherits the congenital char- 
acteristics of the ancestors. So those who have through 
variation those characteristics which better fit them for 
survival transmit these to offspring, and these to their 
offspring, and so continue these as instincts. Those who 
vary in the opposite direction die before they produce 
offspring or transmit to their offspring the handicap 
which sooner or later leads to extinction. Thus instincts 



318 Studies in Psychology 

are the helpful variations transmitted from ancestor to 
offspring until they have become fixed in the group. 

Instinct has been defined as ''inherited habit/ ^ But 
this definition is not quite accurate. It is misleading, 
too. Habit is acquired in one's lifetime. So habit is 
an acquired characteristic. And the mass of evidence 
is that acquired characteristics in human beings are 
not inherited from ancestors. Instincts are inherited 
congenital variations, not inherited habits. 

Intuition and Instinct. — Intuition is knowing, 
something one acquires in a lifetime, and grows out of 
experience. One may intuitively know whether a cer- 
tain person is friendly to some cause he is advocating, 
but he does not intuitively get scared at any strange 
noise. The baseball pitcher may intuitively know a 
batter's weakness, but he does not intuitively enjoy the 
approbation of the spectators. The wild goose instinc- 
tively migrates. The butterfly instinctively, not in- 
tuitively, lays her eggs on the plant which proves the 
proper food for the young. Intuition is acquired, in- 
stinct is inherited. 

Classes of Instincts. — A close analysis would give 
many classes of instincts on different bases, but a con- 
venient and helpful classification is as follows: 

1. Individual instincts. 

2. Racial instincts. 

3. Social instincts. 

Individual instincts are those whose tendency is to 
contribute to the welfare of the individual. Examples 
of individual instincts are : 1. The instinct which guides 



Studies in Psychology 319 

the child in taking his first food. 2. The instinct of 
self -protection. 3. The child's fears. 4. The instinct of 
pugnacity. 5. The instinct of ownership, and many 
others. 

Racial instincts are those whose tendency is to con- 
tinue the existence of the species. Examples of racial 
instincts are : 1. The egglaying instinct of animals. 2. 
The nest building instinct. 3. The mating instinct of 
human beings and animals. *'The innocent adolescent 
youth is as surprised at his thrills as he gazes upon the 
beautiful object of his first love and may be as ignorant 
of their cause and purpose as is the beetle that is laying 
its eggs, or the robin that is building its first nest.*' 4. 
The instinct of jealousy. 5. The parental instinct, and 
many others. 

The social instincts are those whose tendency is to 
preserve the social group. Examples of the social in- 
stinct are : 1. The desire for companionship. 2. Bash- 
fulness in the presence of strangers. 3. The instinct of 
sympathy. 4. The instinct of self-sacrifice. 

Value of Instincts. — Instincts influence directly or 
indirectly all the activities of man. They form the basis 
for all sorts of activity which we commonly think of 
as learned, intentional, purposive and reflective. Man 
has the most instincts of any being. This is different, 
however, from saying that the largest proportion of his 
acts are instinctive. Man modifles, controls, changes and 
inhibits his instinctive action largely, animals lower than 
man much less. The following is a good summary on 
instinct from Mr. Pillsbury: **In summary it may be 



320 Studies in Psychology 

said that instincts are movements, or feelings that may 
or may not be the result of movements that come because 
of inherited connections and dispositions in the nervous 
system. In function they serve, on the one hand, to 
keep the infant alive until he may be able to learn for 
himself, on the other they serve to enforce general lines 
of conduct that are essential for the preservation of the 
individual, the race and the social group. As opposed 
to habits and rational activities, instincts, of the latter 
class at least, are vague and prescribe only the end to be 
attained, not the precise means. Even the first group 
of instincts to make its appearance is soon modified by 
habit, or is repressed. Instincts can not be set apart 
from habits and other intelligent movements in the 
adult; all that can be said is that these acts have an 
instinctive element or an instinctive basis, the others are 
altogether acquired. The advantages of an inheritance 
of the vague outlines of action only with much left to 
individual learning is evident, if one will but consider 
the relatively small number of movements that may be 
inherited and the great number of situations to be met, 
not to mention the great possibility of change in the 
environment. "Were an organism to be rigidly limited 
to a few forms of response to predetermined conditions, 
it would soon find a situation for which it was not pre- 
pared and be eliminated. Or if the environment should 
change in some way, the organism could not long sur- 
vive.'' 

Animal Intelligence. — Closely connected with in- 
tuition and instinct is the question of animal intelligence. 



Studies in Psychology 321 

Intelligence, it will be remembered is something ac- 
quired in the life of the individual. It is acquirement 
of the being which he obtains by learning. If an an- 
imal acts by instinct, but learns a better way of re- 
sponding to a stimulus than that prompted by instinct, 
he has gained some knowledge and has some intelligence. 
There could be thousands of illustrations given to show 
that animals do this very thing. But since there is no 
one, so far as the writer knows, who has studied this 
subject long enough to make his opinion worth anything 
who denies intelligence to animals lower than man, this 
phase of the question needs no further study. 

Another aspect of this subject is. Do animals lower 
than man reason? This is yet an unsettled question. 
People are divided into about three classes on the basis 
of their views on this question. There are those who are 
perfectly certain that animals lower than man can 
reason. There are those who are just as certain that 
animals lower than man can not reason. And there are 
those who yet have to be convinced which view is right. 
And it is interesting to know that some of those who 
have studied the question most carefully belong to the 
last class. 

And again, much of this difference of opinion hing- 
es on the meaning to be put in the term reasoning. 
Wundt says animals lower than man do not reason and 
most men do not. If a definition of reasoning could be 
agreed upon, much of this difference of opinion would 
vanish. But so long as different persons mean different 
things by reasoning the dispute will go on. 



322 Studies in Psychology 

If one adopts the definition for reasoning that it is 
the mind's process of explicitly comparing two ideas 
through the medium of a third, it is safe to say that no 
one as yet has proved that the lower animals reason; 
and it is equally true that no one has proved that they 
do not. But if reasoning be defined as the mind's pro- 
cess of adapting means to end, then there are abundant 
instances of reasoning among the lower animals. 

A study of the minds of elephants, of apes, of 
horses, of dogs, etc., makes it very difiicult for one not 
to believe that these animals possess all the mental facul- 
ties that man possesses only in a smaller degree. 

** Meantime, we have to remember that the nervous 
system of the higher animals seems to afford all the 
necessary basis for the appearance and development of 
the simpler forms of rational consciousness, and the only 
difference in these processes, as compared with those of 
man, of which we can speak dogmatically and with en- 
tire confidence is the difference in complexity and elab- 
oration. ' ^ 

Distinguishing Element of Intuition. — In intuition 
the mind deals with both aspects of an object of con- 
sciousness, the particular and the universal. And the 
attitude of the mind toward the object is such as to re- 
gard these aspects of equal worth. In no other stage of 
knowing does the mind do this. The distinguishing ele- 
ment of intuition is as follows: 

The mind regards the particular and universal as- 
pects of objects with equal stress. 



Studies in Psychology 323 

The Advance of Intuition, — The advances of intui- 
tion over the other stages of knowing are : 

1. The mind in intuition knows objects most com- 
pletely; that is, most fully in both aspects, 

2. The mind knows objects most easily. 

3. The mind knows objects most implicitly. 

This knowing an object most easily, most implicitly 
with both the particular and universal aspects of the 
object stressed is the highest kind of knowing possible 
and with it the development of knowing ends. 

Read: 

1. Angeirs Psychology, pp. 294-309, 251-255. 

2. Dewey's Psychology, pp. 235-245. 

3. Pillsbury's Essentials of Psychology, pp. 238- 
257. 

4. Colvin and Bagley's Human Behavior, pp. 126- 
164. 



INDEX 



Axones, 30 

Axones and Dendrons, 29 

Activity — 

Nature of, 50 

Voluntary, 52 

Involuntary, 52 
Reflex, 53 
Process, 54 

Mental, 112 
Association Centers, 66 
Aphasia, 70 
Attribute, 73 

Particular, 74 

Common, 75 
Of Mind, 76, 77 
Attention, 86 

Conditions of, 88 

Classes of, 90, 91 

Basis of, 93 

Importance of, 98 
Apperception, 102 

Definition of, 104 

Laws of, 105 

And Sense-perception, 178 
Association, 189, 191 

Laws of, 193 

Results of, 201 
Animal Intelligence, 320 
Brain, Divisions, 44 

Medulla oblongata, 44 

Cerebellum, 45 

Cerebrum, 46-49 

Injury and Conscious- 
ness, 60 

Effect of Injury on Mind, 
68 

Blood and Mind, 61 

Size and Intelligence, 70 



Convolutions and Intel- 
lectual Capacity, 71 

Growth and Development, 
72 

Localization of Functions, 
62 

Motor Zone, 63 

Sensory Brain Areas, 63 
Belief, 288 
Center of Speech, 63 
Consciousness, 77, 78 

Fields of, 81, 82 

Functions of, 83 

Education of, 84 
Concentration, 99 
Correlation, law of, 213 
Concept, 259-264 
Concept and Image, 265 
Conception, 253 

Steps in, 254 

Advance in, 266 

Distinguishing element, 
282 
Dendrons, 29 

Discriminating and Unify- 
ing, 114 
Desire, 123 
Dreams, 219 
Definition, 267, 271 

Laws of, 272 

Errors in, 273 

Value of, 275 

Advance of, 277 

Distinguishing Element, 
282 
Doubt, 289 
Eye, 148-155 
Ear, 146-148 



326 



INDEX 



Feeling, 116-118 

Forms of, 119 

Function of, 120 

Intellect and Will, 125 
Forgetting, 219 
Fancy, 242 
Hate, 120 
Hallucination, 176 
Ideas, 263 
Illusion, 175 
Image, 226 

Kinds of, 227 
Imagination, 225 

Reproductive, 231 

Mechanical, 232 

Construction, 233 

Limits of, 237 

Influence of, on Body, 238 

Classes, 241 

Cultivation of, 243 

Dangers of, 245 

Advance of, 247 

Distinguishing element, 
281 
Impulse, 128 
Impulsive action, 57 
Indifference, 120 
Interest, 93 

Classes, 93 

Law of, 96 
Introspection, 21 
Intellect, Feeling and Will, 

125 
Induction, 296-297 
Intuition, 312-315 

Distinguishing Element, 
322 

Advance of, 323 
Intuition and Instinct, 318 
Instinct, 216-219 
Iterativeness, 108 

Definition, 109 

Function, 109 
Judgment, 279, 283 

Steps in, 284 

Product of, 285 



Element of, 285 

Intention and extension, 
286 

Distinguishing Element, 
290 

Symbol of, 290 
Knowing, 113 

Definition, 114, 115 

Function, 115 

Development of, 156 

Stages of, 159, 292 
Character of, 279 
Distinguishing Ele- 
ment, 280 
Unity of, 303 

Functions of, 124 

Reasoning in lower, 303 
Love, 119 

Local Sign, 134, 145 
Mind, 22 
Mind and Body, 59 

Effect of Suggestion, 59 
Mastery of Subject, 106 
Mental Activity, 112 

Classes of, 112 

Order of, 113 
Memory, 185 

Elements of, 186 

Laws of, 188 

Classes of, 205 

Cultivation of, 210 

Advance of, 223 

Involved in Sense-percep- 
tion, 223 

Distinguishing Element, 
281 
Mnemonics, 218 
Mind Wandering, 220 
Nerve Cell, 26 

Number, 28 

Connections, 29 
Neurones, 26 

Classes, 29 
Nervous System, 38 

Composition, 38 

Action of, 38 



INDEX 



327 



Centers and Ganglia, 39 
Functions of, 40 
Controlling Impulses, 40 
Storehouse of Energy, 40 
Division of, 41 
Peripheral, 41 
Central, 42 
Spinal Cord, 42, 43 

Function of, 44 
Spinal Nerves, 43, 44 
Brain, 44-49, 60, 68 
Nerves and Consciousness 

61 
Object, 79 

Classes, 80 
Organ of Sight, 149 

Accommodation of, 150 
Phenomena, Mental 12 

Physical, 13 
Psychology, Definition, 15 
Subject-Matter, 16 
Methods of, 17 

Introspective, 17 
Experimental, 19 
Comparative, 20 
Objective, 21 
Phrenology, 66 
Percept, 174 
Rhythm, 109-111 
Relation, 202 
Recognition, 205 
Remembrance of Particular, 
206 

Of General, 207 
Recollection, 208 
Reasoning, 292 

Classes of, 293-294 
Distinguishing Element, 

301 
Advance, 301 
Science, meaning, 11 

Presupposition of 12 
Self- Activity, 106 
Definition, 107 
Law of, 108 
Senses, 137 



Special, 138 

Temperature, 139 
Muscular, 140 
Taste, 141 
Smell, 142 
Touch, 143 
Hearing, 146 

Functions of, 148 
Sight, 148 

Stimulus, 149 
Sensation, 31, 36-37 
Stimulus, 32, 128 
Excitation of Nerve 

Ending, 33 
Transmission of Im- 
pulse, 33 
Disturbance in Brain, 

35 
Mental Disturbance, 35 
Importance of, 37 
Nature of, 127 
Definition, 128 
Classes, 129 
Characteristics, 129 
Limits of, 132 
Threshold of, 132 
Quality, 129 
Intensity, 133 
Duration, 133 
Aspects of, 134 
Comparison of General 

and Special, 135 
Relation to Object, 164 
Sense-Perception, 156, 159 
Object of, 162 
Classes, 165 
Reasoning in, 173 
Products of, 174 
And Apperception, 178 
Cultivation of, 178-184 
Distinguishing Element, 
280 
Sounds, 146 
Stimulus, 32-35, 128 
Suggestion, 59, 203 
Syllogism, 299 



328 



INDEX 



Figures of, 300 
Systematization, 303 
Nature of, 305 
Products of, 306 
Distinguishing Element, 

306 
Advance, 307 



Tones, 146 
Truth, 287 
Unit of Investigation, 24 

How Studied, 25 
Voluntary Action, 52, 57 
Willing, 121 

Definition, 122 




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